

Heini Maria Harala

## Good Bye Ice, Welcome Business Opportunities?

*Process Tracing Analysis on the Change of the Finnish Arctic Discourse 2011-2013*

*University of Tampere, Finland*

*School of Management, International Relations*

*Master's Thesis, June 2014*

University of Tampere  
School of Management

HARALA, HEINI MARIA: Good Bye Ice, Welcome Business Opportunities? Process Tracing Analysis on the Change of the Finnish Arctic Discourse 2011-2013

Master's thesis, p. 139.

International Relations

June 2014

---

This thesis covers the fast-changing political and environmental climate of the Arctic region, and how the development has affected the Arctic discourse, created in Finnish media and public discussions in the period 2011-2013. The impact of global warming, which, thanks to the reseeding sea ice, is opening up the Arctic region at an unprecedented rate provide the researchers within the field of Arctic IR and governance a continuously changing cocktail of economic interests, natural considerations and nation state power-politics.

In the fall 2013 Arctic discussion in Finland unfolded to an entirely new due to a combination of developments in the national Arctic policymaking, and unexpected international and national events in the Arctic politics. The Finnish Government released its new Arctic strategy in October 2013 and around the same time, in September 2013, 30 international, Greenpeace activists attempted to board a Russian oil drilling platform in the Pechora Sea in order to protest against oil drilling activities in the Arctic. Greenpeace crew was imprisonment in Russia for over two months, and the crew included also one Finnish activist Sini Saarela, who gave activist fighting against the Arctic oil drilling a 'Finnish face' and brought environmental problems in the Arctic 'closer' to the Finnish people. Events of the fall 2013 caused a media tornado, which invigorated Arctic interest also in the Finnish media. During the 2013, Arctic question were covered by wider range of Finnish media outlets than during any previous years since the turn of the millennium, which is why the discourse building before those events was chosen to the time frame of this master thesis project.

Through an extensive examination of mainstream media, political speeches, interviews and academia about the developments in the High North this paper provides an up-to-date snapshot of the Arctic political climate in Finland, as well as an process-tracing case study of the change in Arctic discourse in Finland.

Based on the theory of critical geopolitics, which – contrary to traditional geopolitics – states that discourse matters, and that change in discourse reflect change in politics, this thesis concludes that there has been a great increase in interest in the Arctic development in the timespan investigated. I have reached this result through the untraditional method

applied in the Finnish IR studies, the process tracing method, which has allowed me to incorporate large amounts of data, in order to investigate causal mechanisms behind the selected social phenomena. Casual connections have been investigated through selected variables ('environmental changes', 'economic prospects' and 'international Arctic'), which I anticipated to be the most essential factors shaping the change in the Arctic discourse.

Furthermore, and more interestingly, though the academic consensus has continued to reflect a growing concern about the speed in which the climate change occurs in the Arctic the discourse in Finland showed a trend towards more focus on the economic opportunities these changes present. This is fascinating, as Finland was among the first to actively promote a policy of environmental custodians in the early days of international cooperation in the Arctic. However, as with most academic research, my results are mixed, as is to be expected when official Finland's public statements are not squared off. As my analysis shows, the different ministries in Finland are pushing for different agendas, which muddles the picture. What is a clear fact however, is that the frequency of the business- and economic driven argument, favoring Finland's pursuit of economic success in the Arctic, has increased.

## **TABLE OF CONTENT**

<b>1. INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SELECTED RESEARCH DATA</b>	<b>5</b>
1.1.1. RESEARCH DATA	8
<b>1.2. PROCESS TRACING: SOMETHING NEW?</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>2. BACKGROUND: DEFINING THE ARCTIC</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>2.1. FEW FACTS AND SEVERAL DISCOURSES OF THE ARCTIC REGION</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>2.2. DEFINING ARCTIC PARADOX</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>3. LOOKING BACK: PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE ARCTIC IR</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>3.1. ACADEMIC 'ARCTIC STORM'</b>	<b>17</b>
3.1.1. ARCTIC PARADIGM OF THE DECADE: COOPERATION VS. CONFLICT	19
<b>3.2. DOES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES CREATE A RISK TO 'PAX ARCTICA'?</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>3.3. ILLULLISAT, NUUK AND KIRUNA</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>3.4. FINLAND IN ARCTIC IR</b>	<b>24</b>
3.4.1. THE ARCTIC 2.0	28
<b>3.5. MY CONTRIBUTION TO THE ARCTIC IR: OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>4.1. FROM GEOPOLITICS TO CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS</b>	<b>33</b>
4.1.1. POST-MODERNISM BEHIND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS	36
4.1.2. DISCOURSE IN CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS	37
<b>4.2. THREE PATHS TO RECONSTRUCT GEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>4.3. CRITICISM OF CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>5. METHODOLOGY: PROCESS-TRACING AS A CASE STUDY METHOD</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>5.1. CASE STUDY IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH</b>	<b>47</b>
5.1.1. TESTING, DEVELOPING AND BUILDING THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS	48
<b>5.2. PRESENTING THE CASE: FINLAND AND THE CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC DISCOURSE IN 2011-2013</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>5.3. NUTS-AND-BOLTS OF PROCESS TRACING</b>	<b>52</b>
5.3.1. DEFINING VARIABLES	53

<b>5.4. BRIDGING POST-POSITIVIST THEORY TO POSITIVIST METHODOLOGY</b>	<b>56</b>
5.4.1. CONTEXT AND CAUSAL MECHANISMS	58
5.4.2. HOW PROCESS TRACING AND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS WORK AS RESEARCH PARTNERS?	59
<b><u>6. RESEARCH DATA: DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARCTIC DISCOURSE IN FINLAND FROM 2011 TO 2013</u></b>	<b><u>61</u></b>
<b>6.1. REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE DATA</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>6.2. YEAR 2011: “AS AN ARCTIC COUNTRY, FINLAND IS A NATURAL ACTOR IN THE REGION”</b>	<b>64</b>
6.2.1. PARTNERS, COMPETITORS AND ENEMIES: DISCUSSION ON THE ARCTIC FOREIGN RELATIONS ANNO 2011	67
6.2.2. FINNISH MINISTERS ON THE ARCTIC ROAD	71
6.2.3. DOMESTIC POLITICS WEAKENS THE ARCTIC AGENDA	74
<b>6.3. YEAR 2012: INTEREST TOWARDS THE ARCTIC INCREASES</b>	<b>75</b>
6.3.1. ALL EYES ARE ON THE ARCTIC	75
6.3.2. BUSINESS, BUSINESS, BUSINESS. BUT LET’S NOT FORGET THE ENVIRONMENT	78
6.3.3. STATE OF THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT CONCERNS MINISTER NIINISTÖ	80
6.3.4. HIGH TIME FOR THE FINLAND’S ARCTIC AWAKENING	81
6.3.5. GEOPOLITICS OF “THE NEW ARCTIC”	81
6.3.6. MINISTER TUOMIOJA: CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERNS	83
6.3.7. LOBBING EU AND SEEKING NEW PARTNERSHIPS FROM NORWAY	85
6.3.8. FINLAND BOLSTERS ITS ARCTIC COOPERATION WITH NORWAY	87
<b>6.4. YEAR 2013: ARCTIC ISSUES ENTERING THE MAIN STAGE</b>	<b>89</b>
6.4.1. SPRING 2013	89
6.4.2. ARCTIC MILESTONES IN 2013: MINISTERIAL MEETING IN KIRUNA	91
6.4.3. SUMMER 2013: ‘CALM’ BEFORE THE (ARCTIC) STORM	93
6.4.4. SAME STRATEGY, VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS	93
6.4.5. THE ARCTIC RAILWAY: FINLAND’S GATEWAY TO THE ARCTIC OCEAN?	96
6.4.6. FINNISH ICEBREAKERS: DOOM OF THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT, OR THE SAVIOR OF THE FINNISH ECONOMY?	98
6.4.7. FINLAND’S ARCTIC EPIPHANY BADLY BELATED?	100
6.4.8. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE GOLDEN COIN: ENVIRONMENTALISTS GET ACTIVATED	102
<b><u>7. ANALYSIS</u></b>	<b><u>105</u></b>

<b>7.1. YEAR 2011</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>7.2. YEAR 2012</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>7.3. YEAR 2013</b>	<b>112</b>
<b>8. CONCLUSIONS</b>	<b>118</b>
<b>9. RESEARCH DATA, IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>10. BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>132</b>

## 1. Introduction

*“As Finland is one of the world’s northernmost countries with one third of our territory above the Arctic Circle, it is natural for us to take our Arctic commitments seriously.”*  
(Pertti Torstila 2011, *Arctic Frontiers*)

A growing significance of the Arctic affairs appeared to the politicians and the public audience in Finland in the fall of 2013 (Mikkola 2014), when media intensively followed Greenpeace activist Sini Saarela’s story in the Russian Arctic Greenpeace ‘attack’ against the Russian oil rig was accused to be thoroughly planned media stunt, where the imprisoned activists gave ‘faces’ to the environmental injustices happening in the Russian Arctic, but it is easy to argue it worked: Finnish Arctic Center research institution reported the amount of ‘hits’ on discussion about the Finland’s position and perception the Arctic affairs more than doubled during the 2013 compared to previous years<sup>1</sup>.

Arctic affairs is however not a new area of interest in the Finnish politics. After the famous Murmansk speech given by General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, in Murmansk in 1987, Northern nations turned their interest towards the Arctic environment and called for international cooperation on this issue. Finland took an active role in international Arctic cooperation as of its early days, and Arctic affairs have stayed high on Finland’s political agenda ever since. Internationally, the so-called ‘Rovaniemi process’ started a unique route to rediscover dialog between East and West in the post-Cold War world. Issues of environmental cooperation in the Arctic were perceived as a ‘low-tension’ area and as a forum for easier collaboration during antagonistic atmosphere of the time (Palosaari 2011, 3). The ‘Rovaniemi process’ resulted in the formulation of the

---

<sup>1</sup> University of Lapland’s ArcticFinland- media monitoring site documented 42 articles (including news, articles, speeches and blog postings) on Finnish Arctic discussion in 2012; in 2013 same site had 216 hits in the same category (ArcticFinland 2014). ArcticFinland-forum will be used as a primary source for data that I will analyze later in this thesis.

Environmental Protection Strategy (IASC) for the Arctic region in 1991, and finally, in 1996, the establishment of the Arctic Council (AC), which was agreed upon in the Ottawa Declaration by the world's eight states with territory north of the Arctic Circle<sup>2</sup> (Palosaari 2011, 3-4).

Since the early days of international Arctic politics, this branch of international affairs have had several dimensions, in Finland and globally, and the focus on the Arctic politics shifts depending on the perspective the questions are observed from. Security questions, local indigenous people's rights, EU's Northern Dimension and debate between economic benefits environment challenges are often discussed in Arctic policymaking. Despite changing attributes, defining the Arctic politics, Finland's Arctic strategy from 2013 summarizes how important role the Arctic has on the Finnish political agenda:

*“Arctic (affairs) are a high priority in Finland's foreign policy, Finland's role in international affairs and country brand. (Valtionneuvosto 2013)”.*

Though focus have shifted in the international Arctic political environment rather frequently along the years, current environmental and economic changes in the region have significantly pushed the Arctic affairs higher on both the Arctic, and the non-Arctic states' daily agenda. Behind the current, international and national Arctic boost are ongoing changes in global climate conditions. That climate change is real, and happening right now, and especially real in the complex Arctic environment, has been documented numerous times (United Nations Environmental Programme 2013). That being said, the focus in this thesis is on the change in Arctic politics, which is triggered by current environmental changes in the region today. Warming climate is not just altering the existing fragile environment of the Arctic but affecting drastically the economic and political landscape of the region.

---

<sup>2</sup> These states are Canada, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, United States, Russia and Sweden.



Scientists from National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), together with the broad community of scholars and scientists, agree that the Arctic has warmed more than any other region over the past 30 years, and the effects of that warming are becoming more and more observable in Arctic ecosystems on the land and in the sea. Environmental changes in the polar areas, most concretely warming of the Arctic climate, have resulted in the rapid diminishing of the Arctic sea ice cap. In 2012, international community became widely aware of Arctic ice melt, and its consequences<sup>3</sup>, when NSIDC announced that the extent of the Arctic ice was the lowest ever to have been recorded in the Arctic history. In September 2012 ice fell below 4.00 million square kilometers for the first time in the 33-year satellite records. (National Snow and Ice Data Center 2012)

Emerging ‘Arctic treasures’ are still covered with ice but buzz around them is already blazing. Predictions of Arctic energy sources are based only on estimates, but a widely cited study conducted by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) from 2008 suggests that the Arctic may contain approximately 13 % of the global mean estimate of undiscovered oil and some 30 % of the global undiscovered gas. That oil amount equals approximately 618 billion barrels of oil (BBO). (U.S. Geological Survey 2008) The undiscovered oil in the Arctic equals approximately 618 billion barrels of oil (BBO) (U.S. Geological Survey 2008). Naturally, these figures vary from source to source, but scientists generally agree, that current estimates of total amount of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic vary between 3 % and 25 % of the world’s total undiscovered oil and gas reserves (Hong 2011).

Finland is one of those states, which have expressed their economic interest towards the Arctic. Finland states its detailed visions for the economic development in the Arctic in several action points on its Arctic strategy from 2013. According to the strategy, Finland’s Arctic profile is based on the following vision:

---

<sup>3</sup> The Guardian, Feb. 13, 2013 “Arctic needs protection from resource rush as ice melts, says UN”  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/feb/18/arctic-protection-resource-rush>  
Yle uutiset Sept. 9, 2012 “Arctic Sea ice melts record low (Arktinen merijää sulanut ennätyspieneksi)”  
[http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktinen\\_merijaa\\_sulanut\\_ennatyspieneksi/6301853](http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktinen_merijaa_sulanut_ennatyspieneksi/6301853).

*“Finland is an active Arctic actor with the ability to reconcile the limitations imposed by the Arctic environment with the related business opportunities. It can do so in a sustainable manner, based on international cooperation.”* (The Arctic Strategy of Finland 2013, 7-8)

In this thesis I focus on the rhetorical side of the environment vs. economy ‘battle’, which creates problematic paradigms such as the previous quote about Finland’s visions for the Arctic; “the ability to reconcile the limitations imposed by the Arctic environment with the related business opportunities” suggest that Finland aims to accommodate the often conflicting economic and the environmental interest in its Arctic politics without neglecting one or another. With this thesis I aim to show how arguments and reasoning behind the potential Arctic business opportunities have change the understanding of the environmental challenges emerging at the region due to the warming climate, and how those changes have shaped Arctic discourse in Finland.

As laid out in the arguments above, environmental changes and economic prospects are key factors in the future of the Arctic. Therefore I have limited the scope of this thesis to investigations on how the warming Arctic shapes the Arctic discourse in Finland, and especially which factors have affected the discourse the most. *In other words, my aim is to track changes that happened in the Finnish Arctic discourse between the first and the second Arctic strategy, during 2011-2013.* I forecast that the changes in the discourse mainly emerging from divided understandings of severity of the paradox between melting Arctic sea ice and its affects on the prospects for commercial activities, e.g. hydrocarbon resources, as well as on new shipping routes. This thesis investigates how the latest, accelerating changes in Arctic environment - and consequently in geopolitics of the region - have influenced Arctic discourse, and changed the proportions of environmental and economic arguments represented in Finnish Arctic discussion.

## **1.1. Research Question and Selected Research Data**

I argue that changes in the Arctic environment have effected the (geo)political and (geo)economical landscapes of the region faster than anyone has expected, which has caused a political, business and media race to the region. The scientific community as well as political actors carefully monitor changes in the Arctic, in order to stay informed, and on top of potential drastic influences these changes might have in geopolitical status of the High North. During these times of transformation in the region, the states bordering the Arctic are not necessarily the only actors who fight for power in the Arctic. Commercial actors, such as shipping companies, oil and gas extractors as well as icebreaker companies are getting increasingly interested about the Arctic's markets. Commercial actors have the necessary know-how and capital to get involved in the Arctic economic affairs, which make them attractive partners to the state actors in costly Arctic business projects, and give them potential to strong leverage in lobbying Arctic decision making processes (Aaltonen&Loescher, 2013).

Though the Cold War, and consequently, the “golden era” of geopolitics in IR is over, meaning of geography has not diminished in the studies of international politics. However IR studies influenced by postmodernism in social sciences, such as studies of critical geopolitics, understand geography as an constantly evolving concept that is socially constructed in interactions of various actors (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 2) First and foremost, the Arctic region is geographical area, but ways of defining its borders or its “location”, in the periphery vs. in the center of the global politics, shifts significantly depending on the framework the Arctic is discussed in.

It is exactly those multiple dimensions and, sort of a mysterious nature of the Arctic geography (and nature) that has always attracted new actors to the region since the early polar explores. Today's academia's, politicians' and the corporate world's fascination over the region can be explained by this truly unique location that the Arctic has in the world, both geographically and politically. For instance, the Arctic region is the only place on the globe that connects the three continents (Europe, Asia and North America),

which consequently creates unique potential to develop logistic connections between these three major powers of the world economy (Sørensen 2013, 2-3). If the Arctic ice keeps diminishing in its current pace, prospects for commercial utilization of new shipping routes<sup>4</sup> becomes ever more realistic, cutting thousands of kilometers off the current route between Asia and Europe (Borgerson 2008, 67-71). Unique location brings unique challenges as well as great responsibilities in terms of defining political and legislative convention to the region, where the group of involved actors is highly diverse (e.g. indigenous peoples vs. private oil companies) and decisions of today can have unforeseeable impact to the future of the whole globe.

Based on the arguments above about the current developments in the Arctic, I have narrowed my research question to following:

**How have recent environmental changes *and* today's economic prospects shaped the Arctic discourse in Finland from 2011 to 2013? Process tracing analysis of the change in the Finnish Arctic discourse.**

As described earlier the Arctic region is undergoing environmental changes that enables new business opportunities to rise at the region, which I argue to change the way of framing the Arctic issues, and will affect far-reaching to the practice of Arctic politics. Through process tracing I will track down how Finnish Arctic discourse changed from 2011 to 2013, and which were the causes that triggered these changes. Media and other public discussion around widely covered, current Arctic events, such as Greenpeace's "Save the Arctic"-attack in September, 2013 are analyzed as a part of the process that lead to the Arctic discourse as it appears today in Finland.

---

<sup>4</sup> The two possible Arctic shipping routes, the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage, or Northern Sea Route represent a 7000-kilometer shortcut, or as much as a 50 % reduction compared to the current route between Europe and Asia (and much more for the cargo ships and oil tankers too large to enter the Panama Canal). From Finland's perspective increasing cargo traffic through Northern Sea Route could open potential to develop infrastructure in the Arctic Finland to support logistics to and from a new commercial harbor on the Arctic Sea. (Aaltonen&Loescher 20-21, 2013)

In order to bring international perspective to this topic, I will also conclude, on the basis of the selected data, whether it is beneficial to Finland to bandwagon heavier Arctic players, such as Norway, and pursue an economically ambitious plan in the Arctic, or if an ‘environmental path’ could provide Finland more beneficial ways in a chase of national success in the future Arctic?

My hypothesis states that the frequency of economic-driven arguments have increased in the Arctic discussion in Finland at the expense of an earlier focus on the environment, which reflects the direction where Finnish Arctic politics is heading. Though environmental conservation and economic prospects are often seen as conflicting sides of the same case, with this thesis I want to investigate if that is the case in Finnish Arctic discussion as well, or if Finland is actually looking for possibilities to adjust business-minded vision in order to respect sustainable environmental development in the region. What really triggered my interest was an urge to scrutinize, *which reasons or factors have caused the shift in Arctic discourse in Finland*, while in the global scale, melting of the Arctic sea-ice, and consequential “Arctic gold rush” are already often provided as an main factors behind the current understanding of the Arctic discourse. However, the changes in the Finnish Arctic discourse have not been investigated by any IR scholars, which makes it fruitful and rewarding start point to this master thesis project.

In addition to the “political hotness” of this topic, I have thorough personal, academic and professional interest towards the Arctic politics, which inspired me to select this topic to my thesis. I have being involved, academically and professionally, in the Arctic affairs in Finland, Canada and Denmark since 2008, and have learned that the Arctic is a geographical space with a wide range political and environmental controversies, as well a an extraordinary place for global cooperation, which could set ‘an example model’ for international cooperation in other regions in the world as well.

Combination of personal and professional experience from different Arctic countries have given me an excellent opportunity to follow daily media and public discussions about the Arctic related affair in a North-American context as well as in a broader Nordic

context, and a chance to observe the differences, as well as similarities, used in argumentation. Although as a native Finn, I was inspired to scrutinize the causalities and factors, *which shape the Arctic discourse in Finland*, because it has not been studied thoroughly before and due to Finland's special geographical position in the Europe. Finland's location in the eastern boarder of the EU and the Nordics, as well as its position in the far North of Europe, has always dominated its foreign and domestic politics, as well as defined Finnish national identity. Geography's multiple meanings as a part of politics, and policymaking is widely analysed by scholars of critical geopolitics, which is why I chose it as theoretical framework of this study. Study of discourses is in the core of critical geopolitics (e.g. Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998) and I argue that by analyzing discourses we can understand better the changes emerging in geopolitical relations. Analysis of the current 'status' of the Finnish Arctic discourse provides an excellent case to evaluate, firstly how the change in argumentation happened, and secondly to evaluate how the changed discourse will affect the geopolitics of the region.

Critical geopolitics suggests that discourses of a region or a political space, such as the Arctic, define politics and policymaking on that specific field. According to this theory, discourses are socially constructed in every day interactions between various actors such as in a relationship between media and audience. (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992) In this thesis I approach geography not as a self-evident concept, but instead as a result of historical and social knowledge formulation process that is constantly developing. (G. Ó Tuathail 1999, 108-109). These theoretical assumptions locate my study to the post-modern tradition in the international affairs, and therefore, it follows constructivist understanding of the academic studies of International Relations.

#### **1.1.1. Research data**

My study is conducted as a process tracing case in which I analyze a wide array of media sources, including every major public speech on the subject, as well as blog posts on Finland's new Arctic strategy. These sources represent my primary data to represent public and official understanding of the Arctic in Finland. All the data is collected from the 'ArcticFinland-portal' (<http://www.arcticfinland.fi/en>), which is a discussion and media-monitoring portal aimed at Finnish political society for providing a basis for

discussions on research and economical development in the Arctic. ArcticFinland is monitored by the Science Communications Unit of the Arctic Centre at University of Lapland (ArcticFinland 2013). ArcticFinland collects and publishes links to Arctic related topics Finnish media and speeches given by decision makers in Finnish politics and business community (ArcticFinland 2013). My research focuses on articles etc. published on the portal between 1.1.2011-31.12.2013. I have chosen to narrow the scope of this paper to this particular time frame, because it is the time period between release of the first and the second Finnish Arctic strategies and included historical boost in public interest towards the Arctic politics in the fall 2013. The media storm that was kicked up by the dispute between Russia and Greenpeace (and it spillover over to the diplomatic community of every country who had a member of the crew detained in the incident) in the wake of their 'Save the Arctic'-campaign, which created excellent momentum for investigations of possible changes in Finnish Arctic politics, at least on discursive level, during the last three years. In other words my aim has been to answer an important question of how the change happened in the Arctic discourse in Finland.

I acknowledge that selection of articles and speeches on ArcticFinland-portal is not absolutely including all the media notions on the Arctic in Finland, and I accept that some arguments on Finnish discussion are left out due to this method of selecting data. Nevertheless I am positive that the large quantity and variety of selected media sources and speeches/remarks, together with an unprecedented use of process tracing method in mapping the arguments presented in the selected data, will provide an ample platform for analysis of the development of Arctic discourse in Finland, to be presented in this Master thesis research.

## **1.2. Process Tracing: Something New?**

By combining a research design of process tracing, which is a one type of a case study method, to critical geopolitics, my theoretical approach, I will break the conventional division between positivist and post-positivist research traditions. The reason for this exceptional theory-method -combination is to produce a new perspective on discourse as a research object. Process tracing aims to bring theoretical assumptions closer to 'real

action', closer to what actually happens in political and social interactions instead of forcing real events to strict theoretical preconditions. As this study also shows, process tracing is based on a collection of huge amount of research data, which constructs the process itself, and the researcher's role is to seek for explanations to the selected social phenomena by setting hypotheses and exploring mechanisms about how interactions become as they are today (Checkel 2005, 4).

Mechanisms connect things and events, which together construct a process. Tracing a process happens in a theoretically informed way, where theoretical assumptions and hypotheses are leading the research. Process tracing is strongest on seeking for explanations to questions of *how* something happened and exploring *interactions* between events. (Checkel 2005, 4-5)

In hindsight process tracing method proved to be a highly challenging research method due to its requirements for extensive variation of/and abundance in research data. The chosen methodology demands thorough investigation of research data thus keeping the analysis in the scope of this thesis, I chose to narrow the period of observation to the relatively short time period, years 2011-2013. The years between 2011 and 2013 were event-filled in the Finnish Arctic-front, as well as on the global scene. Clear indication of Finland's activation on the Arctic affairs was the Prime Minister of Finland, Jyrki Katainen's announcement to establish the Arctic Working Group in October 2012. The Working Group's mission was to constitute a new Arctic strategy for Finland. Katainen pledged Arctic affairs to be covered thoroughly in the Government's new Action plan, which also envisioned Arctic region's gained importance Finland's economical and political agenda (Prime Minister's Office 2013).

During 2011-2013 attention of the the Finnish media towards the Arctic affairs accelerated significantly due to a series of controversial international events in the Arctic, in which Finland was also involved. One of them was the start of the cooperation between the Finnish icebreaker company Arctia Shipping and international energy-giant



Royal Shell in Arctic oil exploration outside of the coast of Alaska in March 2012<sup>5</sup> (Arctia Shipping 2011). Another Arctic event, which attracted great deal of media attention, was the Greenpeace ‘attack’ against a Russian oilrig in Pechora Sea in the fall of 2013<sup>6</sup>. My research data will give a more detailed outlook of the happenings in the Arctic region that triggered public interest during the years of 2011-2013.

Increasing interest towards the Arctic issues was also shown in international media, which strengthens my argument to limit the timeframe of this study to only these three years; changes in the Arctic politics, environment and business happens extremely fast at the moment, and only a limited timeframe enabled me to conduct a coherent analysis of the changes in the discourse. International media followed also closely Arctic affairs during last three years. Among the other topics, the proceedings of Canada’s claims on Arctic resources, the Chinese involvement in the mining business in Greenland, and EU’s awakening in Arctic affairs were covered rather actively by international media<sup>7</sup>. Although Arctic agendas of different countries might first appear to been quite fragmented during the last few years, I argue that a change has happened in the argumentation related to environmental threats versus economic benefits as a consequence of melting Arctic sea ice. Arguments and reasoning *for* economic prospects of the Arctic activities was coming up more frequently, and I wanted to investigate if that change of a discourse were also unfolding in Finland.

Despite the methodological challenges that emerged along the research process, my personal and academic enthusiasm towards Arctic politics drove me through the process

---

<sup>5</sup> Arctia Shipping’s ice breakers’ participation stirred up active discussion in Greenpeace Finland about the projects’ environmental consequences: Greenpeace Finland, March 2012: “Letter to Minister Heidi Hautala: What is responsible business in the Arctic?” and February 2013 “Shell’s first right decision in the Arctic – What about Finland” (Greenpeace Suomi 2012/2013)

<sup>6</sup> See in this thesis: “9. Research Data” article 47 and 50.

<sup>7</sup> Danish journalist and author Martin Breum administrates a media monitoring portal on Danish and global Arctic affairs, where he collects articles and news from world of the Arctic:

<http://www.martinbreum.dk/index.asp?ID=59&TopID=1>

For example the following articles about the current topics in international Arctic affairs are found on the portal:

“China’s Arctic Strategy” (The Diplomat June 20, 2013), “Den store kineser i Grønland” (Information April 22, 2013),

“Rush for Arctic’s resources provokes territorial tussles” (The Guardian July 6, 2011), “Canada, Russia will share Arctic riches, scientist predicts” (Postmedia News October 8, 2012)

simultaneously strengthening my assumption that this kind of study was needed in the field of Arctic IR. Working with this topic for the past several years, academically and professionally, made me to realize that a thorough examination and review of Finnish Arctic discourse was *lacking* in order to back up the ongoing discussion. Though domestic and international Arctic affairs have been actively studied by Finnish academia, e.g. studies as the comparative study of the all the existing Arctic strategies by Lassi Heininen (2012), there was no up-to-date review of the Finnish Arctic discourse after the turbulent (as well as eventful) years in the Arctic IR after 2010.

The heating up of rhetoric (environment vs. economy) makes me argue that such an analysis as you have in your hands serves to strengthen the argument found in my hypotheses, and inspire to further studies on Arctic discourse in Finland. As I see it today, discussions around environmental and economic perspectives will accelerate in upcoming years and well-founded research needs to be conducted in questions arising.

Finally, I have deliberately decided to conduct my research in English because of lack of academic studies about Finnish Arctic politics in any other language than Finnish and unfortunately the studies conducted in Finnish will remain non accessible for non-Finnish audience. In addition, findings from my research data show that Finnish politicians, as well as private businesses, are increasingly reaching out towards Nordic, and global, Arctic cooperation, which I argue, requires academically evaluated analyses on Finnish Arctic rhetoric. My contribution in this regard has been to investigate and open up the discussion that reflect changes in Finnish Arctic discourse from environmental and economic perspectives to the international community. I argue that discussion, and policymaking, in the frame of environmental vs. economic future of the Arctic will raise the most vigorous debates in Finland as well as globally in upcoming years.

## **2. Background: Defining the Arctic**

As mentioned above even the geographical boundaries of the circumpolar world are still a highly debated subject. Considering the complexity of the geography, boundaries and

the people living in the area, it is obfuscating the matter to the point that no universally accepted definition of the Arctic, as a geographical region, exists. Contrary to Antarctica, which is a continent surrounded by an ocean, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by five different sovereign states (so-called littoral Arctic states). However, as mentioned earlier, eight different states have territory above the Arctic Circle<sup>8</sup>. Some argue that the most accurate definition to the Arctic is the territory north of the Arctic Circle, which lies at 66 degrees, 30 minutes North Latitude. However this definition omits vast areas in North America, which lie below the Arctic Circle but resemble the treeless tundra associated with the Arctic. In Asia and Europe one can find forests and climate north of the Arctic Circle, which is much warmer than what would normally be associated with the Arctic (Grant 2010, 6).

As well as definitions based on the latitudes, the others point to the fact that the Arctic cannot just be defined by an imaginary line but a definition must take into account the flora and fauna, e.g. the presence of permafrost<sup>9</sup> or tundra vegetation as well as the culture of the people living there, the southern limit of the ice cap during winter months or definitions by the temperature. In fact the Arctic could even be described as a cold and dry desert (Arctic Studies Center 2004).

## **2.1. Few Facts and Several Discourses of the Arctic region**

There are however a few undisputable facts about the region: the Arctic is roughly 14.5 million square km and covers both the Arctic Ocean – which might be the smallest of our oceans but also the least explored – and the surrounding land, including Spitsbergen, all of Greenland (Denmark) as well as the most northern parts of Alaska (US), Canada (Nunavut, Northwest Territories and Yukon), Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Russia. The area covers roughly 8 % of the Earth's total surface and includes land and sea territory that lies with the sovereign jurisdiction of eight countries (Suter 2010, 187).

---

<sup>8</sup> The Arctic Circle is an imaginary line which marks the line above which the sun does not set for at least one day during the summer and does not rise for at least one day during winter.

<sup>9</sup> Natural Resources Canada defines 'permafrost' "on the basis of temperature, as soil or rock that remains below 0°C throughout the year, and forms when the ground cools sufficiently in winter to produce a frozen layer that persists throughout the following summer" (Natural Resources Canada, 2007).

In this thesis I refer to these previous geographical facts, when I refer to the Arctic region and/or to the High North.

Though some scientific and geographical definitions of the Arctic can be agreed upon, some Arctic scholars, such as Carina Keskitalo argue that the Arctic as a region is constructed by *several* discourse<sup>10</sup>, which makes the study of discourses in the Arctic context meaningful (Keskitalo 2007, 187). Relying heavily on constructivist theory, this means that our view and understanding of what is ‘the Arctic’ is affected by how it is being discussed by, for e.g., politicians or the media. Keskitalo argues that regions are first created through language, i.e. discourse (Keskitalo 2007, 188). Theoretical framework of this thesis, critical geopolitics, aims to reveal discursive structures behind the geopolitics, and investigate how those determine frames, e.g. to foreign policy making. As I will demonstrate in this paper, the discussion on Arctic-related issues, not only within the eight Arctic states, but also by private sector, NGOs and the media, can have a great impact in the future’s geopolitics, and policy-making, in the Northern hemisphere.

As mentioned earlier, I approach Arctic discourse as a product of discussion and arguments presented in Finnish media, in academic debates as well as in official statements (e.g. speeches) given by Finnish political decision makers. I accept, that due to vast amount of data available about the chosen topic, I can provide an adequate analysis in the limited scope of this thesis, only by selecting carefully the perspective, from which I am evaluating the Arctic discourse. I chose to focus only on arguments related to *environmental and economic developments* in the Arctic, because I found these two perspectives the most opposite from each other’s, as well as conflicting sides of many debates in current Arctic affairs. I acknowledge that the discourse observed in this study, is not the only Arctic discourse produced in Finland but I find the chosen perspective the most current, and ‘the hottest’, approach to the Arctic discussion at the

---

<sup>10</sup> By ‘discourse’ I mean the way in which speaking about certain thing, e.g. the Arctic as a region of great importance, as well as the selection of things that is spoken about, is a way of highlighting certain subjects while obscuring others (see e.g. Foucault, 1974).

moment due to rapidly changing environmental and economic landscapes in the Arctic region. I argue that changes in environmental/economic argumentations are politically consequential in the future Arctic politics.

## **2.2. Defining Arctic Paradox**

The diminishing of the Arctic sea ice has resulted in an increase in questions related to environmental conservation and emerging new natural resources, which international community has not faced in the Arctic before. Prospects of oil and gas drilling in the Arctic force the international community to face the so-called Arctic paradox. Moral issues, from an environmental perspective, about the utilization of these new Arctic resources, and the potential implications for the region, clash with the potential economic possibilities, which undiscovered natural resources could create in the region. (Palosaari 2011, 7) However due to our dependency on fossil fuels, the world's demand for energy is rapidly increasing which makes supplying, dealing and trading energy an extremely important element in current international relations. Locating the last untapped energy reserves in the world can have an everlasting effect impact on the geopolitical balance in international community. Taking into consideration the serious impacts of the still ongoing financial crisis in Western economies, looming Arctic business opportunities appear very attractive for any actor with economic responsibilities (Aaltonen and Loescher 2013, 3-5).

Increased attention towards the natural resources in the Arctic, has, naturally, also raised awareness of the high risks posed by drilling in the Arctic waters, and the possibly catastrophic consequences on the Arctic region's fragile ecosystem in the case of a major oil leak. Environmental NGO's - Greenpeace being the most vocal of them - have increased their involvement in the region significantly during the last years. One of Greenpeace's most popular campaigns ever is named 'Save the Arctic' and has been active since 2009. It is based on a demand for an immediate moratorium on all oil and gas exploration and extraction in the Arctic (Greenpeace, 2013). The World Wide Fund for nature (WWF) and United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) have both articulated a related message, though often more diplomatically than Greenpeace, by

calling for increased research into the environmental impacts of Arctic oil exploration and exploitation (e.g. WWF.fi; UNEP.org). Both UNEP and WWF were granted the status of observers to the Arctic Council at the ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013, while Greenpeace's request was turned down at the very same meeting (Pelaudeix 2013).

The 'Save the Arctic'-campaign gained significant global media attention when a group of 30 Greenpeace activists, including a Finnish activist named Sini Saarela, got caught in their attempt to board a Russian oil-drilling platform in the Pechora Sea, Russia in September of 2013. Greenpeace's mission was to protest against oil exploration and future oil drilling activities in the Arctic by Russian energy company Gazprom. All 30 Greenpeace activists participating the operation were detained by the Russian Coast Guard and kept in prison for over two months in Russia. Finnish, as well as global media, followed closely the events surrounding the imprisoned Greenpeace activists in Murmansk. Sini Saarela was one of the two activists who managed to board the Russian vessel before they were detained. Saarinen was held in custody for over two months while Russian authorities pursued an investigation on piracy charges against the activist, however the charges changed from piracy to hooliganism during November 2013, and finally in December Russia dropped all charges against the activists (Greenpeace International)

As I will show in this paper, the 'Arctic media storm' in the fall of 2013 had a significant impact on Arctic discourse in Finland, and even further; I argue that it had a long-reaching impacts on the Finnish Arctic policymaking, which can only first be measured after policymaking in Arctic affairs goes forward in Finland. However, in order to understand the current changes in the Arctic discourse, it is important to study earlier academic discussions in international and Finnish Arctic politics, which I have summarized to next chapter.

### 3. Looking Back: Previous Studies of the Arctic IR

As presented earlier, the thesis focuses on Arctic as geopolitical space, and how it is (re)constructed in Finnish Arctic discourses. My research is based on thorough mapping of existing data from ArcticFinland, thus analysis will give a snapshot view how Finnish Arctic discourse have development during past three years, and reach also forward to forecast what the changes possible tell us from the future Arctic politics in Finland. Used method is called *process-tracing (case study)* that serves particularly well studies of complex series of events, which have resulted a certain outcome (Bennett 2002, 26-28). Process-tracing bases on carefully mapping of research data, i.e. documentation of the process that lead to X outcome, theoretically guided typologies as a tool to structure the analysis (ibid, p. 28-29), and in my view also a brief look to time before the chosen chain of events happened, is crucial part of a case study. In the following chapter I summarize previous studies in Arctic IR, anchoring Finnish Arctic discussions to wider international debate in Arctic politics, which will help to understand why new study perspective for the topic was also needed. During my thorough research within previous Arctic studies, I did not encounter any researchers to approach Arctic politics, nor discourses on the Arctic, with process tracing methodology.

#### 3.1. Academic ‘Arctic Storm’

Early years of 21st century started still ongoing surge of popular interest in the Arctic. A great deal of IR studies between 2000-2012 focused on “the scramble of the Arctic” (Sale og Potapov 2010) following the lines of classic division between realistic-liberal discourses<sup>11</sup> in Arctic affairs; division between speculations over natural resource or military conflicts and development of international regime and institutes to govern Arctic cooperation within regional and international players in the area. Clearly this was too simply categorization of the complex circumpolar affairs (Sørensen 2013), which has

---

<sup>11</sup> See more e.g. G., Borgeson. Scott, 2007 "Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming."; Huber, Robert, 2009 "Canada and the Changing International Arctic: At the Crossroads of Cooperation and Conflict."; Young, Oran 2011 "The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace? ." in order to mentioned few most cited studies contributing to tradional realisim-liberalism debate in Arctic IR.

lead us to today's diverse mix of studies in Arctic politics ranging from sovereignty-focused, heavily security oriented argumentation to analysis driven by concepts of region-building and strong inter-governmental cooperation all the way to evaluations on (geo-economics) impacts of Arctic resource exploitation to the global economy or the global climate<sup>12</sup>.

I argue that Arctic politics are still on the road that paves the way to the future of region, but based on empirical evidence and several academic studies, we finally can move on from alarmists' rhetoric of looming conflict and anarchy. Conflict/cooperation debate has become outdated proven by empirical evidence on Arctic nations' recent endeavors firstly to strengthen governing structures of the Arctic Council, and secondly to promote political consensus in their interstate relations. In contrary debates over the global environmental impact of glaciers melting vs. the utilization of the new Arctic oil and gas resources are heating inside the Arctic nations and also globally (Palosaari 2011, 2), which demands academic analysis and evaluations on impacts of these changes in Arctic's future.

However study of Arctic discourse in theoretical framework provided by critical geopolitics can easily fall into to repetition of arguments on security and sovereignty in Arctic interstate relations, yet this is valid discussion, but also widely covered by several Arctic students and scholars<sup>13</sup>. In this thesis my aim has been to seek for an explanation to *how* Arctic discourse has developed to today's form by evaluating the changes in rhetoric of Arctic politics in Finland. Consequently stepping forward from the realist-liberalist discourses to more explanatory outcomes of the future Arctic prospects still basis on the previous academic argumentation and studies conducted in Arctic IR, which this following outlook will summarize.

---

<sup>12</sup> Diversity of studies in Arctic IR and Political Science is vast, see more e.g.: A. Smith, Heather, 2010 "Choosing not to see: Canada, climate change, and the Arctic."; Schram Stokke, Olav, 2013 "Political Stability and Multi-level Governance in the Arctic"; Byers, Michael, 2010 "Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North."

<sup>13</sup> Recently IR graduate Marc Jacobsen covered in his extensive MA Dissertation (in September 2013) development of the Arctic security discourse analyzing political events from the Cold War years to Post-Illullisat era, from 1949-2013, in the Arctic international relations (Jacobsen 2013).



### 3.1.1. Arctic paradigm of the decade: Cooperation vs. Conflict

Since the turn of the millennium, the focus of Arctic researchers and observers has been the question of whether **cooperation** or **conflict** would dominate the future of the Arctic<sup>14</sup>. However, political change in the region is happening just as fast as the climate change, and the recent intensifications of governance structures in the Arctic Council and resource explorations e.g. at the Russian Arctic demonstrate a trend which has incited observers to step forward from Cold War paradigms<sup>15</sup>. These changes have forced scholars to start to evaluate the shifts in Arctic politics we are witnessing today (Young 2009, 73).

As one of the most prominent neorealist Arctic writers Scott Borgerson, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard, declared already in 2009: “The next few years will be critical in determining whether the region’s long-term future will be one of international harmony and the rule of law, or a Hobbesian free-for-all” (Borgerson 2009).

Until the late 2000s, (Huebert, Canada & the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security & Stewardship 2011) analysis on the Arctic international relations mainly followed the classic lines of scientific discourse based on realist and liberal tradition in IR (Heininen 2011). Analyses based on realist tradition presume that dominant attributes for political behavior in the Arctic are national interest and power, which are often related to territory and sovereignty (Huebert, Canada & the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security & Stewardship 2011). Studies following realist tradition defined Arctic region as “expansion field for national sovereignty” (Claes, Østerud & Harsem 2010) and a playfield of a “future resource race” (Borgerson 2008).

Despite the rhetoric of the Arctic as ‘a wild-wild west’ of the Northern hemisphere, are

---

<sup>14</sup> See e.g. Sven Holtmark, *Towards cooperation or conflict? Security in the High north*, NATO Defense College, No. 45, 2009; Oran Young, *Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the circumpolar north*, Polar Record, Vol. 45, 2009 or Ian Brosnan et al., *Cooperation or Conflict in a Changing Arctic?*, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol 42, 2011.

<sup>15</sup> The first major change was the thawing of international relations across the Arctic region following the end of the Cold War.

the Arctic waters and the seabed firmly covered by international agreements; the legal source for governing the maritime sovereignty issues in the Arctic, as well as in the rest of the world, is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)<sup>16</sup>, and in addition to UNCLOS, the Arctic seabed is governed the International Seabed Authority and the UN Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS) deals with the coastal states' claims to extend their territory past the EEZ (Koivurova 2008, 15). Nevertheless many of the arguments for increased conflict were examples of an oversimplification of 'complex multidimensional issues' or based on individual events taken out of context, this rhetoric of conflict has non-the less been dominating the debate in the Arctic IR, but which do not seem to have taken into account the recent years' developments in the region (Brosnan, Leschine og Miles 2011; Palosaari 2011, 1). The Russian flag-planting episode in 2007 was a widely covered example of individual, over-exaggerated political event that nourished conflict discourses in the Arctic discussions<sup>17</sup>.

### **3.2. Does Economic Opportunities Create a Risk to 'Pax Arctica'?**

Among the (neo)realist scholars, new economic opportunities have raised deep concerns about sustaining peace and consensus in the Arctic. Scott Borgerson published Arctic neorealist scholars' landmark article in *Foreign Affairs* titled 'Arctic Meltdown' in 2008, where he argues, that "the combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in possible oil and gas resources, and a poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for a toxic brew" (Borgerson 2008, 71). This trend continues in Canadian scholar Rob Huebert's writings, e.g. in his article from the 2009, 'Welcome to a New Era of Arctic Security' (Huebert 2010).

The neorealist discourse of increasing conflict reached mainstream media in 2007, when

---

<sup>16</sup> See the convention in full here: [http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm](http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm) (accessed October 14, 2011).

<sup>17</sup> In the summer of 2007 Russian scientist Artur Chilingarov descended to the seabed directly below the North Pole to plant a Russian flag in a media stunt to remind the world of Russia's Arctic aspirations and capabilities in the Arctic (Ingimundarson, 2010, 18).

record-low levels of sea ice were recorded, and the news coincided with the before-mentioned Russian flag planting. Same year Time Magazine ran a cover story titled '*Who Owns the Arctic*' in where the interest in the Arctic is described as "a perfect storm seeded with political opportunism, national pride, military muscle flexing, high energy prices and the arcane exigencies of international law" (Graff 2007). The article showcases the trend of ignoring the growing political importance of institutions, especially the AC, by focusing on a number of potential conflicts and the lack of an overarching international legal regime (ibid.). The scientific journal 'Nature' published in January 2008 an article called '*The next land rush*' where Cressey explains how the "nationalistic debate about who has rights to what in the Arctic" has been reignited since the turn of the millennium (Cressey, 2008).

Political developments in the Arctic move forward rapidly, and over the last five six years Arctic states have taken even further steps to strengthen consensus in Arctic affairs. Among the others, Arctic scholars Lassi Heininen and Anne Toft Sørensen, argue that especially following interstate cooperation initiatives highlight the cooperative curse, where Arctic international relations are heading (Sørensen 2013, 4-5):

1. Ilullisat Declaration formulated by the Arctic littoral states<sup>18</sup> in 2008 and
2. Barents Sea Treaty agreed between Norway and Russia completing 40-year-long negotiation process in 2010. (Sørensen 2013)

### **3.3. Ilullisat, Nuuk and Kiruna**

The latest environmental and political developments were first time illustrated by official agreement in Ilullisat conference in 2008, when the Arctic rhetoric got new tones in the global agenda. Naturally coastal states around the Arctic Ocean still emphasize(d) their national interests within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)<sup>19</sup> towards the region's

---

<sup>18</sup> Arctic coastal states, United States, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark, are often referred as 'the Arctic 5'.

<sup>19</sup> Today the littoral states follow the rules laid out in UNCLOS' Article 76 when trying to establish the ownership of the seabed that is beyond the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). In practice, it is the (CLCS) which deals with the submissions once the five coastal states all have handed in their claims. Coastal states can submit a claim to CLCS to extend its EEZ if it can prove that the seabed under the Arctic Ocean is a geological extension of the country's

potential natural resources, but at the same time they have recognized cooperation and diplomatic interactions as the most beneficial means in Arctic affairs. Deepening cooperation between ‘the Arctic Five’ was manifested in Illulisat declaration in 2008, where littoral states agreed to “ (...) take steps in accordance with international law both nationally and in cooperation among the five states and other interested parties” (Illullisat 2008, 2). By signing the Ilulissat Declaration in 2008, the members of ‘the Arctic 5’ agreed to resolve all current and future disputes in the Arctic region on the basis of the UNCLOS (Ilulissat Declaration 2008).

IR scholar interpreted outcomes of Illulisat as steps towards Arctic stability, peace and good governance (Rosamond 2009, 49), though not unconditionally. Critical voices did not see it purely as a positive development to the cooperation. Counter-arguments for harmony and cooperation in the High North stated that Illulisat reflects deepening cooperation only among the economically legitimate Arctic partners, which could mean weakening of Arctic Council and consequently leaving Iceland, Sweden and Finland out of the important decision making in Arctic affairs (Heininen 2011, 42).

As a response, and alternative, to the realists’ studies, neo-liberal interpretation of the Arctic relations rose in North American and European studies of IR. The analyses focused on institutionalized cooperation across the circumpolar region seeing the degree of cooperation as the key common variable (Nilsson, Hoogensen og Nicol 2010; Young 2010). Scholars flagging for the Arctic cooperation, such as Oran Young, approached Arctic relations through theoretical assumption on increasing benefits for all the actors when mutual interest were recognized (Oye 1985, 19). Such as mutual interest can e.g. be a peaceful Arctic region, which ensures equal opportunities for all the littoral states to explore economic possibilities in the region. As for a strong Arctic Council, as a core governing body in the region’s politics, ensures equal decision making as well as legislative rights to all the Arctic states in the questions related to the Arctic. Consequently AC’s members boosted the governing structures of the region in the

---

own continental shelf. At the time of writing Canada, United States and Danmark are still in the process of collecting geological data in order to establish their claims before presenting them to the CLCS.

Ministerial meeting in Nuuk (Greenland) in 2011, by agreeing to establish the Council's permanent secretariat to Tromsø in Norway (Nuuk Declaration 2011).

The establishment of the permanent secretariat finally suppressed the criticism towards the AC in terms of lacking institutional structure and constantly rotating personnel and shifting priorities on its agenda. Some scholars also accused the AC to be "decision-shaper rather than decision-maker" (Ingimundarson 2010, 18, Koivurova 2008, 14). In addition, Nuuk Declaration finalized negotiations on the Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (SAR Agreement), which represents the first legally-binding instrument crafted under the auspices of the soft-law body Arctic Council (Nuuk Declaration 2011, 2).

In the spring of 2013 the AC's Kiruna meeting reflected and amplified the fast pace of challenges that Arctic is facing today. Meeting emphasized the growing importance of the Arctic in world politics, which requires Arctic states' and whole international community's preparedness to be able to manage these changes (Pelaudeix 2013). Kiruna Declaration set out the Arctic Council priorities for improving economic and social conditions, acting on climate change, protecting the Arctic environment and strengthening the Arctic Council (Kiruna Declaration 2013).

But the AC has not been all consensus-minded in terms of streamlining Arctic states' political road maps for next decades. For instance, Canada has not been in favor of so-called internationalization of the Arctic that Sweden and Finland, instead, have strongly supported.<sup>20</sup> Subsequently the EU's membership application for permanent seat at the Arctic Council was denied in Kiruna meeting. Nevertheless, the members of the AC signed their second legally binding agreement regarding shared governance of the Arctic region: *the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic*. The Agreement followed diplomatic negotiation process that

---

<sup>20</sup> Nunatsiaonline discuss outcomes of Kiruna meeting in May 2013:  
[http://www.nunatsiaonline.ca/stories/article/65674researcher\\_observers\\_nervous\\_about\\_canadas\\_arctic\\_council\\_chairmanship](http://www.nunatsiaonline.ca/stories/article/65674researcher_observers_nervous_about_canadas_arctic_council_chairmanship)

resulted the AC to sign on the SAR agreement in Nuuk in 2011 (Kiruna Declaration 2013).

However cooperation and the governing structures of the AC have strengthened during the last decade, arguments on sovereignty and national interest have not been entirely abandoned from the today's Arctic discussions. In spite of that, several studies and the current empirical data show, that cooperation has become more dominant paradigm in the Arctic IR in last three years.<sup>21</sup> Emergent financial crisis in the Western world and struggles of the Arctic economies have also argued to be behind the 'consensus boost' in the Arctic relations. Global financial crisis and impacts of the climate change are both causing uncertainties that the humanity has not faced before (Tienhaara 2010) and media's, businesses' and politicians' perception on the Arctic as 'new Eldorado'<sup>22</sup> of the global economy is encouraging Arctic nations to ensure peaceful cooperation to continue at the region.

However coherent, and yet valid, explanations, realist and liberal approaches provided to the Arctic affairs, are they too narrow in order to explain the current environmental, economic and geopolitical dynamics of the Arctic. On the basis of my data analysis, I argue that the developments in the Finnish Arctic discourse reflect similar changes that the international Arctic affairs is undergoing, as well as a shift in the paradigm of the Arctic IR (from conflict vs. cooperation to environment vs. economy -debate).

### **3.4. Finland in Arctic IR**

Finland's position outside the littoral states', as well as a lack of an up-to-date academic analysis on the Finland's current, and future position in the international Arctic affairs,

---

<sup>21</sup> Sovereignty rhetoric is still part of current discussion on the Arctic affairs in Canada but clearly fading from the Nordic and European academic studies. Lassi Heininen's extensive study on all existing Arctic policies showed which arguments were dominant in different Arctic states and in Canada's Northern Strategy "Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future" national identity and sovereignty were named to define Canadian Arctic politics (Heininen 2012, 17). In addition Canadian media is often eager to frame Arctic region as an national territory of Canada and to lift sovereignty issues to the headlines i.e. CBC 12.9.2012 "*Sovereignty issues loom as Arctic sea ice shrinks*". Most recently, in December 2013, Canada announced their plan to submit a claim on North Pole as part of their extended continental shelf in the Arctic i.e. CBC 9.12.2013 "*Canada's claim to Arctic riches includes the North Pole*."

<sup>22</sup> Finnish newspaper Kaleva described in December 2013 the Arctic as "new Eldorado just around the corner of Finland". I will discussed these definitions more in *the analysis chapter*.  
<http://www.kaleva.fi/mielipide/kolumnit/eldorado-ihan-naapurissa/651948/>

has been the key inspirations to this thesis. Finland's position in international Arctic politics is certainly not unproblematic; Finland's position outside the littoral coastal states requires it to seek alternative avenues for diplomatic influence as well as for economic participation in Arctic economic affairs now and in the future.

Finland's geographical location is in many sense 'secluded' in the EU and the Europe, even in the Nordics, but in the Arctic affairs it is aiming to be in the core of the 'actions'; Of all the people living north of the Arctic Circle, nearly one third are Finns (Arctic Strategy 2013) In the Arctic affairs Finland's foreign policy guidelines are very tangled to its Nordic neighbors, as well as to the European Union. Finland has for instance, been an active participant in EU's Northern Dimension, which is an political instrument of cooperation between geographical partners; the European Union, Russia, Norway and Iceland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2014).

Finland's geographical position as the "Western gateway" to the East, and, especially to Russia, has traditionally defined its foreign policy identity. Consequently, Finland lobbies vigorously for a stronger role for Arctic Council e.g. in questions regarding Arctic natural resource management in order to ensure its voice to be heard at high level meetings (Heininen and Numminen 2011, 141). Finnish politicians and civil servants supported eagerly the EU's bid to become a permanent observer in the Arctic Council (i.e. Under-Secretary of the State Laajava in his speech 2011<sup>23</sup>), which was illustrated in the Finnish media several times in 2011-2012. I will present more elaborate data on the Finnish discussion about the EU's bid in the analysis chapter later in this thesis.

Since Finland is not part of Arctic littoral states, traditional security questions have never been on a high priority on its Arctic agenda, but preservation of the environmental security, i.e. conservation of fragile Arctic nature has being on the Finnish Arctic agenda since 1990. In the matter of fact, environmental security was the initial reason behind Finland's interest to promote international cooperation between the region's countries

---

<sup>23</sup> Data list article number 6.

(Heininen 2011, 24; 81).

However, the political importance, Arctic affairs are relatively undervalued realm of research within the Finnish political scientists and the IR scholars, and studies have mainly followed the same mainstream paradigms than international studies conducted in the Arctic affairs. The flagship institution for the Finnish Arctic research, is the Arctic Center, an international research hub that operates in conjunction with the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi. Through the research, the Arctic Centre promotes increased knowledge, awareness and understanding of the Arctic both within and outside the region (Arctic Centre, University of Lapland 2013) In addition The Finnish Institute Of International Affairs (the FIIA) produces occasionally reports on the latest developments in the Arctic international relations (2014). More recently, in August 2013, FIIA published a study on the growing interests in the Arctic region of Russia, China, the United States and the European Union. Study focuses on Arctic re-emerging as a geopolitically important region in world politics (Käpylä and Mikkola 2013).

On a more general, and global level of Arctic politics, FIIA's researches, Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola, published a report in 2013 on the conflict potential in today's Arctic affairs. They summarize that Arctic resource exploration still including so many unknown variables that well-functioning regional and international governance is a pre-request for the Arctic region to progress into an attractive economic investment for actors interested in Arctic resources. The harsh Arctic climate makes resource exploration extremely expensive and a high-risk investment, which should not be underestimate when economic benefits of the Arctic are discussed. A risk of major inter-state conflict remains low if governance mechanism in the Arctic cooperation will remain strong and legitimate. Käpylä and Mikkola state that "incentives for stability in combination with relatively well-functioning Arctic governance, the potential for a major inter-state Arctic conflict due to endogenous sources is quite low and there is little reason to presume that this will change any time soon" (Käpylä and Mikkola 2013).



At the time of writing this thesis, Teemu Palosaari's and Lassi Heininen's study "*Jäitä Poltellassa. Suomi ja arktisen alueen tulevaisuus*" (2011) is the most thorough, academic overview on the contemporary issues in the Finnish Arctic politics and policymaking published in the 00's. It provides a fruitful outlook of academic articles on the contemporary Arctic issues from the Arctic IR perspective, and the articles address Arctic issues from various different frameworks, such as from the perspective of the international law and the Arctic indigenous people. Though, the publications is a few years old by now, it still provides several up-to-date views on the Finnish Arctic politics, which I use as a background, and comparison material in this study. Placing the current case to its historical background is a crucial phase in order to conduct a successful process tracing study (Bennett and George 2005). "*Jäitä Poltellassa. Suomi ja arktisen alueen tulevaisuus*" also provides a solid ground for methodological comparison because the articles approach Arctic affairs from a different perspective than my study on causal mechanism in the change of Finnish Arctic discourse.

Lassi Heininen's comparative research on all Arctic eight nations', as well as the EU's, Arctic strategies, or state policies, provided an unique overview of similarities and conflicting agendas in international Arctic politics as of 2011. Heininen's study covered Finland's objectives for the Arctic from its first Arctic strategy. Heininen concluded all the strategies reflecting that the Arctic region is increasing in geostrategic significance, and consequently growing its role in international politics (Heininen 2011, 80). Heininen's extensive study elaborates and compares a wide range of policy objectives between the Arctic states and the EU, and he summarizes an intriguing common feature in all the strategies launched between 2009-2011: "All the Arctic states, as well as the EU, would like to become a natural or real, or major actor or player, or even leader or power, in the Arctic (or in some field of northern affairs), or would like to maintain a leading role there" (Heininen 2011, 81). That conclusion envisions increasing interest towards the Arctic politics as a part of international affairs. One objective of this study is to reveal how Finland's attempt to become "a major player" in the Arctic affairs reflects from its Arctic discourse.

In the publication, Timo Koivurova approached Finland's role in the Arctic from a perspective of international law, evaluating the existing legislative structures in Arctic affairs and whether or not there is a potential for Finland to take a stronger lead on that subject. The role of the Arctic Council in terms of developing stronger, legally binding policies, for instance for environmental regulation in Arctic, remains debated. (Koivurova 2011, 75-76) Koivurova's article together with Lassi Heininen's analysis (2012) on the Finland's first Arctic strategy provides a good comparison to my study, and they also show how rapidly discussions in Arctic politics are moving forward and changing course.

Latest developments in Finnish Arctic politics are a good example of rapidly changing focuses in the Arctic. In 2010 Finland had proposed an exclusive summit for the Arctic issues to be organized in Finland, which could have been seen as a continuum of the successful Rovaniemi-process. The summit was planned to give an wider political emphasis to the region's future (Koivurova 2011, 77; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2010), albeit it got postponed due to Finnish parliamentary elections in 2011. The elections caused a heavy reshuffling of the ministerial positions in Finnish parliament including the ministers at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, resulting in Arctic affairs being put on hold once again (Heikkilä 2011).

Despite the fact that Arctic has been gaining significant importance on a global political arena in past seven years, it has also gained increasing attention in international and in Finnish media, extensive, academic studies have not been conducted on the actual arguments and discussion constructing the Arctic discourse in Finland. All the studies above, as well as current empirical data, demonstrate a growing interest on the changing geopolitics of the Arctic region, which can spill over to several sectors of international relations but which is also full of "what ifs" and predictions.

#### **3.4.1. The Arctic 2.0**

Anne Sørensen coined the phrase for the new era of Arctic cooperation as "**the Arctic 2.0**", by which she refers to a constructivist approach to the Arctic affairs, due to the lack of explanatory power of neo-realistic and neoliberal approaches (Sørensen 2013). Current

agreements<sup>24</sup> and diplomatic cooperation between Arctic states have provided noteworthy evidence that political dynamics in the Arctic is heading further from a security focused, antagonist atmosphere of the past (Sørensen 2013, 2). Today's Arctic relations are about a question of identifying opportunities for and linkages between issue-specific areas of cooperation (Young 2011), such as prospects for establishing a legally binding international agreement on Arctic resource exploitation<sup>25</sup>.

To summarize, I argue that the Arctic IR studies of the first half of the 2000s had a clear focus on the conflict vs. cooperation paradigm, which however, has faded during the recent years marked by the intensification of international governing structure of the Arctic. Due to these diplomatic developments in the world of the Arctic IR, the community has moved further away from the theoretical presumptions flagged by realist-liberalist scholars towards more constructivist approach in order to address the complex, multi-dimensional, and truly global Arctic issues (Sørensen 2013).

The purpose of this short review of the last years' political events and previous academic studies on the Arctic international affairs is to highlight the backdrop on which the current situation in the politics of the Arctic plays out, as well as to explain the development of the dominant paradigms in Arctic IR. However, the objective of this study is not to evaluate which paradigm is the most dominant or has the most explanatory power in the Arctic IR of today, but to investigate how the change in the Arctic discourse in Finland happened which might also illustrate a broader change in the Arctic paradigm. All in all, I argue that black-and-white conflict vs. cooperation-paradigm does not provide a comprehensive enough platform to scrutinize the Arctic affairs of today<sup>26</sup>. Broader theoretical and methodological approaches are required in order to analyze, as mentioned above, truly global Arctic issues.

---

<sup>24</sup> Barents Sea agreement and SARS agreement.

<sup>25</sup> Finland was the first state to call for a global sanctuary around the North Pole (Arctic strategy 2013, 48).

<sup>26</sup> Though the current developments and proceeding in the Arctic relations illustrate strengthening of a confidence-building paradigm (Illullisat, Nuuk and Kiruna declarations), Harri Mikkola (FIIA) argues that the recent dispute between Russia and Greenpeace challenges the understanding that all the Arctic states will follow their commitment to the UNCLOS, when vital national interest (in this resource exploitations) is in question (Mikkola 2014).

### 3.5. My Contribution to the Arctic IR: Objectives of This Study

Despite the great amount of studies and research reports covering various aspects of the Arctic IR, there is a very little methodological or theoretical variety among them. As mentioned above e.g. comparative study and theory testing are among the others widely used research methods in the Arctic IR<sup>27</sup>.

Critical geopolitics provides a widely used theoretical reasoning to approach discourse as the defining factor in geopolitics, as in this case in the Arctic region, but process tracing method brings a new perspective to study the construction process of the Arctic discourse. This thesis seeks to bridge the positivist and interpretivist understanding of the research process in order to respond to question of causality - *what caused the known outcome (in this case the change in the current Arctic discourse in Finland)*. Therefore I believe, that process tracing is a fruitful, though challenging, method to apply to a hasty, and complex discourse formulation process such as the Arctic discourse in today's Finland.

Researchers can use process tracing to subtract causal mechanisms behind a complex event or series of events, such as formulation of a discourse in e.g. public discussion. By carefully mapping different turns and moves (in my case different arguments and statements in Finnish media) in a series of events, researchers can with the tools of process tracing analyze *what kind of* and *how* change happened. Mapping causal connections in a historical process gives a fruitful ground for further research, and poses a stand to formulate new hypotheses based on the outcomes of the previous process-trace. (Bennett and George 1997)

---

<sup>27</sup> Read more about the previous studies in the Arctic IR from the chapter "Looking back: Previous studies on contemporary Arctic issues" in this thesis. To name a few theory testing/comparative studies in the Arctic IR: "Canada and the Changing International Arctic: At the Crossroads of Cooperation and Conflict" (Hubert 2009), "Amazing Race-On Resource, Conflict and Cooperation on the Arctic" (Palosaari 2011), "Arctic Strategies and Policies. Inventory and Comparative Study" (Heininen 2012).

Though not so commonly applied method in the Arctic IR, several process-tracing case studies have been conducted in the other subject fields of IR in order to scrutinize causal connections and mechanism behind various questions of the international relations. Among others, Thomas F. Homer-Dixon's (1999) seeks in his study "Environment, Scarcity, and Violence" causal patterns of linking together environmental scarcity and violence in different societies e.g. in water shortage problems in China and land distribution disputes in Mexico. Homer-Dixon's research is based on a wide range of empirical studies on the affects of ecological marginalization and how those can lead to critical social as well as environmental problems (Burns 2000). Bennett and George mentioned another significant process tracing study which was published already in 1970s by George and Smoke (1974) with a title "Deterrence in American Foreign Policy Making: Theory and Practice". In this process-tracing study George and Smoke apply a structured, focused comparison of a relatively small number of historical case studies in order to develop the selected theory (Bennett and George 2005, 75). In the forthcoming *methodology* chapter I will elaborate the analytical tools of process-tracing that are utilized in this study.

Notwithstanding the current international agreements covering the various Arctic issues, as well as an increasingly positive political and economical attitude towards the benefits of jointly coordinated Arctic region, we cannot lull ourselves to believe controversies would be over in the Arctic relations. Confrontation between Russia and Greenpeace, in the fall of 2013, reflected again political sensibility of the Arctic; actions of e.g. non-governmental Arctic actors can cause geopolitical turbulences between Russia and the West, which can have unpredictable impacts on political consensus in the High North (Mikkola, The Return of Realpolitik? The deepening crisis in Ukraine may spill over to the Arctic 2014). That is why existing Arctic paradigm(s), and the causalities behind them, should be actively re-evaluated through thorough academic research, such as this thesis.

#### 4. Theoretical Framework: Critical Geopolitics

As I have already mentioned, the concept of *change* is a core element of this thesis. Change is an attribute that is very commonly connected to explanations of the current state of affairs in the Arctic. Climate change, change in political awareness of the region, changes in the Arctic ice cover, change in the world's economical situation and change of the geopolitics of the Arctic, just to mention few *changes distressing the Arctic*.

Change was also an important factor behind the birth of the critical approach to geopolitics, which serves a theoretical framework in this thesis. Critical geopolitics is a loose set of theoretical concepts and reasoning based on a post-modern influence in geopolitics (G. Ó Tuathail 1994, 313). Critical thoughts on geopolitics was born as result of the great changes that happened in the world order after the end of the Cold War, and which caused dramatic turbulences in global (geo) politics by the late 1980's and early 1990s: The bipolar geopolitical East and West disappeared from the map of world politics and opened new avenues for political alliances, as well as for new rivalries. This new era of geopolitics was especially true in the Arctic, where global governance, new actors and European integration became more present to everyday politics of the region. New ways to understand the emerging interdependence and the rapid changes on a new global Arctic agenda were desperately needed (Koivumaa 2011, 113).

In the next chapters I introduce the core hypotheses of critical geopolitics in relevance to this study. I will mainly refer to the writings of Irish scholar, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, often referred as the founder of contemporary critical politics, and of fellow Irish scholar Simon Dalby, as well as to writings of British political scientists, John Agnew, and the works of Finnish political scientists, Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio. Already in their early writings, Tuathail and Dalby located critical geopolitics to post-modern, post-positivist realm of international relations research by accepting broader understanding of political reality including concepts such as ideas, social interactions and identities as important building blocks of political reality. Tuathail approaches *geo* and *politics* from a human science perspectives ignoring any absolute truths about the world, or ways of organizing

it, but instead seeing geopolitics as discursive practice re-constructed in social interactions. (G. Ó Tuathail 1996) (Dalby 1990)

As mentioned earlier, the research behind this thesis is formed by methodology and previous research. The theoretical framework of critical geopolitics is considered a background reasoning for the selected research approach. Despite the fact that critical geopolitics was defined as a modern, and critical theory within the school of IR, it has never created a neatly defined research field or school of scholars, which makes it serve perfectly in study with a strong method and large pool of research data. Studies in critical geopolitics do not necessarily separate the method from the theory, but instead apply theoretical concepts as theoretical guidance to selected research question (G. Ó Tuathail 1994, 313). Critical geopolitics is often defined as a diverse collection of works characterized by focus on the *processes* through which political practice is bound up to territorial definition (Kuus 2010, 1-2) (Harle and Moisio 2003).

In addition, Tuathail and Agnew (1992), as well as Vilho Harle avoid naming critical geopolitics as a strictly limited theory of IR. They define critical geopolitics as a collection of various methods, approaches and research targets, which together create a theoretical framework to conceptualize or conduct a geopolitical analysis (Harle 2003, 45) (G. Ó Tuathail 1994, 313-314). To sum up: In this thesis I follow this tradition of critical geopolitics by using it as a loose theoretical basis for my conclusions, and more importantly, as a theoretical reasoning to discursive approach to Arctic politics.

#### **4.1. From Geopolitics to Critical Geopolitics**

*“Geopolitics, as I have suggested elsewhere, is best studied in its messy contextual specificity”* (G. Ó Tuathail 1998, 17)

Generally, geopolitics can be defined as a research field that studies how geography affects politics and vice versa. Geography is not a self-evident concept in the world, rather it is a result of a historical and social processes, which produce knowledge and is

under constant development (G. Ó Tuathail 1999, 108-109) As an academic concept, geopolitics, defined by attributes such as borders and identity, have existed in the tool set of political scientists since the writings of Sir Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan in late 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, analysis of ideologically as well as geographically divided world of the Cold War brought geopolitical research traditions into mainstream of political science (Moisio 2003, 21-22).

Traditional geopolitics was determinant to see material factors, such as material capacities (resources), environmental surroundings (e.g. access to the oceans) and geopolitical positioning as dominant attributes to define states' existence in politics. Traditional geopolitics considered these material capacities to appoint the direction and power structure in international relations, whereas critical geopolitics saw *discourses* behind the material factors (e.g. building up navy) to make political actions meaningful and justified (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 192) (G. Ó Tuathail 1994).

Traditional geopolitics provided an extensive tool set for theoretical analyses of the Cold War world, where geography and power politics determined division between the states in East and West. The end of the Cold War broke the 'Old World Order', which opened the barriers (literally and figuratively) between people and ideologies, trade and markets, cultures and region from all corners of the globe (Harle 2003, 49-51). In the midst of the early 90's political turbulence, scholars of critical geopolitics turned the focus from (geopolitical) rivalry of power to foreign policy making, and, how it defines geography. Whereas traditional geopolitics treats geography as terrain of pre-existing geopolitical claims (e.g. borders between states), scholars in critical geopolitics approach geographical knowledge as a modern, constantly evolving, discourse of power (Kuus 2009). Critical geopolitics wanted to analyze the official political strategies that produce the foreign- and security political "maps" of the world (G. Ó Tuathail, 1996; Harle and Moisio 2003, 28). Foreign- and security politics, i.e. actual acts of politics, produce geopolitical knowledge, which define political spaces, and this knowledge is always produced, and reproduces, by someone or something (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 194-195)



The ‘new way of understanding’ geopolitics, critical geopolitics, did not completely abandon material factors as a part of foreign policy analysis, and consequently the different understandings of geopolitics can be found as *an undertone* in critical geopolitics. Moreover, critical geopolitics was developed by international relations scholars, who wanted to emphasize social, cultural and political aspects over the physical resources in geopolitics. Critical geopolitics aim is to scrutinize the geopolitical order in world as a socially and historically evolved process, which is preserved through discursive interactions. Reconstruction of (geo)power was to be made by discursive practices (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 2-4) (Popke 1994).

Even though the concept of discourse rose to the core of critical geopolitics, it did not assume regions to speak for themselves but theirs stories needed told by someone. Policy- and decision makers as well as main-stream media are these “communicators” of geopolitical stories, which produce our understanding of different geopolitical premises (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 194-1996). Scholars of critical geopolitics argues that geopolitical phenomena are outcomes of social and political interaction (Harle and Moisio 2003, 27), which gives this thesis justification to seek the change in Finnish Arctic discourse in arguments, writings and comments of Finnish politicians and media. The geopolitical phenomena under scrutiny in this thesis is the politics of the Arctic region in Finland and it is approach through ‘researchable’ outcomes of social interactions i.e. discourses produced in the public discussions.

By documenting arguments presented in various speeches, reports, articles and news stories about Finnish Arctic policies, I have constructed a process that is based on the assumption that discourses defines geopolitical space (Harle and Moisio 2003, 27). I do not focus only on environment, or economic-driven discourses in the Finnish Arctic discussion, but instead I track down a series of discursive elements that materialize in selected speeches and articles. By locating the discursive elements, I aim to reveal how official and public speaking (and writing) on the Arctic issues illustrate a change that has happened in the understanding of the Arctic in Finland from 2011 to 2013.

#### **4.1.1. Post-modernism Behind Critical Geopolitics**

Following the same path as many other critical theories in social sciences, critical geopolitics emerged in an awakening of postmodern world that featured post-industrial capitalism, rise of the information society, globalization and the aforementioned revisiting geopolitical truths. It aimed to question grand theories that had determined geopolitical studies during the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Moisio 2003, 28). The end of the Cold War forced scholars to question the existing assumptions of a static world order, where the balance of two super powers had defined the order in world politics for decades. Analysis of geopolitical concepts, such as space and borders, became multidimensional and complicated in the context of a new and interconnected world. The new era of international relations also triggered the emergence of new analytical concepts, such as discourse, to be added to the geopolitical tool set (Harle 2003, 49-51). The critical approach tried to respond to growing need of new analytical tools for geopolitical thinking. It aimed to break off historical determinism in geopolitics by applying new methods of constructed geopolitical knowledge. Critical geopolitics tries to bring poststructuralist ‘methods’ to the analysis of space and geographical conditions. In other words, scholars of critical geopolitics aim to avoid any pre-given, material perceptions of the geopolitics as basis of the analysis (G. Ó Tuathail 1994).

Characteristic to critical thoughts in social sciences is to question predominant power structures behind knowledge. Critical geopolitics shares philosophical roots with social constructivism, which emerged to IR studies in the 1980’s. A well-known constructivist Alexander Wend’s article ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ has been called as ‘a door-opener’ for critical thinking in geopolitics (Aalto p.43-44), which illustrates the close connection between constructivism and critical geopolitics. The constructivist heritage gave critical geopolitics an understanding of the idea of discourse as being a defining concept in international relations. Critical geopolitics view the world through different discourses such as environment, foreign policy or economy, which are all produced in interaction between different actors in a society (ibid.).

In order to simplify and summarize social constructivist understanding of geopolitical realities, it needs to be divided into two separate layers: an ideal layer and a material layer. The material level refers to material resources such as geographical location or military power, whereas the ideal level represents ideas and norms behind the structures. Change in one or both layers will affect to socially constructed societies. For example, a need or wish to implement new environmental regulation in the Arctic can evoke from a shift in common opinion of how Arctic should be protected, or it can rise from an environmental catastrophe such as flooding that has affected to people living in the area. Existing material resources and prevailing ideas determinate, how state practice their politics on domestic and international arenas (Burch 2000, p.198-201).

Postmodern poses no single rationality or historical narrative above to another in terms of creating common understanding on social science and history. Diverse societies include huge number of different implications and identities, which makes political actors to be significantly indefinable than rational approaches assume. In addition, postmodernism highlights the role and influence of discourses in a broad sense of the concept - including meanings, symbols, words, identities, means of communication - in all structures of society (Halliday 1994, 38).

In this paper, the influence of postmodern traditions is reflected in my collected data, which contains solely textual materials from various Finnish Arctic communicators in forms of their comments and interviews in media. In this study I am anchoring to the postmodern trend due to the power of its exploratory nature; my study aims to explain *how* Finnish discourse changed to during past three years, instead of analyzing the status quo of existing Finnish Arctic discourses that reflect current policies and practices.

#### **4.1.2. Discourse in Critical Geopolitics**

Another important, postmodern feature in critical geopolitics is the significance of linguistic dimension in geopolitical studies: critical understanding of geopolitical space and borders requires acknowledgment of socially constructed discourses as a core element of the study (Aalto 2011). Analyses of textual materials (speeches, statements of the foreign policy makers etc.) are still often the basis of IR studies applying critical

geopolitics as theoretical framework, though scholars of the critical geopolitics have never fully agreed on what is *a discourse* in critical geopolitics (Häkli 1998). Nevertheless, textual materials are often seen to play a crucial role in construction of knowledge about the geography, which can be analyzed depending on how it is conceptualized and understood. In this thesis I refer to discourse as a set of models, pre-requisites and ways of framing the selection of things that is spoken about (see e.g. Foucault, 1974; (Hajer 2009, 64).

Tuathail also emphasizes the connection between linguistic history of critical thinking and re-defining geopolitics, which relates to French school of poststructuralists<sup>28</sup>. The poststructuralist paradigm views the surrounding world as being composed by mobile structures that is re-defined constantly in social interactions such as politics. Based on poststructuralists thoughts of the world, geography was seen as constantly evolving process where discourses are dependent on involved actors identity. Different actors produce different discourses even in a same framework of issues. The development of discourse analysis methodology in social theories provided methodological basis for critical geopolitics awakening (G. Ó Tuathail 1994, 525-529).

Critical geopolitics brought about discourse as a way of understanding the interconnected relationship between geography and politics. Ó Tuathail and John Agnew were among the first scholars to regard geopolitics as a discursive practice. In other words they stated that geopolitics is to be defined by political practices and social interactions (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 191-192). In contrary to traditional geopolitics, critical geopolitics emphasizes as much a state's material, as conceptual borders in order to analyze how these borders construct spaces between 'inside' and 'outside' and 'domestic' and 'foreign' domains. Critical geopolitics aims to discover, how states themselves produce these divisions or concepts (Ó Tuathail ja Dalby 1998, 3-4). In other words critical geopolitics turned the focus from studying how geopolitics are, to what kind of

---

<sup>28</sup> French school poststructuralists were a philosophical inspiration for scholars of critical geopolitics. For a further introduction read Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze: "Poststructuralism: Post-Structuralism, Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, Habitus, Roland Barthes" General Books LLC, 2010.

knowledge of the world geopolitical studies and argumentations are actually producing (Harle and Moisis 2003, 11).

Tuathail emphasizes the definition of geopolitics as a discursive practice that is constantly reconstructed in practice of politics (G. Ó Tuathail 1998). As a result, discourse analyses have been an inherent part of critical approach to geopolitics; socially constructed language has a vital role in reconstructing spatial dimension of geography and politics.

Different ways of constituting political language creates different discourses that are used for policymaking. Scholars of critical geopolitics approach geopolitics as part of reality, which is constructed in political discourses, and consequential generates the structure of geopolitical actions (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 2). Change in those (political) discourses can have a significant impact on policymaking and political practices, which makes investigations of those discourses greatly important in order to predict, where the current politics are heading.

Geopolitical analysis cannot, according to critical geopolitics, be completed without one or the other; dominant discourse illustrates the structure, and geopolitical rhetoric represents the acts of politics in geography. The study of rhetoric in political actions makes it possible to unveil any changes in the dominant discourses. Reconstruction of geopolitical space is never neutral which is why Moisis encourages researchers to understand political speaking (language) and actual act of politics united: “Language should be perceived as action or practice” (Moisis 2003, 103-105).

In addition to Moisis’s framework, Tuathail introduces an alternative way to interpret the discursive constructed structures in geopolitics. In his arguments, he refers to Agnew and Corbridge, who emphasize the material aspects of spatiality in geopolitics. They see geopolitical order as being a hegemony, which is still constructed by discourse methods. According to Agnew and Corbridge, the political elite produces practical geopolitical reasoning that reflect the dominant representations geopolitical space, where actual

politics are carried out. This understanding is often applied to global political economy studies, where there is a greater emphasis on material basis (such as military power), also from geopolitical perspective. Definitions of geopolitical practice, imagination of the actor and interactions between the actors need to be taken into carefully consideration, when constructing analyses based on the thoughts of critical geopolitics (G. Ó Tuathail 1996, 21-22, 31). In this thesis I have organized selected textual data to a process, in where I tract the change happened in Arctic discourse in Finland. I don't focus on separate discourses in Finnish Arctic politics but instead concentrate to investigate how those speeches and articles reflect change in Arctic discourse in Finland.

As I mentioned earlier, I have not chosen the 'usual methodological partner' of the critical geopolitics (discourse analysis) to the research method in this thesis. Instead I approach discourse as a part of a process and eventually scrutinize, how they produce the prevalent outcome. Process tracing as a methodological tool works well by tracing down causal mechanism within discourses, historical events and different steps of the particular phenomena (Bennett and George 2005). Discourse analysis focuses on a discourse itself, not to what it presents, or how it is produced (Weaver 2004, p.199), whereas this thesis focuses process thinking *behind* the discourse. Discourse analysis does not drive for reveling causal mechanisms<sup>29</sup> (Foucault 1969, p. 214), which process tracing does and thus allows it to be used in investigations on connection between the process and the outcome.

## **4.2. Three Paths To Reconstruct Geopolitical Imagination**

Tuathail and Delby introduced a three-fold typology as a framework in which to approach geopolitics: practical, formal and popular geopolitics (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4). I aim to use these categories as a prior framework to study research material in my thesis. This typology gives the user a tool to organize different discourses in

---

<sup>29</sup> Discourse analysis is often applied to studies with critical geopolitics' theoretical framework due to textual materials' importance for the theory. However textual research data, i.e. previous studies from analytical journals, speeches, media sources, can be well applied to process tracing studies as well, see e.g. Åtland 2009, Anttila 2012, Lind 2011.

geopolitical analyses of the Arctic. It diffuses popular, structural and practical discourses produced by difference actors in foreign policies.

*Practical geopolitics* focuses on the foreign policy practices and bureaucracy made every day by state leaders and other officials. It studies practice of the statecraft in actual decisions-making and concrete political acts. Practical geopolitics reflects the existing predominant visions of the state official in geopolitical situation of the state, which can also predetermine their actions in the international relations (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4-6).


*Formal geopolitics* refers to strategic communities (academia and think-tanks for example) and how their visions and traditions are reflected in geopolitics. Previous study of a specific geopolitical case is an example of formal geopolitical knowledge. The study of formal geopolitics seeks to find concrete historical and discursive grounds that statecraft applies to explanations of dominant geopolitical situations (G. Ó Tuathail 1999, 111). In my case of Finland, I will focus on historical and discursive perceptions behind argumentations about environment and economic benefits presented by Finnish decision makers between 2011-2013.

Third path to geopolitical imagination is *popular geopolitics*, which illustrates social perceptions in geopolitics that are produced by the transnational/national popular culture actors such as mass media, cinema and literature. It aims to expose popular and widespread ideas on the certain object or phenomena (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4-5). Due to limits of master thesis project, I have left out the data that would present geopolitical imagination of the Arctic Finland by popular geopolitics. Although, I have collected data from various Finnish mass media outlets, which represent popular geopolitics, I interpret media to deliver ‘public opinion’ and arguments of the decision makers, more than represent stands of the Finnish media as such.

This ‘tri-pod’ approach creates a productive framework in which one is able to exam geopolitical practices and discourses. Thanks to popular, practical and formal geopolitics,

a researcher can reconstruct a comprehensive picture of multidimensional imagination-building in a society. *All* the three layers impact the formulation of, for instance, Arctic discourse. The objective of this study has is to demonstrate how a geopolitical imagination is formed from different perspectives and how definitions from not only political discourses but also in popular culture references. Further study would show how these construction-processes actually influences a case such as Arctic discourse in Finland in a long run. Dodds highlights how critical it is to understand that geopolitics is not only conducted by academic researchers but in every-day activities of the people all around the world (Dodds 2007, 21).

The picture below illustrates the three-fold approach to geopolitics, which aims to produce a new representation of the geopolitical knowledge. The three-way approach to geopolitics illustrates how scholars of critical geopolitics object the homogenous, nation-state centralized monopoly of geopolitical knowledge. Critical geopolitics aims to combine all three elements of geopolitics in order to create discussion about the prevailing structures behind the international geopolitics (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4-5).



**Figure 1: “Three paths to reconstructing geopolitical imagination “ (ibid.)**



As mentioned above, I have followed this typology when I collected my research data in order to locate *where* and *how* change in Finnish Arctic discourse happened from 2011 to 2013. Thorough investigation of previous Arctic studies (chapter 4 in this thesis) represent the *formal geopolitics* in geopolitical imagination building in the Arctic. The typology model is useful in order to disclose, from the Finnish discussion, how the frequently used themes in Arctic policy making, environment and economy, create geopolitical imagination of the Arctic as a space in international relations.

### 4.3. Criticism of Critical Geopolitics

Vilho Harle discusses in his article “Is critical geopolitics critical science?<sup>30</sup>” the meaning of ‘critical’ in the critical geopolitics (2003). He emphasizes the role of the actor, especially the linguistic, discursive choices made by the actor in constructing spaces and regions. Spaces and regions are constructed by spoken discourses and by written text to. Actors in geopolitics are in the core of this mission to construct the space of geographical regions (Harle 2003, 37-40).

Harle combines previous work from Häkli and Tuathail in order to construct an understanding about the essence of the research objective in critical geopolitics. Critical geopolitics seeks to understand geographically produced definitions about power and execution of power. ‘Unleashing’ these core themes of international politics from their geographical bindings creates a fruitful space for new understanding about geopolitical structures between political actors such as nation states, NGO’s and people (Harle 2003, 38-39).

One can criticize that critical geopolitics concentrates too much on reshaping its research object, geography, but actually it also contributes to critical theory by creating alternatives. Harle concludes that critical geopolitics research aim to reveal discursive structures and epistemological undertones in international relations (Harle 2003, 48). In other words, critical geopolitics seeks to reconstruct predominant knowledge-structures in geopolitics, in order to provide new understandings about geographical spaces and regions. This kind of knowledge can for instance be the perceptions of Finland’s role as environmental/economic actor in the Arctic.

Criticism towards critical geopolitics has also targeted the hegemony of the discourse, which in geography can still be seen as very material. A researcher should always carefully select a case and representative study data, and acknowledge that a possibility of hegemonic discourses occurring in his/hers research data. Critical geopolitics has been

---

<sup>30</sup> in Finnish: “Onko kriittinen geopolitiikka kriittistä tiedettä?”

accused to stay only on academic level instead successfully reflecting the practice of geopolitics. In addition, feminist scholars in IR have questioned how marginalized voices/actors could be better brought in to geopolitical discussion and discourse building (Harle 2003, 54-55) (Jukarainen 2003, 78-79).

In this study I have aimed to overcome these challenges within the selected discourses by acknowledging the fact that both environment and economy are overarching themes in all aspects of Finland's Arctic politics. Hence I do not focus on what environmental and economic discourse per se represents in Finnish Arctic discussion, but follow the change that has happened between these two discourses during last three years in Finland.

Next I will introduce in more detail my research method, *process tracing*, which has provided this thesis' 'muscles to wrestle' the challenging amount of diverse research data in order to investigate *how* Arctic discourse have changed in Finland in past few years.

## **5. Methodology: Process-Tracing as a Case study Method**

*Political Science as a discipline seeks to formulate explanation why thing in societies happen as they do and reports about the processes how these things actually happened* (G. Falsetti and F. Lynch 2009, 2).

Qualitative research draws particular attention to contextual issues such as time, space and social setting where my research data is collected. Therefore qualitative methods are especially good catching meaning, process and context where studied phenomena occur. In addition, qualitative method is beneficial to this thesis by its ability to tap into thoughts behind processes in politics or in social structures in general, or into narratives in people's minds, for example in foreign policy makers' minds, who construct discourses they maintain (Devine 2002, 199-200)

Quantitative methods are often linked with positivist assumptions and mechanism of the natural science. Quantitative approaches are based on a notion that only the observable can count as valid knowledge. Researchers working within qualitative paradigm accept these conditions when research data is collected (Devine 2002, p.200-201). On contrary, qualitative researcher aligns his/hers research with interpretive epistemology that stresses a dynamic and continuously evolving nature of social reality. A crucial factor in the choice of method is whether the method provides suitable tools to answer to the selected research question from empirical and theoretical perspective. However, neither of these methodologies completely excludes collaboration with one and another, and consequently social scientists are increasingly mixing methodologies rather than using only one method in isolation (Devine 2002, 201-202).

In this paper I have decided to practice a theory-guided process tracing case study, that focuses *on the causal mechanisms* in order to answer how Arctic discourse in Finland has changed during last years. Through my analysis I am providing a comprehensively academically-reasoned perspective to the ongoing debate on Finland's role in domestic and international, Arctic affairs. Eventually, by evaluating the processes that lead to the current state of Arctic affairs, one might be able to predict some future trends in the Arctic politics, in my case the development of environmental and economic reasoning in Arctic politics in Finland. The focus of this thesis however, is in the current, prevailing change in Arctic discourse and how it happened during the last 'turbulent' three years.

In the following chapter I elaborate more extensively on my decisions to apply this quite unconventional type of case study method, process tracing, in IR master thesis research. My aim has been to test, how this bit unusual theory-method combination works in a study of discursive structures, and whether it manages to create a new understanding of the prevailing conditions of the Arctic discourse in Finland.

## 5.1. Case Study in Qualitative Research

One can argue that all studies in social science are case studies: every research project has a target or an object that the researcher aims to reach by explaining and collecting material and data about it (Niemi p. 43). In this study I refer to *case study methodology* as an overarching category that includes both within-case analysis of a single case study, and comparison of small number of cases. As a methodological umbrella, case study is multi-dimensional and it provides different research design tools to conduct a qualitative research, e.g. designs from historical explanations to process tracing, as well as different ways to construct new hypotheses (Bennett 2002, 27). In this study I apply process tracing as the research design and data collection tool, which produces the analysis of this thesis.

Hence the confusion that sometime arises between case study as *a method* or as a *research design tool*, it has established a solid place among IR methodologies since the 1970s (Sprintz and Wolinsky 2003, 11). Despite this confusion, I argue that a correct selection of research tools *within* case study methodology, and a carefully conducted research design, are more significant aspect in order to conduct a successful case study, than focus on discussion *whether case study is a method or a research design tool*.<sup>31</sup> My main source of methodological concepts and definitions have been Andrew Bennett and Alexander George's book "*Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*" (2005), which is an excellent guidebook to case study methodology in social sciences.

In social sciences case study method has been very popular especially within the field of anthropology; studies of historical communities and among other studies of social interaction between/within institutions and individual (Laine, Bamberg & Jokinen 2007, 13-14). In a nutshell one can define a case study as a way of examine relationships

---

<sup>31</sup> Laine, Bamberg and Jokinen state in their book "Tapaustutkimuksen taito" that conceptual differences emerge about the definition of *a method* between Social Science research done in English and in Finnish. In English definition of *method* include a broader selection of means of actual data collection and research methods. In Finnish the word for a method (*menetelmä*) refers only to clearly defined research methods. Thus, in Finnish methodology literature refers to case study more as an umbrella concept of several methods and I accept these slight conceptual difference in this study (Laine, Bamberg and Jokinen 2007, 9).

between empirical data and theory (Laine; Bamberg ja Jokinen 2007, 21-22). Methods used in history studies are often closely linked to the case study methodology as a case study captures a well-defined aspects of a historical happening that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical study of the happening itself (Bennett 2002, 29). The case study approach is claimed to serve well studies that aim to tackle complex, uncategorized and unique phenomena in international relations (Bennett and Elman 2007, 171), which is why I chose it as methodological approach to investigate vast and multidimensional data from Finnish Arctic discourse building.

In addition, case study methodology emphasizes an overall and thorough understanding of the time and space in which and where the selected phenomena take place (Bennett and George 2005, 72-73). Time and space are key concepts in critical geopolitics, which seeks to conceptualize geography in constant process of change and uncertainties (Kuus 2010, 6).

#### **5.1.1. Testing, Developing and Building Theoretical Frameworks**

Theoretical and empirical framework of a case study depends on the choices made by the researcher, which makes defining a well-reasoned statement of the research problem or “puzzle” crucial part of case study design. All choices made in a case study drive to create an understanding of, and new perspectives on the selected case as a whole (Häikiö and Niemenmaa p. 42). In this study my aim is to create an updated understanding of the Arctic discourse in Finland through analyzing the change, and simultaneously explore what possible consequences the change in the discourse has to the future of the Arctic politics in Finland.

Bennett summarizes the major advantages of case study methods as being the ability to identify new or omitted variables and hypotheses. In addition, case study methods can make inferences on causal mechanisms, and to help to develop historical explanations of particular cases. Case studies are particularly advantageous in creating new hypotheses, because they allow for a combination of deduction and induction in analytical reasoning (Bennett 2002, 26). A case is understood in this study as Bennett’s definition: “(the case is) *an instance of a class of events of interest to the investigator*” (Bennett 2002, 27). By

using a case study approach, a researcher aims to discover reasons for the appeared outcome by applying theoretical frameworks or causal mechanisms models to the case. The years between 2011-2013 are the time period when a series of significant political events happened in the Finnish Arctic politics, as well as in international Arctic relations, which is why I chose to narrow my study to focus on those years. As for the case in *this* study, it is '*the change in Arctic discourse in Finland*', which represents a broader thematic topic of the evaluation of the objectives and stage of Finland's contemporary Arctic politics.

Thus it is important to differentiate empirical generalizations from analytical replications; drawing generalizations from a highly selected and defined case study research should not necessarily be the goal of a single or comparative case study. Instead, the researcher should focus on presenting the analytically replicable definitions and conclusions that can be tested in another context (Vaus 2001, 243; Laine, Bamberg and Jokinen 2007, 25). Discussion about the replication of a case study highlights the importance of well-stated case selection. Even *one* specific case is enough to conduct replicable case study, if it serves the chosen research objectives (Laine, Bamberg and Jokinen 2007, 3-4). This thesis is conducted as a single case study, because it serves the purpose to investigate, how Arctic discourse have changed in *Finland during the selected years*.

Though my aim is not provide absolutely generalizable arguments about the affects of rhetoric battle between arguments pro/against environment and economy in the Arctic discourses of different Arctic states, my objective is to construct a comprehensive analysis of the change in Arctic discourse *in Finland*, which delivers a basis for further testing of new hypotheses in different research setting that resemble Finnish Arctic discourse (for example, evaluation of the Arctic discourse in another Nordic state). In this case study I apply process-tracing research design by George and Bennett (2005), of which I use to chase a *historical explanation behind the change in Arctic discourse in Finland* during this relatively short time (in history), meaning the years from 2011 to 2013.

## **5.2. Presenting the Case: Finland and the Change in the Arctic Discourse in 2011-2013**

As stated earlier, Finland followed the trend of its Arctic partners, and launched its first Arctic strategy in 2010, which pushed Arctic affairs on higher priority on the domestic and foreign policy agenda in Finland. Within last five four years all the Arctic states have published and updated their national Arctic strategies; Canada and Russia in 2009, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland in 2011 and United States of America in 2013 (Arctic Finland). Growing global interest on the Arctic has encouraged Arctic states to update and sharpen their Arctic position, which was incentive also behind Finland new Arctic strategy (Mikkola and Kämpylä 2013, 3).

I see the fall 2013 as a culmination point of the previous three years developments in the Finnish Arctic politics. Illustrations of this “culmination point” was i.e. how in 2012 cooperation started between state-owned Arctia Shipping’s offshore icebreakers and Royal Shell, that rose to the headlines in the aftermath of Finnish Greenpeace activist, Sini Saarela’s, time in prison for piracy after protesting (peacefully) at an offshore platform in the Arctic owned by Russian state-controlled energy giant Gazprom in October 2013. Events in Russia turned Finnish media’s attention towards Finland’s participation in Arctic resources exploration, and especially towards questions on official policy-lines for the Arctic region. State-owned icebreaker company, Arctia Shipping’s, participation in Arctic offshore activities gained lots of media attention and started public debate on Finland’s objectives in the Arctic region (Kaleva 21.10.2013 “Kylmä arktis herättää kuumia tunteita” in English: ”Cold Arctic provokes hot feelings”).

In my perspective, the discussion around Finnish ice breaker’s off shore activities; the release of the new Finnish Arctic strategy and statements from Finnish (foreign and domestic) policy officials provides adequate empirical material in order to conduct a case study that aims to reveal a change in Finnish understanding of the Arctic affairs in 2013. As I stated earlier, Arctia Shipping’s participation in Shell’s oil drilling project in Beaufort Sea in 2012 was first time, when Finnish government-owned company paired up with international energy company in an offshore oil exploration in the Arctic region



(YLE 8.3.2012 “Finnish icebreakers to sail in Arctic oil drilling”). This event among others caught my interest towards clearly shifting focuses in Finnish Arctic politics, and encouraged me to investigate if those changes can be found also in a discourse level in Finnish Arctic discussion.

Although the case of this study is the change in Arctic discourse *in Finland* and even though it does not aim to produce generalizations of changes in Arctic discourse in other countries, I argue that my analysis does reflect factors that could be found behind changes in Arctic discourse also elsewhere. I interpret my case study to a most-likely case study, which presents a typical, most representative case of the phenomena under examination (Bennett and Andrew 2005, 83; e.g. Eckstein 1975). I argue that the evaluation of the change, especially in terms of environment vs. economy –battle, in Arctic discourse represent a trend that Arctic politics is going through in Finland.

During 2013, when this thesis was conducted, Arctic politics underwent a turbulent period in Finland, which has never been experienced before. Though, the Arctic paradox truly burst out to the awareness of the general public in Finland in the fall 2013, Arctic has always been essential part of Finland’s self-image as an Arctic nation. Finland’s geographical location in the Arctic region, as well as its indigenous population, Sami people, living above the Arctic Circle, illustrate Finland’s Arctic identity (Arctic Strategy 2013). On the basis of these arguments my case study *change in the Finnish Arctic discourse* presents a most representative case of Arctic discourse in Finland.

I recognize the epistemological challenges facing me by combining definitions from qualitative theoretical framework and somewhat quantitatively rooted process tracing.<sup>32</sup> A researcher has to take into serious consideration his or hers understanding of the knowledge, when combining quantitative and qualitative research design (Devine 2002,

---

<sup>32</sup> Bennett and Elman reflect more advantages and challenges of qualitative and quantitative methods in terms of social scientists constructing and verifying their knowledge about the world. Template on causes and effects is also discusses there more explicitly. Due to limited scope of this thesis, those discussion, as well as important legacy of Keohane, King and Verba’s thoughts on lack of qualitative methods applied in social sciences, are left out from the methodology chapter in this research (Bennett and Elman 2006).

199-200). In the next chapters I elaborate more thoroughly how I apply process tracing to a qualitative case study, and discuss possible pitfalls of the selected methodology before putting it into action in the presentations of the data, and finally in, the analysis.

### **5.3. Nuts-and-Bolts of Process Tracing**

*“Process tracing is in, acquiring near buzz-word status in certain circles. Europeanists do it; IR scholars do it – all with the goal of bringing theory closer to what really goes on in the world”*(Checkel 2005, 3).

As mentioned earlier, process tracing is located in “a sub-category” of the case study. Process tracing as an IR study method aims to observe and analyze causal mechanisms around selected case, which hopefully can be applied to a wider context in international relations. Process tracing seeks explanations for social phenomena by setting hypotheses and exploring mechanisms how interactions become as they are today (Checkel 2005, 4-5). In addition it is an analytical tool for describing political and social phenomena, as well as a tool to evaluate causal claims behind the case (e.g. political and social phenomena) (Collier 2011).

Mechanism connects things, which together construct a process. Tracing a process happens in theoretically informed way, where theoretical assumptions, hypotheses, are leading the research. Process tracing is strongest on questions of *how* something happened and exploring *interactions* between events (Checkel 2005, 4-5).

According to George and Bennett (2005), process tracing serves well in a research conducted in “a grey-zone” between political science and history. It provides “a common middle ground for historians interested in historical explanation and political scientists (...) who are sensitive to the complexities of historical events but are more interested in theorizing about categories of cases as well as explaining individual cases” (Bennett and George 2005, 223). Analytic practice of tracing can assess how outcomes of a case were affected by the choices of the actors along the way (Bennett and George 2005, 213; Tracy

and LeGreco 2009). Reference to studies of history and concept of causality, can arise positivist connotations and confusion on epistemological basis of this study, which is why I aim to reason carefully and transparently, how process tracing method is used in this thesis.

Despite the positivist connotations, a well-reasoned process tracing can be part of a constructivist methodological tool kit, and, as a matter of fact, it can contribute greatly to qualitative analysis of causes (Bennett and George 2005). This thesis stands on post-positivist epistemology, which acquires deeper explanation on my understanding of variables and approach to the concept of context.

### **5.3.1. Defining Variables**

In a process tracing research as important as defining one's goal on developing or testing selected theory, is selecting suitable variables, which are actually core elements of process trace. Researcher's first step in choosing variables is to ask *what* does she/he actually want to explain or predict in the study, and the answer will define the dependent variable(s) (Bennett and George 2005, 79). Through variables researcher challenges theoretical predictions on existing outcome of the research question. Thorough study of connections, or lack of them, during the process reveals new assumptions on, *how* things happened as they did in the selected case (Checkel 2005, 15).

Independent and/or inventing variables are the ones *affecting to* the end result, in other words, by scrutinizing independent variables one can predict and explore *why* dependent variable became as it did. Theoretical assumptions support selection process of the variables and ensure they have power to reveal new hypotheses from the chosen research question (Checkel 2005, 5-7). Thus this thesis applies the logic of exploring causal mechanism between the variables in order to describe the path to the outcome, it does not take causal mechanisms as fundamental or only way to the occurring outcome. Context is one of the core concepts in the analysis because I see context and causal mechanisms as an inherent coalition in the study of process. In the other words I address importance of the timeframe, where the causal mechanism are studied.

Hypotheses and selected variables should be in a close discussion with each other through out the research conducted in process tracing tradition (Bennett and George 1997). In this study I defined dependent variable in reflection of the predicted outcome of Arctic discourse formulation process. In contrary, independent variables refer to phenomena, concepts or other factors influencing to the process. Independent variables lead and shape the direction of the analysis towards the outcome of the study. Together with defining variables it is vital to narrow down what is the specific problem or question asked from selected research data. In addition in a single-case study meaning of left out variables should be considered cautiously in order to secure research validity (Bennett 2005, 80-81).

In the limits of this thesis research and my hypotheses, I have chosen to focus on environmental and economic dimension in the Finnish Arctic discourse. This thesis won't focus to any other, though important, Arctic discussion such as could be e.g. indigenous peoples rights, development of legislative regimes or changes in the security discourse in the Arctic. All these discussion have left out, yet those discussions can provide some fascinating variables to another process tracing analysis of the Arctic discourses. However, security issues, as well as social development in the Arctic region, are recognized as important factors in questions of Arctic oil and gas, due to still unsolved debates on search and rescue (SAR) plans in case of an oil spill accident in the region (discussions often refer to BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2006<sup>33</sup>).

By observing the relationship between the intervening variables, and impact of the intervening variable, I test my theoretical assumptions (discourses as defining factor in geopolitics) to the selected dependent variable. Nevertheless, I am not assuming this limited study to produce widely generalizable outcomes. I have defined two independent variables, which also appear in my research question, and one intervening variable in

---

<sup>33</sup> In April 2010 a gas release and subsequent explosion on BP-operated Deep Water Horizon oil rig caused largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of petroleum industry, which media and environmental organizations have used as alarming example case of devastating environmental impacts of an uncontrolled oil spill accident (e.g. Greenpeace 2013 "Black ice - Russian oil disaster"; The Guardian 2013 "Arctic oil spill is certain if drilling goes ahead, says top scientist") (The Guardian, Environment n.d.).

order to understand why and how Arctic discourse in Finland has changed in 2011-2013. Selected variables are presented in this chart below:

<b>Variables</b>		
<b>Intervening</b>	<b>Independent</b>	<b>Dependent</b>
International Arctic (neighbors etc.)	Environmental changes	Change in Finnish Arctic discourse
International Arctic (neighbors etc.)	Economic interests/prospects	Change in Finnish Arctic discourse

As mentioned above, theoretical framework should lead the researcher in the process of selecting the variables. Though a careful problem formulation, well-reasoned case selection, and choice of methodological tools are cornerstones of a single case study, are all these choices dominated by researcher's own mindset, which can lead to biased research approach. In single case studies causal inferences and poorly selected variables can cause over-assumptions in the analysis, or challenge the validity of the conclusions (Bennett and George 2005, 220). Therefore meaning of carefully selected, representative variables is amplified in a single case study, such as the case in this thesis.

Critical geopolitics guided me to select environmental changes and economic prospects as independent variables, because those themes are the most debated on the today's Arctic agenda (in Finland and internationally). The intervening variable 'International Arctic' includes arguments arising along the process, that refer to international cooperation, as well as to impacts that Finland's international Arctic partner/competitors have to the discourse. Significant events, such as Russia vs. Greenpeace –dispute, and the EU's release of the Arctic strategy, stood out several times from the selected research

data, which is why I wanted to evaluate international Arctic partners' impact to the Arctic discourse in Finland.

The debate between environmental and economic arguments, as well proceedings of the international Arctic affairs, can be claimed to have had the most influence on the Arctic agenda during the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and therefore have raised lots of focus within Arctic (geo)politics (Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009) (Moisio, Dittmer and Dodds 2011). I argue that geopolitical imagination of the Arctic is constructed in those debates.

#### **5.4. Bridging Post-Positivist Theory To Positivist Methodology**

As Checkel states above, process tracing research aims to create new conclusions about the selected topic on the basis of thorough understanding the case, in other word bringing theoretical frameworks into the analysis of the real world.

Process tracing is used to track down causal mechanisms in practice of a (historical) case or process. Researcher maps carefully *“the process, exploring the extent to which it coincides with prior theoretically derived expectations about the workings of the mechanism”* (Checkel 2005, 115).” In other words, it tests the explanatory power of particular theory in selected process (ibid). Concepts of causality and causal mechanisms can first appear to be prone to positivist epistemology, and consequently be seen as a challenge in cooperation with a post-positivist theoretical framework. Nevertheless, they do not have to exclude one and another. Philosophical realism provides the conceptual ‘bridge’ and epistemological opportunism to diminish the possible contradiction on a metatheoretical level in process tracing studies conducted in post-positive theoretical framework (Checkel 2005, 22). Causality is here understood on the epistemological basis of philosophical realism<sup>34</sup>. Therefore cause is understood to mean “anything that

---

<sup>34</sup> Philosophical realism refers to philosophical proposition about the reality that exists independently of our observations of it and therefore cannot be “directly observed”. Philosophical realism believes on “the real ontological structures” of the reality, which consist both observed fact and “unobservable” such as reasons, ideas, aspirations, discourses, as well as “social relations and social structures” (Hall 2009, 629).

contributes in anyway to the producing or maintaining of a certain reality” (Hall 2009, 630).

Philosophical realism refers to causality as an understanding of a complex interaction between varieties of different kinds of causal factors. Causal mechanisms are interpreted simply as constitutive elements in a process. The philosophical realists define causation as an open, ‘common-sensical’, intuitive notion with multiplicity of different meanings, excluding laws of causation and determinism (Kurki 2006, 190).

Ideas, meanings and reasons are significant in the social world because they are causal themselves. Epistemologically, philosophical realists approve notions of information in social and political context we live in: “(...) knowledge about the world is constructed and enabled by linguistic conventions, conceptual systems and the social-political backgrounds that we know ‘within’” (Kurki 2006, 203).

Philosophical realists, such as Wendt, Dessler and Patomäki, challenged the ‘taken-for-granted’ Humean positivist model of science, and simultaneously they opened up new avenues for ontologically and epistemologically reflective, and methodologically pluralists frameworks to be applied in social sciences (ibid.) Due to the limits of master thesis I am not going to immerse myself into a meta-theoretical debate on the conceptualization of cause, which has been a complex, ongoing debate in IR community since the rise of humeanism (in social sciences) until today<sup>35</sup>. This study emphasizes interactions and context as the basis of causation analysis, in which the development of Arctic discourse in Finland is studied.

---

<sup>35</sup> Milja Kurki discusses further the debate of early positivist and development of social sciences in her paper “Causes of a divided discipline: rethinking the concept of cause in International Relations theory” (2006). Causal relations have been defined after Hume’s thoughts about causation, which had embedded rules and regularities to the concept of causality. Causality was seen as regulatory-deterministic (ibid., 192). 1990’s mainstream IR community also accepted King, Keohane and Verba’s methodological thesis *Designing Social Inquiry* as a “guidebook” to ‘scientific’ causal analysis. King, Keohane and Verba underlined identification of appropriate empirical variables in order to social scientist to study causal mechanism of social life. (ibid., 196) In addition constructivist approaches had their saying on causality but they continued to attach certain deterministic and materialistic connotations to the notion of cause. Consequently relation between constructivist explanations and causal mechanism remained unclear. (ibid., 199-201).

That been said, I impose upon my study the following postmodern research traditions in social sciences, where mixing of methods is considered acceptable (Devine 2002; Checkel 2005). I argue that from constructivist stands, the reality, and discourse of the Arctic is formulated in the discussions/public speaking conducted by Finnish Arctic policymakers and the media, and consequential a change in the Arctic discourse has an impact on the politics conducted by Finnish policymakers. By investigating the process, where the discursive interactions are defined, I aim to locate causal mechanisms behind the change in Arctic discourse in Finland, which I argue to reflect the current understanding of the Arctic in Finland.

I am aware of the threats and the possible downfalls of a single case study, and that is why I aim to articulate clearly my theoretical and methodological choices. Bearing in mind my possible pitfalls of a case study, I do not seek to present a single truth about the state of affairs, but instead aim to create new knowledge about selected phenomena or event (Leino 2007, 227)

#### **5.4.1. Context And Causal Mechanisms**

As mentioned earlier, selected variables are not seen here as absolutes or given but as part of the context of this case. Leino argues that successful and comprehensive understanding of the context of selected case can construct new perspectives to approach the case that can eventually be applied to more general context (Leino 2007, 215-216). A comprehensive outlook on the context of this study, updated discussion about Finnish Arctic politics, and general developments of in the Arctic IR, is presented along the analysis by introducing wide selection of media writings on the Arctic affairs in 2011-2013.

Detailed examination of causal mechanisms behind individual cases is one of the core purposes of all the case studies. As mentioned earlier causation is understood here as *an open interaction* between causal factors, which means in this study natural determinism in causation is rejected. In the thesis causal mechanism is defined after Bennett's and George's definition, which states that "causal mechanisms (...) operate only under certain



condition and their (...) effects depend on interactions with the other mechanism that make up these contexts” (Bennett and George 2005, 145).

In this study causal mechanisms are observed in the context of the current developments in Arctic discourse in Finland, as well as in the frame of international proceeding in the Arctic. I argue that ‘pro-economy’ argumentation has increased in Arctic discourse in Finland, by number of the Arctic actors emphasizing occurring economic benefits in region, yet the same time concept of environmental sustainability is widely presented as an important principle for Finland actions in the Arctic. With this thesis I point out the change in the discourse, and explain why and how it occurred.

As mentioned earlier, I acknowledge the positivist epistemology behind of process tracing research design, and its emphasis on causality, but this study approaches causal mechanisms from another perspective. Causal mechanism are considered here only as a part of constantly re-constructed social context of international politics, such as Finnish Arctic politics. Therefore I apply to Fallatti and Lynch’s (2009) notion on causal mechanism, in which they refer to causal mechanism as portable concept operating in different contexts. Causal mechanisms interact with the context in which they operate which makes the outcome of the process unpredictable (ibid. 5-6). By studying causal mechanism researcher can reveal “ how actors relate, how individuals come to believe what they do, or what they draw from past experiences, how policies and institutions endure or change, how outcomes that are inefficient become hard to reverse, and so on.” (ibid., 3-5) This thesis approaches variables and causal mechanism as constitutive features of the process, emphasizing role of the context, where the research data was collected from 2011 to 2013.

#### **5.4.2. How Process Tracing And Critical Geopolitics Work As Research Partners?**

A theory guided study approach is a core element in a well-executed process trace (Checkel 2005, 4). My research is collected from data portal called Arcticfinland.fi and includes speeches, comments and media material, which underlines critical geopolitics’

perspective on discourses as the basis of the geopolitical knowledge, and further as a key attribute to understand political practices of a certain region (Kuus 2010, 1)

Theory is understood here, as not to replicate the real world, but to structuralize social life's realities. Same principle applies to selected variables in the thesis: Their role is constitutive in the process of scrutinizing causality, but they are expected to produce omnipresent outcomes (Kurki 2006, 203). Critical geopolitics provides the threefold typology where different types of meanings, ideas and information construct geopolitical imagination, and through the imaginations one can interpret geopolitical realities (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4-5). As mentioned earlier research data in this thesis represents mainly *formal* and *practical* way reconstructing geopolitical imagination, but *popular* category is presented incorrectly in my data sources, which are mainly different media outlets.

Critical geopolitics understands discourse as 'an element', like a building brick, which constitute reality, not just describe it. Also social constructivism leans strongly to discourses in restructuring social structures in the world. Constructivism emphasizes actors, such as states and media, as active contributors in international relations. Discourses are affected by, and actually, created in the ideas and meanings of these actors, though material dimension of social interaction is not completely abandoned. I approach geopolitical reality from critical geopolitics and constructivist perspective and argue, that discursive structures and context are inseparable elements in understanding the geopolitics (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 2-3).

Critical geopolitics shifted the focus geopolitics greatly towards different methods of producing knowledge, or understanding on geopolitical events instead of reproducing material frame realities of geopolitics. In other words geopolitical speaking and writing actually shapes our understanding of the geopolitical realities and is contacts changing (Harle and Moisio 2003, 11). I interpret this notion to support my unconventional selection of method and theory; by observing causal mechanism between the variables, I seek to discover the change, and its explanations behind the Artic discourse in Finland,

and most importantly analyze what this change represent in the Finnish Arctic politics. Finally by locating the change in the discourse I aim to produce new understanding of the existing assumptions about the (geopolitical) reality of the Arctic in Finland.

## **6. Research Data: Development of the Arctic Discourse in Finland from 2011 to 2013**

In following analysis I present a carefully documented and summarized selection of media articles, news releases, speeches and blog posts related to the debate between environmental conservation and economic prospects in the Arctic region. All data is collected from ArcticFinland-portal between 1.1.2011 and 31.12.2013. All together, my research data includes 77 articles originally published in Finnish mainstream media; various Ministries' websites and in other online outlets.

This analysis proceeds in mainly in chronically order, following the timeline, when media articles and speeches where published on the ArcticFinland-portal. The chronologically order will help to reveal the causal mechanisms between dominant arguments and current political events, which might have had an impact on Finnish Arctic discourse during the process. The main focus of this analysis is to establish *how* Arctic discourse have changed, and *what has caused* the change in Finland during the last three years.

I use all the speeches, blog posts and media materials published on ArcticFinland-website from 2011 to 2013 as my primary source of research data. However, due to limits of this thesis, and the huge amount of articles on the Arctic issues collected to ArcticFinland-portal, I had to narrow the selection of media sources directly referred in this analysis to two main Finnish language (online) news media, Helsingin Sanomat and Yleisradio<sup>36</sup> (YLE), and to one main Swedish-language media in Finland, Huvudstadsbladet. In

---

<sup>36</sup> Yle is Finland's national public service broadcasting company. Yle programmes and content reach 95 % of Finnish people weekly (Yleisradio Oy 2014).

addition, I use articles, news etc. material published in online edition of one of the main regional media in the Northern Finland, in Kaleva newspaper.

Further more, I have paid extra attention to carefully map arguments presented by different key actors, such as Finnish ministers, and to summarize all their arguments presented in the selected media outlets. Research data in this analysis includes translated version of all references, comments or arguments presented in the sources above, in which the speaker refers to Arctic environmental changes/impacts/developments/risks or economic benefits/prospects/potentials/risks, and which were archived in ArcticFinland-portal between January 2011 and December 2013.

I refer to the articles etc. summarized in the analysis by using numbers in brackets, which leads to the original source and the publisher of the comment. The data used in the analysis is attached as a numbered list of references in order of appearance in Chapter 9.

### **6.1. Representativeness of the Data**

Media has an important role in creation of geopolitical definitions and perceptions, which is the reason why I have mainly selected data from different media outlets in order to conduct a comprehensive process of the arguments etc. that construct the Arctic discourse in Finland. Media delivers arguments from political decision makers, which reflects state's, or other political entity's, official stance on a particular issue. While public opinion is relatively complicated to investigate in societies, without conducting massive interview surveys, media is often considered as a communicator of public opinion. Moreover media itself plays a role in public discussion. It frames arguments differently based on which it sees relevant and important. (Bennett and George 1997, 10) Arguments presented in media construct discourses, and further, maintain certain kind of reality. Media has power to frame reality in their the arguments they present, and in addition, the arguments that are *left out* from the limelight of media are as important (Kuusisto 1999, 19; Fairclough 1997, 139).

As well as media discussions, political actors' public speeches or comments construct discourses. The very act of argumentation expresses a belief, that the argument can change ideas and those ideas shape our understanding of the world. Public communication, speeches and product of media outlets, deliver arguments, that can be used, at least to some extent, as an evidence of the ideas building (geopolitical) imagination<sup>37</sup>. Based on the notion, that media and public opinion cannot be separated, media data is understood here as opinionated, not as an holistic, view of the word. Perspectives presented in the media can belong to a journalist, a politician or an institution, depending whose voice has been represented at the time. Media data serves well a purpose to map public opinion on certain topic, because media represents often both the argument, and the mean of representing the argumentation (Fairclough 1997, 10-11)

Combination of media articles, speeches and official Arctic strategy will reveal different perspectives and reasoning behind the change, or lack of it, in Arctic discourse in Finland. Hypothesis of the thesis claims, that environmental changes and shift in economical attitudes, combined to the international atmosphere in Arctic cooperation, have shaped Finland's Arctic discourse towards more economy driven approach in the cost of weakening environmental agenda.

I acknowledge the fact that a researcher conducting empirical studies has to carefully self-reflect role of objectivity in relation to his/her own interpretations on the research data. In an analysis of qualitative material several different interpretations can be made and there is no definitive interpretation that tells the 'truth'. However, the qualitative researcher has to demonstrate clearly the plausibility of their interpretation in the selected research project (Devine 2002, 205-206). In order to ensure plausibility in this thesis I interpret findings from my research data through academically discussed theoretical typologies, as well as follow carefully research guidelines defined in process-tracing methodology.

---

<sup>37</sup> See e.g. Ó Tuathail and Dalby (1998) "Rethinking geopolitics".

## **6.2. Year 2011: “As an Arctic Country, Finland is a Natural Actor in the Region”**

Year 2011 was the year, when Finland was supposed to implement its objectives on the Arctic affairs as it had pledged in its first Arctic strategy from the previous fall. Internationally, the Arctic affairs had taken a significant step forward on the road to balance and cooperation in the region, when Norway and Russia had signed a new maritime delimitation in Barents Sea (Barents Sea agreement) in 2010, which ended a 40 year-old dispute between the two countries (Sørensen 2013, 7).

Secretary of State, Pertti Torstila, gave a speech at the Arctic frontier conference in Tromsø in January 2011 reflecting current developments in international Arctic affairs and presented Finland’s objectives, defined in its new Arctic strategy, for the Arctic politics (1). Torstila described Finland’s interest in the Arctic affairs as the following: “As a result of geography, history, and experience, Finland has a natural interest and contribution to make in the Arctic.” Torstila described Finland’s historical bond to Arctic with Arctic explorers and the Saami people. Often overshadowed by the Norwegian polar explorers the Finn, Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld, stands out as the first man who sailed his ship through the Northern Passage during 1878/1879. Torstila bridged Finland’s historical background as a polar exploring nation to the modern ice management technology which is Finland’s core competence in Arctic business opportunities: “We are the only country in the world experiencing such a dramatic limitation to seafaring and yet shipping continues at all our harbors uninterrupted all year round.” (1)

In the speech Torstila presented Finland’s priorities in the Arctic as stated in the strategy by summarizing them to “utilization of Finland’s Arctic know-how and research, institutional issues, regional cooperation, environmental matters and questions related to the indigenous peoples”. A key issue to Finland is to create measures to combine economic activities and environmental concerns. Finland’s economic approach to the Arctic region takes sustainable development, in terms of the fragile Arctic environment, as the basic platform of all the Arctic activities. Despite the mention on the importance of the principle of sustainable development, Torstila did not offer any concrete action plans

for ensuring sustainability in Finland's economic projects in the Arctic. Most concrete initiative introduced in the speech was Finland's request to place Arctic Information Center for the European Union to northern Finland in Rovaniemi. Finland's role in increased scientific and research related cooperation is seen as strength for its Arctic presence (1). This application reflects clearly Finland's determination to promote Finnish Arctic know-how and research capacities, as well as Finland's support to the EU in its process to apply for its observant status in Arctic Council.

The purpose of the information center would be to "serve as a tool to support EU's Arctic policy and increase its visibility". Torstila mentions also a greatly awaited report from European Parliament called "Report on a sustainable EU policy for the High North," the so-called 'Gahler Report' named after the rapporteur, Member of the European Parliament, Mr. Michael Gahler. Torstila stated openly Finland's support to EU in Arctic affairs by describing EU's role essential factor for strengthening Arctic cooperation. Finland has promoted EU as an Arctic actor, and the EU Commission's prospect to be accepted as a permanent observer in the Arctic Council. Torstila summarizes: "It is hard to see how the Arctic Council could not benefit from a more active participation by the Union." (1)

Overall, Torstila introduced a economic-driven, environmentally conscious and cooperation-favoring Finnish Arctic action plan, which reaches to the future by emphasizing Arctic research and strengthening cooperation between old and new Arctic partners. However, Torstila gave a vague definition of Finland's future actions in the region by stating that Finland is "open to exploring possibilities of increased scientific and research related cooperation"(1). Research cooperation, especially in form of Arctic Information Center for the European Union center is mentioned as Finland's high priority in the Arctic affairs several times. Finland's answer to Arctic environmental questions is to act cooperatively, to use resources in environmentally sustainable way and to enhance "the dialogue and cooperation mitigate the consequences of the change, while preparing to adapt ourselves to others." Torstila mentioned also research and education in order to prepare us to the future changes in the Arctic. (1)

Torstila's speech did not give many concrete examples of how Finland will e.g., execute its plans for Arctic economy, but an increasing enthusiasm for the Arctic can be read from the speech. However, the Arctic future is still a big unknown for all the players in the region, which leaves a lot of room for speculations and expectations. (1)

In January 2011, the Ministry of Employment and Economy published a press release on the economic opportunities in the Arctic. The release contained no reference to sustainability in terms of economic prospect for Arctic opportunities. It was based on an official report on reforming economic structures of the Barents region (2). Finland's main focus on Barents region should be in marine industries, technology application, development of local heating and electricity production, forestry, construction, mining- and metal industries as well as in other areas of Finland's expertise, not forgetting growing opportunities in support and maintenance sectors and in tourism (2).

The report encouraged Finnish business representatives to explore emerging opportunities within the Arctic industries, which will increase simultaneously with the extensive gas- and oil projects in the region. These support functions can create a huge variety of export potential for Finnish businesses. The report emphasizes Russia's central role in future Arctic resource explorations and the importance of a well maintained Russian-Finnish business relationships in terms Finland's intentions to strengthen its role in Arctic economic activities. Finland does not hold a special connection with Russia in Arctic affairs anymore, because Norway, for example, has strengthened its relationship with Russia through logistic investments and co-managed project over the Arctic Ocean via Northern Sea route. The report encouraged Finland to rediscover its former strong business- and political relations with Russia via public and governmental intermediary organizations, such as The National Technology Agency (Tekes) and Finpro, as well as via reliable, preferably ministerial level, representative as a facilitator in communication and execution of business projects in the Barents region. According to the report public mediation organizations can only *facilitate* better business connections between Finland



and Russia, but the actual will power and initiations have to arise from the private, Finnish businesses (2).

#### **6.2.1. Partners, Competitors and Enemies: Discussion on the Arctic Foreign Relations anno 2011**

Helsingin Sanomat covered in January 2011 the results of ‘the great Arctic survey’, which was conducted to the people of the eight Arctic nations<sup>38</sup> and covered their perceptions of Arctic international relations. 9.000 people participated in the survey, 824 of them were Finns. According to the survey, the Finns would like to strengthen Arctic cooperation especially within the Nordic countries, and at the same time avoid cooperation with China (3). Finns, along the majority of the other participants in the survey, support political collaboration and negotiation over the possible economic use of the Arctic region. 77 % of the Finns want to strengthen the Arctic Council, whom they see as a weak, Arctic actor. Professor Timo Koivurova from University of Lapland commented in Helsingin Sanomat, that the Finnish opinions on the Arctic cooperation follow closely Finland’s official lines of the Arctic foreign policies. (3)

In addition to the Nordic dimension of the Arctic cooperation, the Finnish media closely follows debates and discussion on the Arctic issues in the European Union. On January 20<sup>th</sup> 2011, YLE Lappi<sup>39</sup> reported on European Parliament’s support on an initiative to locate EU Arctic Information Centre in Rovaniemi, Finland. YLE reported about the European Parliament’s (EP) recently released report (so called Gahler’s report), which names Rovaniemi and University of Lapland as the only potential and realistic location for the EU Information Centre. European Commission makes final decision on the location, but the European Parliament’s statements create pressure to the process. YLE told discussions regarding to the Information Center take place in the spring of 2011 in the EU Commission. (4)

In terms of the EU’s Arctic report mentioned above, the EP organized a discussion and debate in connection with the release of the report “(..) on a sustainable EU policy for the

---

<sup>38</sup> Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, USA, Sweden and Russia.

<sup>39</sup> YLE Lappi: YLE news’s local department covering news in Northern Finland and in Lapland.

High North” (5). The debate took place in Strasbourg in January 2011. Finnish MEPs Liisa Jaakonsaari, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Timo Soini, Mitro Repo and Riikka Manner participated actively to the debate on the report’s content, and on the signals it sends about the EU’s Arctic policies. Despite the Finnish MEPs represent different political groups in the EP, they all mentioned *the importance of the EU in the Arctic affairs*. They all also emphasized the report’s great contribution to develop the Arctic Council’s role in the international Arctic affairs by eventually accepting the EU as an observer to the Council. In addition, they all supported strongly the suggestion to locate EU’s Arctic Information Centre in Rovaniemi. Anneli Jäätteenmäki (ALDE Group<sup>40</sup>) for example pointed out that “The University of Lapland deserves a praise for being the only university, the only agency, that has really worked to ensure that such a center would be established, and has devoted much time and effort to this.” (5)

The Finnish MEPs participating the debate raised their concerns on possible consequences, which resource exploration in the Arctic could have on local, indigenous communities and on the fragile polar environment. Timo Soini from the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) party, representing right-wing Eurosceptic political group in EU, was the most expressive in his criticism towards the EU’s “Arctic excitement”. He reminded, together with his Danish EFD colleague, Anna Rosbach, that EU’s access to the Arctic issues comes mainly through its Arctic member, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Therefore EU’s Arctic presence should not be taken for granted. He argued “they (Arctic regions) are regions with sovereign rights, which they may exercise to take decisions on their own matters.” (5)

Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D Group<sup>41</sup>) reminded the listeners, that resource exploration brings not only possibilities, but as well as responsibilities for the EU: “It is important that natural resources are exploited responsibly and carefully in order to avoid the ‘gold rush’ phenomenon and catastrophes of the sort that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico (5)”

---

<sup>40</sup> Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

<sup>41</sup> Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.

From a Finnish perspective, the EU is seen as an important intergovernmental actor in the Arctic affairs, as well is the Arctic Council. Finland's Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava gave a speech at the Arctic Council's Ministerial Meeting in Nuuk in 2011, where he addresses the Arctic issues importance to Finland. Bearing in mind the audience for the speech, Mr. Jalava emphasizes intergovernmental cooperation as a corner stone of the Arctic politics, and Finland's willingness to be a proactive participant in all the endeavors to deepen Arctic cooperation in the future. He stated: "Cooperation is not possible without political will, and political will must be based on the realities of our interconnected world and the appropriate understanding of our respective national interests in our new environment of increased mutual interdependence (6)."

Jalava expresses Finland's contentment with the current policy proceedings<sup>42</sup> of the Council including the decision to establish the Council's permanent Secretariat to the city of Tromsø in Northern Norway. Finland sees the permanent secretariat as an important instrument to raise awareness and to create long-lasting networks in the Arctic. Overall, Jalava expresses Finland's support to strengthen the Arctic Council, which can be achieved by "engaging governments and institutions with legitimate interest in the region". (6) Finland supports strongly EU's acceptance as a permanent observer to the Arctic Council: "In view of the major contribution by the EU to enhanced cooperation in the field of environment, economy, research and human contacts in general, its input into our work within the Arctic Council should be welcomed. I believe we all would benefit from a permanent observer position granted to the EU." (6)

Secondly, Jalava stressed Finland's current Presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), where it has been leading NCM's response to climate change, especially in the Arctic. Finland encourages AC to seek dialog and to embrace best practices between

---

<sup>42</sup> Arctic Council's member states signed in the Nuuk meeting the Agreement on Cooperation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue, the SAR agreement, which is the first legally binding agreement between the eight Arctic states (Arctic Council, 2011). Jalava expresses Finland's wish that SAR agreement as a succesful precedent "will lead to further improvements in the Council's normative role" (6).

other organizations related to Arctic issues. Finally, Jalava emphasized Finland's long history in the Arctic in terms of its indigenous Sami population, and strong traditions in ice know-how, both through Finnish Arctic explorers and modern ice-breaking technology. (6)

Timo Koivurova (University of Lapland) commented in Kaleva newspaper in October 2011, the outcomes of the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting. Koivurova points out a shift in power structures in the AC meetings; previously, some of the highest state representatives and the civil servants from the each member state attended the Council's meeting, but the increased focus on the Arctic, means that today even ministers attend the meetings. For instance, US Secretary of the State Hilary Clinton participated meeting in Nuuk 2011. This change reflects the increased importance that Arctic Council is gaining in world politics. (7)

Koivurova argues that the increasing number of new candidates for observant members also reflects international communities' growing interest towards the Arctic. At the moment, the AC has six members with an observer status, but the EU Commission, Italy, China, Japan and South Korea have all submitted their applications to receive observer status. The AC members agreed in Nuuk for the new and relatively strict criteria for bids of new observer candidates. New applicants have to accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council, recognize the Arctic States' sovereign rights in the Arctic, respect the values and interests of the Arctic indigenous people and demonstrate political willingness, as well as financial ability, to contribute to the work of the Arctic indigenous people in the Arctic Council. (6)

Koivurova summarized in Kaleva's article Finland's willingness to make the Arctic Council the international institution and cooperation forum, where core decisions for the future of the region are made. Finland is an eager supporter of the new bids for observers in the Council in order to strengthen its power in global Arctic affairs. (6)

### 6.2.2. Finnish Ministers on the Arctic Road

In June 2011 Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen's Government published a press release presenting the finalized negotiations over the Government's Action plan for the next four-year-period. The press release stated that the Arctic affairs will be covered thoroughly in the Government's new Action plan. The Arctic region has gained increasing economical and political importance in the global and domestic politics during the past years. However, climate change and resource utilization increase the risk of an environmental catastrophe in the Arctic region. Finland's response to increasing risks is to promote Finnish expertise, and to intensify cooperation between the actors in the region. Finland believes that "cooperation between the Arctic countries should be increased in order to enhance the region's business activities, and in order to work against the environmental threats in the region" (7). In addition, "mining operations and exploitation of the natural resources in the region must respect the ecological sustainability and the rights of the indigenous peoples" (7). In terms of the EU's participation in the Arctic policymaking, Finland's aim is to strengthen the EU's Arctic policy and get the EU's Arctic Information Centre to be located in Rovaniemi. (7)

Erkki Tuomioja was elected to become Finland's new Foreign Minister to Jyrki Katainen's government in the summer of 2011<sup>43</sup>. Foreign Minister Tuomioja, gave a speech at the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) meeting in Kiruna, Sweden in October 2011.

In the speech he addressed Arctic issues from the Barents region perspective by describing BEAC not only "to embraces people-to-people, community-to-community, or cross-border relations", but actual represent *the region, that is a part of the Arctic*. For Finland, the Barents region is its gateway to the Arctic, and globally, the region is gaining increasingly more and more attention. (8)

Tuomioja emphasized a comprehensive approach to the challenges occurring in the Barents region in the upcoming decades: "Climate change, together with sustainable use

---

<sup>43</sup> Jyrki Katainen's Government: <http://valtioneuvosto.fi/hallitus/jasenet/fi.jsp>

of natural resources, biodiversity conservation, pollution prevention as well as building up energy efficiency and renewable energy resources, economic growth, enhanced transportation and logistics in the region are inherently intertwined”. Barents Euro Arctic Council represents remarkable knowledge and expertise on these issues, and therefore has a potential for increasing its role influence on these complex problems that the region will facing.

From the Finnish perspective, the Barents region plays a crucial role in the future of infrastructural development in the Arctic. Tuomioja stated: “The Barents link railway corridor from Northern Norway via Sweden and Finland to North-West Russia is essential for the economic development of the region. The Barents link will, undoubtedly, complement the Northern maritime routes”. (8)

Lastly, Tuomioja highlights the importance of emerging new transportation routes across the Arctic via Barents region: “As a result of the climate change, the North-East Passage is opening as a global maritime transit corridor. While this is expected to benefit the Barents region, and contribute to region’s socio-economic growth and well-being, increasing traffic brings about new challenges and risks. The Agreement on Cooperation within the Field of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response is an indispensable instrument in this context. Finland will ratify the Agreement within the next few weeks”. (8)

Last documentations from 2011 is a speech from Minister of Environment, Ville Niinistö, which he gave at the Barents region environmental ministerial meeting in Umeå in November 2011. Minister Niinistö gave the speech in a meeting where Sweden handed over the chairmanship of the Working Group to Finland for the following year. In his speech, Niinistö stressed Finland’s objectives for its chairmanship period, which includes promotion of environmental issues in the framework of economic activities in the Barents Region. (9)

Barents Region has gained significant emphasizes as strategic region for whole Europe. Niinistö encourages the Council to develop and to facilitate "more communication on environmental issues with, and between, the economic stakeholders in the region." Natural resources and new transportation routes are in the interests of the whole global community. The area is the world leader in in paper and pulp production. In addition, Niinistö reminded "that all of the 14 minerals listed by the European Commission as critical to the European Union can be found in the Barents Region." Needs for natural resource extraction in the region come increasingly from outside of the Barents states, which demands a pan-Barents approach to the future environmental challenges in the region. (9)

Finland believes that cooperation on nature conservation could enhance overall understanding and management "of the magnificent nature values existing in the region". Niinistö stressed the importance of comprehensive understanding of natural conservation in the region in order to decrease the environmental impacts from the increasing endeavours on natural resources. Finland will continue its participation to the Barents Protected Areas Network (BPAN) project in order to increase understanding on environmental impact of the economic activities in the Barents region. Results of the BPAN project will be reported at the end of Finnish chairmanship. (9)

Niinistö also named understanding of the climate change consequences on the economy as an important point on the Finland's chairmanship agenda. He mentioned that Finland is developing regional climate change strategies, and encouraged similar cross-sectorial regional processes to be applied also elsewhere. Finland is committed to continue "the main lines of environmental cooperation in the framework of the Working Group on Environment", and to maintain the group's role "as one of one of the most important and active bodies of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council." Overall, Niinistö emphasized in his speech the importance of increasing environmental cooperation within, and outside the Barents region so as to generate comprehensive understanding of the environmental impact of future economic activities in the region. (9)

### **6.2.3. Domestic Politics Weakens the Arctic Agenda**

As a criticism to the weakening importance of the Arctic agenda in Finland, Analys Norden<sup>44</sup> published an article in June 2011 referring to Finland's recent political actions as "wasted opportunities" in the Arctic international relations. The article blamed Finnish political decision-makers for prolonging the government formulation process after the Parliamentary elections in April 2011. Finland's passive Arctic politics in the Barents region has lead the country to pursue a dull Arctic agenda without any concrete accomplishments, e.g. to create a plan to improve railway connection between the Arctic Ocean and Norway, Finland and Russia. Finland lost its Arctic coastal line in the World War II, which moved it to the team of non-littoral, 'secondary' Arctic states, together with Sweden and Iceland. Nevertheless, those geographical changes granted Finland a special role as an Arctic mediator, because it does not have to worry its direct, national interests or to preserve its sovereign rights in discussions over the Arctic resource claims. However, Finland has not capitalized the benefits of its special role in the Arctic. (10)

Developments in the Finnish domestic politics have been seen as a hindering factor on its road to strengthen state's Arctic profile. The article argues, that changes in Finland's domestic politics in the spring of 2011, interrupted severely its ruling government's strong curse in international Arctic politics. Minister Stubb, together with the Katainen's first government acted as strong Arctic lobbyists, but the election in March 2011 resulted a shift in the domestic power structures in Finland, and put a pause on progression in the Arctic agenda. While Finland has been struggling to strengthen its Arctic profile, Norway has successfully created a hub of international Arctic politics in Tromsø, as well as turned one of it's the most remote Arctic islands, Svalbard, into Norway's most international local community. The focus of the global Arctic community is turned firmly toward the Arctic Norway, argues the article. (10)

---

<sup>44</sup> Analys Norden is a web publication produced and maintained by Nordic Council of Minister. Its aim is to give a summarized outlook of ongoing political debates in the Nordic countries (Nordic Council of Ministers 2014).



### **6.3. Year 2012: Interest Towards the Arctic Increases**

The Finnish media's attention towards the Arctic-related topics increased significantly in 2012 compared to the previous years<sup>45</sup>. ArcticFinland reported 24 different articles, speeches and press releases from Finnish Arctic discussions on 2012, whereas on the previous year, that number was 14. Media coverage, as well as topics of the official press releases on the Arctic were widely fragmented covering themes from emerging Arctic business opportunities to the EU High Representative Cathrine Aston's Rovaniemi-visit and to the indigenous peoples' involvement in the future Arctic policy making. (Arctic Finland 2014)

#### **6.3.1. All Eyes Are On the Arctic**

Kaleva newspaper covered Arctic topics actively during 2012. Kaleva's first column on the Arctic affairs in the 2012, was published in February and it highlighted the differences between Finland's and Norway's Arctic presence. Basically, the column focuses on explaining how Norwegians deliver much more successful Arctic business strategies than Finns do. Climate change and global economic recession are the main reasons for economic endeavors that Norway has actively practiced in the Arctic for the last decade. (11)

The direct impacts of the climate change are seen in the opening of new, global transportation routes, such as the Northern Sea Route. This new transportation route could benefit considerably also Northern Finland's cargo transportation as soon as Finland finds its access to the Arctic Sea. At the same time, Norway establishes actively Barents region's gas and oil province to Northern Norway. Norway expects exploitation of the Arctic natural resources to bring even more jobs and prosperity to the northern regions of Norway in the upcoming years, while already now Norway is the world's second largest gas and the sixth largest oil producer. A key phrase for the Norwegian plans for the Arctic, is 'energy export'. (11)

---

<sup>45</sup> By this notion I refer to frequency of media 'hits' on the Arctic.finland-forum, which means there is a possibility, that some Arctic related articles are not included to this analysis.

Norway aims to offer Europe a more sustainable alternative for Arctic energy production than unethical and unsustainable energy production operated by Russia. However, the column also addresses criticism raised against Norwegian energy procedures in the North. Local communities, including indigenous communities, do not want to become a target of energy colonialism, which means that foreign energy giants or Norwegian national energy companies from the South, would gain all the benefits from the Arctic resource exploitation. In addition environmental organizations are against actions that expose fragile Arctic ecosystems to environmental hazards. (11)

Finally, the column argues that Finland's Arctic strategy, as well as its Arctic actions in general, lack of a genuine enthusiasm towards the Arctic cooperation. According to the columnist, Finland has the knowledge and the know-how required for projects in harsh Arctic conditions, e.g. understanding of extreme ice-conditions and long periods of darkness. Despite the know-how and occurring possibilities in the Arctic, Finnish interest towards the region has stayed surprisingly low. (11)

The second Arctic-related column in Kaleva in 2012 approached the Arctic affairs with a title "Presidents of the North". Finland's 12<sup>th</sup> presidential elections were just over, and the columnist commented Arctic being more vigorously exposed in national media during the presidential debates than ever before. Questions about the politics of Northern Finland, especially in the frame of transportation connections to the Arctic Sea and mining projects in Lapland, were regularly covered in presidential election debates. (12)

Globally economic potential of the Arctic is not news anymore. In Finland the economic potential of the Arctic is tied to our geography, which can be very beneficial to Finnish economy. Increasing importance of the Arctic does not necessarily benefit only the Northern parts of Finland, but shipyards and technology industries located in Southern Finland can as well boost their business through incoming Arctic investments. This comprehensive approach to the Arctic strengthens Finland's position as a true Arctic nation. Nevertheless, the growing national interest towards the Arctic, regional

cooperation moves slowly forward in the Barents region. Policy mechanism for intensified cooperation are existing but actions stay on a backburner. (12)

Kaleva's next column, in March 2012, addressed huge investment potentials that the Arctic region can bring to the Northern Finland in upcoming years. The column encouraged Finland to "wake up" and start following its Arctic neighbors' lead in the search of Arctic business opportunities. Lapland Chamber of Commerce estimates that potential investments related to Arctic business and infrastructure to northern parts of Finland, Norway and Sweden could rise to upwards of 125 billion euros during this decade. As a comparison the columnist mentioned that the state budget of Finland is annually around 50 billion euros. (13)

The majority of investments come from mining, oil- and gas industries and projects within transportation infrastructure. In addition, wind power investments are rising in Sweden and Norway, while Finland is investing in nuclear power. Time will show, which energy path creates most sustainable ground for energy production. At the moment, the Sakatti-mine in Sodankylä is the biggest mining project in Finnish Lapland and is owned by mining company Anglo American. The columnist predicted that the Saketti-mining project could change Lapland region more than anything in its history. However, today the region is still a Nature-conservation area. (13)

The columnist argued that exploitation of natural resource will bring along also challenges in terms of reindeer herding, forestry, tourism and nature conservation. New businesses will need the same land that has been used by the local business owners, and e.g. by the indigenous people in the region. The columnist predicted that there will come a day when investors' and indigenous people's interest clash in the Sami areas. (13)

The column suggested occurring Arctic business opportunities to become a long needed "steam engine" to boost Finnish economy up again. Columnist advises innovation people of Helsinki to "Look North". Finally column reminds of the importance of

comprehensive approach to land utilizations, and the knowledge of environmental impacts of any economic activities in the Arctic. (13)

**6.3.2. Business, Business, Business. But Let's Not Forget the Environment**  
Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) is the leading business organization in Finland, and its main mission is to create an internationally attractive and competitive business environment for companies operating in Finland. EK has 16.000 member companies in Finland, which all together employ over 950.000 workers (Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto 2014). In February 2012 EK published in its Prima-magazine a feature story titled “Arctic Window Is Open” focusing on Finland’s business opportunities in the Arctic. (14)

Chairman of the Finnish Construction Industries Timo Kontamäki encouraged in the article Finnish companies to act on the business opportunities in Arctic infrastructure development now, when the momentum is here. Finnish expertise on, for instance in research and development and in infrastructure construction businesses is highly valued in e.g. Northern Russia. Norwegians have already materialized lots of this Arctic business potential, and they work closely with Russian e.g. in Shtokman’s energy projects.

Finland’s other strong asset in the Arctic business is its world-leading ice management industry. Tero Vauraste, CEO of state-owned icebreaker company Arctia Shipping, predicts that demand for offshore icebreakers grows when Arctic energy exploration keeps expanding. Northern Sea Route and growing Russian energy industry can generate significant new business for Finnish ice management industry. However, Vauraste reminded the reader that expanding Arctic transportation markets mean toughening competition in the area. Finnish shipyards have to be able to keep their cost of labor on competitive (compare to foreign operators) in order to stay in the race. (14)

In the same story, Hannu Halinen Finnish Arctic Ambassador, summarized Arctic economic endeavors to be grounded on political and scientific cooperation. Finland is the EU’s forerunner in the Arctic cooperation. He stated, that competition over the Arctic natural resources will be hard, but the majority of the estimated energy reserves will be

found within the EEZ of some of the Arctic littoral states and therefore, ownership of the reserves will stay undisputed. Lots of questions still remain unanswered in the future discussion over the Arctic. For example Arctic fishing laws, transportation and environmental conservation will all include variety of aspects that need to be settled between the Arctic nations. (14)

Hallinen emphasized Russia's role as an important Arctic partner for Finland. However, Halinen encouraged Finland to be more proactive towards Russia and Norway, who both have intensified their Arctic relationship since the Barents Sea Agreement, in order not to be left out of crucial Arctic discussion and decision-making. In addition Halinen emphasized the role of University of Lapland in Finland's international Arctic profile. Finland's strong and multidisciplinary Arctic research profile will strengthen international interest towards the Finnish Arctic knowhow. Scientists from the Arctic center follow actively, for instance climate change impacts on yearly ice covers in the Polar areas. (14)

Tero Vaurasto, CEO of Arctia Shipping, commented Finland's Arctic profile and its Arctic endeavors also in Helsingin Sanomat in April 2012. The news article was titled "Competition over the exploitation of the Arctic regions accelerates" and included argumentations for and against economic utilization of the Arctic region. Russia, Norway and Canada are already operating actively in the region, and Finland is about to follow their lead. Arctic politics have been included to the Government's Action Plan and Finland has its own Arctic strategy, but lacks coherence in term of executing its plans for the Arctic. Vauraste said in Helsingin Sanomat that, Finland's "take off" for Arctic business opportunities has been sluggish. According to Vauraste Finland has a unique, comprehensive know-how on ice management, extending from ship design to working with them: "This should also be capitalized properly." (15)

In the same article, EK's Timo Laukkanen, addressed the significance of an early decision making when vast investment projects are in question in the region. Finland's

role in the Arctic is to be a supplier of technology due to its geographical location outside the Arctic coastal states. (15)

A third expert in the news article was Greenpeace Finland's Programme Director, Tapio Laakso, who was disappointed on the fact, that impacts of climate change in the Arctic are seen purely as a business opportunity to drill more fossil fuels out of the Arctic grounds. In the article he criticizes Finland's Arctic Strategy for "talking the talk" of fragile Arctic environment, but not "walking the walk" of it. He says Finland should not support any oil extraction projects in the Arctic because "Finland does not have any required skills, that would make oil drilling (in the Arctic) any safer. Finland's own Arctic strategy notes, that oil spill prevention in the icy waters is completely impossible with the existing technology." Laakso is particularly concerned about Russia's actions in the Arctic region due to its bad reputation to control oil-drilling projects even on the land. (15)

#### **6.3.3. State of the Arctic Environment Concerns Minister Niinistö**

The only documentation exclusively focusing on environmental threats behind potential economic activities in the Arctic is a post from Finnish Minister of Environment, Ville Niinistö's blog from May, 2012. He explains the reasons behind Arctic "rush" evoking from the growing population and consequently accelerating energy consumption in the world. Due to the increasing energy dependency, pressure to find new natural resources from still undiscovered regions is increasing in every corner of the globe, including the Arctic is mounting. (16)

Niinistö reminds that Finland has followed the global trend of the Arctic boom by rediscovering its mining industry. However, Arctic has still stayed untouched of any drilling and mining projects due to its harsh climate, but global pressure to start exploring Arctic natural reserves is growing. For instance, conceivable oil accidents, oil spills, under the Arctic ice and snow can trigger an environmental catastrophe that could be almost impossible to curtail. In order to stop this kind of hazard to happen, Ville Niinistö calls for a moratorium on Arctic oil drilling, fully prohibiting any resource exploitation, in the most vulnerable areas of the High North. Niinistö emphasizes politicians'

responsibility to take action in international institutions, such as in the Arctic Council, to ensure that internationally agreement on the Arctic environmental conservation will be established. Interests of the Arctic environment and peoples should be considered before starting any exploitation of the region's natural resources. A comprehensive approach of the region's future is needed instead of rushing after the region's natural resources in the cost of the Arctic people and nature. (16)

#### **6.3.4. High Time for the Finland's Arctic Awakening**

Finnish newspaper, Huvudstadsbladet (HBL), published an editorial reflecting the news on 'the kick-off' of the Arctic cooperation between Finnish icebreaker company Arctia Shipping and Royal Shell in oil exploration outside of the coast of Alaska in March 2012. HBL's journalist, Yrsa Grüne, wrote that Finland's actions in the Arctic started "not a day too early." Economic interests towards the Arctic 'treasures', oil and gas, are rising around the world, in among the others China, South Korea and India, who have all expressed their interest toward future Arctic resource exploration. (17)

Contrary to Minister Niinistö's demand for the Arctic moratorium, Grüne wrote that a total ban on oil and gas exploration in the region is unrealistic scenario. However, the international community has to predict and prevent environmental catastrophes in the vulnerable Arctic region, which can to be done by establishing an international agreement exceeding national borders. It should be a high priority for the policymaking in the Arctic Council and the Nordic Council. (17)

Grüne further explains that relying only on the oil companies' actions in the region, is an ignorant approach to the issue. Arctic states have to make sure oil companies have mapped the risks, and are prepared to tackle any unexpected situations that might to occur. Finland has started to pay higher attention to the Arctic, but a lot can still be done in order to secure sustainable future in the Arctic. (17)

#### **6.3.5. Geopolitics of "the New Arctic"**

In August 2012, Sami Moisio published an editorial in Kaleva about "the new geography of the North" and what kind of impacts changes in Northern geopolitics will have on Finland. Moisio argued that melting ice, development of the global energy and the raw

mineral prices and general trends in the world politics will define the course of the future Arctic politics. Development and changes in the relationships between the key players in the Arctic, such as Russia and European Union, are especially important to Finland's Arctic politics. International relations in the Arctic will affect progress of the region's governing structures and engagement of the relevant actors. Current governing structures of the Arctic are defined by international organizations, such as the Arctic Council, and international convention, such as UNCLOS. (18)

Furthermore, despite the changes in Arctic geopolitics, the defining attribute for Finland's Arctic profile is its location outside of the littoral, Arctic states. Therefore, chances for Finland to get involved with resource-related conflict or disputes are negligible. However, changes in the Arctic, can radically affect the Northern Finland's future proceedings. At the moment the majority of Finland's "peripheral regions" are becoming deserted, as residents move away for work and study. (18)

Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen gave a speech in Martti Ahtisaari-seminar in Jyväskylä in November 2012. He spoke about the arising importance of the Arctic region, not only for the Northern parts of the country, but the state of Finland as a whole. Arising Arctic interest, and its impacts to geopolitics, changes Finland's own view of itself as country. Finland has moved from being "a far-away-land" to the "center of the opportunities". (19)

According to Minister Katainen, the ongoing mining boom, rise in Arctic energy natural resources, and new shipping routes are the main "game changers" in future, global politics and economy. Melting sea ice in the Arctic enables these changes to happen. However, Arctic nature is extremely vulnerable and that is why all the economic activities in the region, especially resource exploitation, must be conducted in respect of highest environmental standards. (19)

New shipping routes, as the Northern Sea Route, would remap the transportation logics in the world. However, Minister Katainen is skeptical of Northern Sea Routes realistic



benefits for Finland. Despite the lower levels of ice, harsh climate conditions and darkness remain in the polar areas for majority of the year. Cargo volume through Arctic shipping routes should increase significantly before it would be beneficial for Finland to consider investing for new railway connections new Northern harbors. (19)

However, Finnish expertise on ice management technology is world leading, and therefore should be emphasized in its Arctic profile. Katainen stated that Finnish “cold how” can provide more potential growth and benefit for Finnish economy than Arctic shipping routes. Finland is the world’s only country, where all harbors are frozen in winter but remain their functionality all year around. Consequently, majority of world’s ice breakers are produced in Finland. Finland needs partners in order to grow its Arctic business, because Arctic project needs big investments to materialize. Cooperation initiatives such as Arctic maritime clusters are ideal for Finland’s participation, and its expertise for example in environmental protection technology, has guaranteed demand. (19)

Katainen in the speech further explained, that the Government is currently updating its Arctic strategy with deeper focus on creating more concrete guideline for a knowledge-based Arctic policy. Katainen summarizes the vision of the new strategy to develop Finland’s competences to coordinate the environmental constraints and the Arctic business opportunities as a part of international Arctic cooperation. (19)

#### **6.3.6. Minister Tuomioja: Climate Change Concerns**

Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja, gave a speech at an Arctic seminar organized by FIIA in the 18<sup>th</sup> of September 2012. Minister Tuomioja started his speech on a rather “harsh” note compared to the other Finnish government official’s speeches in 2012. Tuomioja stated that “the raison behind ever-growing Arctic interest and endeavors is rather sad and frightening”. Progress of climate change is the most visual in the Arctic region where “the global average temperature increase of one degree will actualize at least doubled”. (20)

Tuomioja addressed the understanding of the Arctic regions as a whole, taking into account not only the area of natural resources and transport routes, but including the environment and the local residents. Tuomioja emphasizes cooperation, interdependence, trust and transparency as the key elements of all Arctic activities. Finland has an initiative in processes to develop existing legislative structures in the Arctic; “state sovereignty must be respected, but it does not prevent the recognition of interdependence”. (20)

Changes in the Arctic region will have far-reaching effects on the Finnish society as a whole. Tuomioja stated clearly the starting point of Finland’s own Arctic strategy: “while economic activities increase, Finland - and other Arctic countries - must make sure that all activities (in the region) are conducted in respect of the environment and the indigenous rights. In order to preserve sustainable development of the Arctic region, it is essential that the region's natural resources are exploited in a controlled manner, taking into account the economic, social, cultural and environmental impacts.” (20)

Tuomioja explained Finland’s Arctic policies to be defined in close connection to the international Arctic discussion. Bilateral relations are significant also in Arctic affairs; Russia, Sweden and Norway are mentioned as the main Arctic partners to Finland. In addition, Nordic cooperation through the Nordic Council of Ministers has also an Arctic dimension, though Nordic countries have very different basis for their Arctic politics. However, the Nordic countries share the same principles for Arctic cooperation, which they can strengthen in the other Arctic forums as well. (20)

The central forum for international cooperation in the Arctic is the Arctic Council, whose role, Finland wants to strengthen. The Arctic Council fulfills all the prerequisites to become an international institution with a global role and responsibilities. The thought of a joint Arctic Council was born 21 years ago during the ‘Rovaniemi meeting’, which led to the ‘Rovaniemi process’, that was assigned to assess the environmental impact assessment in the Arctic. Now would be the time to examine how environmental impact assessment framework and terms of reference work in practice. Tuomioja encouraged the Arctic Council to take an active role, and place these questions to its agenda again. (20)

Finland acts as a vigorous developer of EU's Arctic politics. In order to enhance the EU's internal and external Arctic communication, Finland has proposed the EU's Arctic Information Center to be located in Rovaniemi, Finland. Decision on the Center's establishment will make the EU Commission, and it will be a part of a broader process of the EU's strategic action points for the Arctic. Finland will be following-up the process carefully in the upcoming years. In terms of the EU's bid for permanent observer status in Arctic Council, Finland believes EU meets all the requirements of a permanent observer and assumes it will be granted the new status in the next spring (2013). (20)

Tuomioja ended his speech with a note on the continuity of the era of the united, peaceful Arctic region, so called era of "Pax Artican". Nevertheless, he stated that cooperation and mutual trust must be built and increased continuously within the old and the new Arctic partner. (20)

#### **6.3.7. Lobbying EU And Seeking New Partnerships From Norway**

In September 2012, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja, gave another Arctic speech in an experts' seminar focused on Finland-Russia partnership in the Arctic region. Tuomioja addressed mainly the same objectives and priorities as elaborated in his previous Arctic speech above, e.g. the necessity of the cooperation in Arctic region. He repeated the same key elements, from Finnish perspective, in the Arctic discussions: cooperation, mutual dependence, trust and transparency. Adequacy of the current legal basis should be assessed, and Finland wants to be an active player in this development process. He highlighted the importance of the Arctic politics for Finland's future; changes in the region will have far-reaching impacts to the whole country: As economic activities in the region increase, Finland together with the other Arctic countries, must ensure that all the activities occur in respect of the Arctic environment and the indigenous people. (21)

EU's Arctic politics remained closely covered in the Finnish media, when Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy visited Finland, Sweden and Norway in March 2012. The purpose of the visit was to highlight

EU's increasing strategic, economic and environmental interest towards Arctic region, and discuss the EU's application for permanent observer status further with these Arctic Council member states (European Commission 2012). Finnish media covered the visit intensely: YLE news and Lapin Kansa-newspaper covered the visit in five (online) news articles, in addition a special Arctic news portal, the Barents Observer, noted Catherine Ashton's visit to the Nordics in their news reporting<sup>46</sup>. (22)

Before the visit, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland reported Catherine Ashton's visit to cover discussions on the EU Northern Dimension and the Union's relationship with the Arctic. Aston comments on a press release, that she wants to "get a real sense of the issues (of Arctic/Northern Dimension) we need to address, and how the EU can engage effectively in support of our member states' work in these parts of the world." Aston's Arctic tour continued from Helsinki to Rovaniemi, from where she travelled to Sweden and Norway. During her visit in Finland she met the Foreign Minister Tuomioja together with his ministerial colleague at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister for International Development, Heidi Hautala, the President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, and Prime Minister, Jyrki Katainen. Aston's visit to the Nordics ended with the EU's Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen, Denmark. (22)

YLE news reported in connection to Aston's visit to Rovaniemi, that Finland is going to get the EU's Arctic Information Centre to Rovaniemi. Intentions had been that the decision would have been confirmed already during the visit, but the EU bureaucracy could not manage such a rapid schedule (22). Finnish Arctic Ambassador, Hannu Halinen, was also positive about Finland's project on EU's Information Center. He emphasized that this visit to the EU's Northern regions will give Catherine Aston concrete vision how important these regions are, and how those have to be included to the EU's policy making. Halinen stated also that the decision-making process in EU is slow, but the base for the project is strong. By locating the Information Center to Rovaniemi, the EU would

---

<sup>46</sup> Barents Observer 5.4.2012 "Knock, knock, knockin' on Arctic's door": <http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/knock-knock-knockin-arctics-door>

also reach out to the its only aboriginal, Sami people, who are residents of Rovaniemi region. (22)

Rector of University of Lapland Mauri Ylä-Kotola wrote a lengthy column in Kaleva in June 2012 about the same theme; Rovaniemi's application for "the Center of the Arctic Cooperation." Especially he emphasized University of Lapland's broad network with wide ranging Arctic institution around the globe. Despite the fact that Norway got the Arctic Council's secretary to be placed in Tromsø, and therefore made it to Arctic region's capital, Norway has an ongoing disagreement with global super power China about its global research station in Svalbard. (23)

Ylä-Kotola stressed that University of Lapland has a strong profile and far-reaching expertise on multidisciplinary Arctic research varying from social, environmental and human aspects of the Northern issues. In addition, it is the EU's northern most university. Ylä-Kotola encourages Finland to cherish its long Arctic history and experience, and endeavor to become forerunner of EU's Arctic affairs. (23)

#### **6.3.8. Finland bolsters its Arctic Cooperation with Norway**

*"Finland has long traditions in Arctic navigation and shipbuilding technology. An expedition led by Finnish polar explorer Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld was the first to achieve a complete crossing of the North East Passage. For Finns the ability to navigate in winter has not been only a means of livelihood. It has also been our country's lifeline. Finland is the only country in the world where in winter every single harbour may get frozen."* (Niinistö 2012, Norway) (27)

The President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, made an official state visit to Norway in October 2012. Finnish media covered the visit in five different articles published, among the others, in Kaleva and in Helsingin Sanomat. The President's delegation for the state visit included Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Alexander Stubb, Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade and a delegation of corporate leaders; and experts on the Nordic region from the Universities of Lapland and Oulu and from Barents Center Finland. During the visit, President Niinistö discussed the bilateral relations between

Finland and Norway with the Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, focusing on issues relating to the Arctic region, and current international affairs. The Office of the President of the Republic of Finland<sup>47</sup> stated in their press release in relation to the visit: “Finland and Norway share interests in the development of the northern regions, and Finland also wishes to strengthen both economic and scientific cooperation in the Arctic region.” The visit included a seminar focusing on the economic relations between Finland and Norway and a visit to the city of Tromsø where program focused particularly on the issues of Arctic research and cooperation. (26)

As mentioned above, President Niinistö participated a seminar at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, where he gave a speech highlighting strong diplomatic, geographical and cultural ties between Finland and Norway. In all, the speech addressed the importance of the great Finnish-Norwegian relationship, which potential both countries should recognize. As an opening remark, Niinistö made a reference to Finland and Norway as tough competitors in winter sports but defined this competition as “very much a family affair”. He pictured Finland and Norway “a one Nordic family”. (27)

He explained that Nordic cooperation continues maintaining its important role in the Nordic politics, but this cooperation can still be brought to “next level”. Niinistö stated that Finland has not properly realized its potential of economic cooperation and opportunities with Norway. On the realm of Arctic, Finland has woken up to action later than Norway, but Niinistö was convinced that Finland is “wide awake now”. And Finland sees Norway as its key Arctic partner; Niinistö summarized the cornerstones of the partnership to be “common border, close contacts and mutually complementary expertise”. (27)

The Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) are natural forums for Finnish-Norwegian cooperation and, to strengthening Arctic region politically. Secondly, Arctic know-how is common dimension for cooperation. Niinistö addressed the importance of the Arctic know-hows in the environmental and economic sectors, where

---

<sup>47</sup> In Finnish: Presidentinkanslia.

networking of Finnish and Norwegian companies and research institutes is essential. In addition, strong cross-border cooperation on local and regional level, in all sectors of the Arctic, can offer new opportunities for both countries. Lastly, Finland's and Norway's close cooperation is needed in order to develop visa practices in the North between Norway, Finland and Russia. Finnish and Norwegian consulates in Murmansk are very useful actors in this area of cooperation. (27)

Niinistö summarized his speech by stating that Finland and Norway have much in common: *"We are not identical, but we are very similar. Although we are very close, we have not fully found each other yet. Or, paradoxically, perhaps because of our closeness, we have not identified the full potential of our relations. It is surely time to open our eyes and ensure that we never lose sight of each other and these possibilities"*. (27)

#### **6.4. Year 2013: Arctic Issues Entering the Main Stage**

Arctic discussion in Finland unfolded to an entirely new level in 2013 due to a combination of developments in the national Arctic policymaking, and unexpected international and national events in the Arctic politics (Arctic Finland 2014). The Finnish Government released its new Arctic strategy in October 2013 and in September 30 international, Greenpeace activists attempted to board a Russian oil drilling platform in the Pechora Sea in order to protest against oil drilling activities in the Arctic. This caused a media tornado, which invigorated Arctic interest also in the Finnish media. During the 2013, Arctic question were covered by wider range of Finnish media outlets than during any previous years since the turn of the millennium, but due to limits of a master thesis project I still focus only to the same selection of media outlets than in years 2011 and 2012 (Helsingin Sanomat, YLE and Kaleva).

##### **6.4.1. Spring 2013**

Finnish media started the year 2013 by publishing news and opinion pieces discussing among other topics, whether Arctic economic opportunities are utopia or the most important direction for Finnish business to develop. Also importance of the EU's Arctic Information Center's for Finland emerged in media comments of Finnish officials in the

winter/spring 2013 (ArcticFinland, 2013). YLE started Arctic news year in January 2013 with a news about the EU's new focus towards the North. News story mentioned Finland's and Lapland's *key role* in the EU's Arctic plans. European Economic and Social Committee visited Rovaniemi in January 2013, in order to listen locals' perspectives on needs for, and requirements of the Arctic region. The Committee is an independent body, which provides advice and recommendations to European Commission and Parliament. (28)

YLE reported that the committee seeking rapid actions for the EU's Arctic policies because developments in the regions were speeding up strongly at the moment. The committee's draft recommendations were divided into two parts. In one hand, the Committee recommended that "the EU to consult local, indigenous voices in order to safeguard the area's nature's balance." In addition the EU should take more active role in the Northern affairs, for example by strengthening its role in the Arctic Council. (28)

On the other hand the Committee's draft defined the North as a region of new opportunities: "Global warming opens up new sea routes and allows for more efficient use of natural resources." Climate change is not seen just as a threat on the Committee's draft recommendation for the European Union; EU should see it also as an opportunity and adaptation to it should be explored thoroughly. (28)

YLE also reaffirmed that EU's Arctic Information Center had received a positive funding decision from the EU, though project is still under evaluation and preparation stages would last until 2013-2014. University of Lapland's Arctic Center manages and monitors the project during the final decision process. (28)

Secondly, YLE news covering the Arctic topics in 2013 discussed the impacts of Arctic ice melt on the marine environment in the region. News addressed concerns emerged in science community about strong, increased growth of algae growing under the Arctic ice. Due to disappearing ice cover algae gets more sunlight, which speeds up its normal growth. Scientists say this to be a new phenomenon in the Arctic. "Warming climate and



shrinking sea ice lead presumably to massive changes in ecology of the northern areas ”, YLE news stated.

#### **6.4.2. Arctic Milestones in 2013: Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna**

The Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council under Sweden’s chairmanship took place in Kiruna, Sweden in May 2013, where Sweden handed the Chairmanship over to Canada. The meeting had a historically important agenda, because the decision on several *non-Artic states’* bid for observation status to the Council was to be decided during the meeting. Evaluation of the observer candidates, especially the five Asian states (China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and Singapore) had raised new international attention towards the Arctic Council. Arctic issues were no longer confined to the peripheral affairs in the world politics that were in the interest of the Northern states quite the opposite; Arctic had penetrated the global geopolitical agenda (Pelaudeix, Arctic Council Kiruna Ministerial Meeting: Strengthened role of the Arctic Council in a globalized Arctic – China in, the EU on hold 2013). In Kiruna, the Council’s member states agreed to accept the five Asian states as new observers at the Council, but EU’s bid stayed only “affirmed” and final decision of it was postponed. The EU’s ban on seal products has caused an ongoing dispute between the EU and Canada, which hindered the Union’s acceptations to the Council. (Pelaudeix, Arctic Council Kiruna Ministerial Meeting: Strengthened role of the Arctic Council in a globalized Arctic – China in, the EU on hold 2013)

Lassi Heininen, Professor of Arctic Politics from the University of Lapland, commented on th expectations and outcomes of the Ministerial Meeting in YLE news on the May 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013. According to Heininen, Arctic Council has created stability to the Arctic region, which is globally unique, because the region was only 30 years ago still a Cold War arena. After the meeting, Heininen commented to YLE news that the inclusion of the Asian states as observers strengthens Artic Council in a long run. The new, powerful observer states the Arctic Council becomes a global actor in world politics. (29, 30)

Heininen was not surprised the Arctic Council's decision to defer EU's bid for observer status. He addressed that roles and responsibilities between different EU bodies (Commission, Parliament and the Summit) are still unclear for the Council's non-EU members, which causes confusion on EU's representation in an international organization. In addition EU's and Canada's interests clash in seal banning issues, and the dispute requires more time for reconciliation. (30, 31)

Heininen mentioned that the Kiruna Declaration brings new understanding on how to combine economic interests and environmental protection in order to pursue sustainable development of the Arctic region. Heininen addressed that economic interests are still one of the key interests on the Arctic states' agenda, but the oil spill response agreement that all the Arctic states agreed upon, is first step on the way to sustainable Arctic development. (30)

Also, Helsingin Sanomat reported on the outcomes of Kiruna meeting by highlighting the Council's decision to postpone EU's application for observer status. The EU's and Canada's disagreement over seal products was mentioned as one of the main reasons for leaving the EU still waiting for its observer status in the Arctic Council. (31)

Other Arctic topics that Finnish media covered during the spring/summer 2013, were the Arctic Prime Ministers Summit of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in Kirkenes in June 2013, where ministers signed Kirkenes Declaration about the future objectives for Barents region. The declaration highlighted on one hand, the sustainable utilization of the region's natural resources, and on the other hand, the importance of improving the region's transportation infrastructure in order to benefit from potential new transportation routes in the Arctic region (32). YLE news reported Prime Minister of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev's suggestion at the Kirkenes meeting to create local, visa-free Barents region. Finland did not receive Medvedev's suggestion with a great enthusiasm (33). Finland's Ambassador for Barents region, Marja-Leena Vuorenpää, commented on YLE news that special visa arrangements would be too costly for Finland due to its long border with Russia (34).

Kaleva newspaper reported on the Northern Sparsely Populated Areas-cooperation meeting in Oulu May 2013, where regional actors from Northern Finland, Norway and Sweden discussed about future perspectives of these regions. Cross-boarder cooperation will strengthen Northern communities and they can create more awareness about the valuable region also in the EU. (35)

#### **6.4.3. Summer 2013: ‘Calm’ Before the (Arctic) Storm**

During the Summer Finnish government official, at home and in the EU, commented their anticipations on Finland’s new Arctic before it was published in August 2013, and also after the release evaluating its objectives.

Prime Minister, Jyrki Katainen, introduced a new strategy to the Parliament and the Government of Finland in June 2013 by describing it more comprehensive compare to its predecessor. The new strategy includes goals and objectives for Finland’s Arctic politics, and defines means for achieving these goals. Katainen envisioned Finland as “an active Arctic player, capable of sustainable coordination of the constraints set by the Arctic conditions and business opportunities while making use of international cooperation.” Compare to the old 2010 strategy, sets the new strategy few more concrete goals in the following substance sectors: first, the environment, “Fragile Arctic Nature”; second, economy, “Economic Activities and Know-How”; third, “Transport and Infrastructure”; and fourth, “Indigenous Peoples”. (Katainen 2013)

#### **6.4.4. Same Strategy, Various Interpretations**

Green Party MP/Minister Ville Niinistö and Finnish MEP, Satu Hassi, commented on the Government’s preparation process of the Arctic strategy in a press conference in June 2013. They talked about the importance of defining clear restrictions on executions of Arctic natural resources. Environmental risk of the Arctic economic activities must be assessed carefully before any decisions of natural resources can be made. (36)

Niinistö commented on the new strategy in his blog after the strategy was published on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of August, 2013. Niinistö comments that the strategy agrees with the basic guidelines, that the Green Party values on the highest in Arctic politics; ”the most

important starting point for all activities in the Arctic are the boundaries set by the sensitive Arctic nature and environment, and identification of the risks caused by human activities.” He complimented the new strategy to be more thorough and more aware of the requirements of protecting vulnerable Arctic environment than the previous Finnish strategy. (37)

Niinistö highlighted Finland’s important initiative to create a protected zone around particularly sensitive international maritime area surrounding the North Pole. These areas are located outside of the economic zones of the coastal, Arctic states.(37)

According to the new strategy, Finland’s objective is to conduct Arctic activities by coherent, predictable and steady regulations. Sufficiency of the existing Arctic convention will be evaluated, and if necessary, additions can be made. (37)

Finland is committed to promote binding minimum standards for oil drilling in the Arctic region, which supports the Arctic Council’s signed agreement on joint efforts on oil spill prevention in the region. Overall, Niinistö addressed the so-called ”principle of caution” to be applied to all Arctic activities, which requires thorough evaluation of possible environmental risk before any decision are made. (37)

Hannele Pokka, Permanent Secretary of The Ministry of the Environment, commented in her blog, that the new strategy is more focused on the economic opportunities and preconditions, whereas 2010 strategy emphasized foreign policy dimension in Finland’s Arctic policymaking. Pokka elaborated Finland’s objectives from the new strategy: to import Finland’s strong Arctic know-how, for instance ship building technology, to the Northern markets. In addition Finland has robust knowledge on risk management and precaution systems that has been tested in various oil spill response assignments in the Baltic Sea. (38)

Pokka mentioned the preconditions to Arctic activities to evoke from environmental questions and climate change. Also Pokka addressed Finland’s progressive initiative to

create a conservation area around the North Pole; The Arctic Council has prepared creation of the protected zone around the North Pole for eight years at this point. (38)

Also, Finland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja, commented on the strategy in his blog in August 2013, by emphasizing the threats of climate change, which he sees as the most dominant attribute behind all the changes in the Arctic: "heating climate accelerates melting of the Arctic ice and permafrost, which in turn increases the release of methane into the atmosphere accelerating greenhouse effects." At the same time, Tuomioja stated that emerging business opportunities in the Arctic are important for the Finnish business community, who should be able to use these opportunities. However, Tuomioja wrote that uncompromising preconditions for all the Arctic activities are "the limits imposed by the sustainable development of the Arctic environment" Tuomioja finished with a note, that the vision introduced in the strategy will ensure Finland's competitiveness in the Arctic affairs, because green know-how will be growing importance in the Arctic context. (39)

Among others, Alexander Stubb, Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, summarized his views about the new Arctic strategy in his blog shortly after the strategy was published in August 2013. Stubb took part in the preparations process of the strategy and describes his contributions by following: "I wanted to get rid of the Arctic "challenges" and turn them into opportunities. I do not want to see the Arctic as a playground of various security efforts or as a laboratory of knocking over climate challenges. It (Arctic) is first and foremost a huge business opportunity for Finland." He wrote to be very satisfied how Finland's Arctic strategy was able to include previous principle to the strategy. (40)

Stubb praised the strategy to provide excellent guidelines for business development in the region by describing various business opportunities at the region for instance in energy, marine industries, natural resources, clean tech, tourism, transport and digital services sectors. (40)

Most of all, Stubb emphasized Arctic politics to be global, not local in all its aspects. The Arctic, including all of its “branches”, interests global actors. He highlighted long-term commitments to develop business in the Arctic region as the only way to achieve long-lasting result in regional development of the Arctic. (40)

Stubb sees Arctic’s economic potential and challenging environmental conditions as “an excellent “test-zone” for the Arctic countries' ability to produce wise action, in which different interests are taken into account, but at the same time, the offered opportunities will be effectively executed. (40)

#### 6.4.5. The Arctic Railway: Finland’s Gateway to the Arctic Ocean?

The new Arctic Strategy includes Finland’s plans to develop transportation infrastructure in the Northern Finland, especially a project to construct a ‘Arctic railway’<sup>48</sup> from and to the Arctic Ocean. The Strategy states that infrastructural developments in the Barents region require consensus and understanding between neighboring states (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia), as well as joint funding mechanism (Arctic Strategy 2013). However, Finland is the only Nordic country without concrete action point on the Arctic railway is to “adapt a long-term policy and investment plan for gradual improving



Picture 1: Plans for Arctic Railway presented in Finnish Arctic strategy 2013 (Arctic Strategy 2013)

<sup>48</sup> In Finnish ‘Jäämeren rata’.

of connection to the Arctic Ocean in regards to the requirements of increasing traffic” (Arktinen neuvottelukunta 2013). The railway proposal caused a great amount of interest and public discussion in Finland, which was reported by several news outlets.

YLE news reported in October on the Finnish Parliament’s discussion about the Arctic railway by defining the Parliament to be very enthusiastic about the project. The Parliament evaluated all three possible Arctic railway projects that were introduced in the new Arctic Strategy: connection between Norway’s Kirkenas and Sodankylä, or connection to Skibotnia, or as a third option connection between Finland’s Salla and Russian Kandalaksha. (41)

The connection to the Arctic Ocean; Sweden has operated quicker in terms of developing Arctic transportation connections. It has started to expand its railway connection to the Norwegian coastal town of Narvik. YLE explained that the debate in the Parliament about the different railway options, heated up due to the party True Finns<sup>49</sup> eager support for connections to Kirkenes. Merja Kyllönen, Finnish Minister of Transport, said that the Government needs to define and examine very carefully transportation needs of Northern mining business before implementing expensive infrastructure project. (41)

Railway projects require billions in investments which is why a thorough evaluation and monitoring of the demands is essential before going forward with the projects, commented Kyllönen to YLE news. A possible new railway connection will affect Finland’s Northern harbours, and those affects must be evaluated carefully. YLE news reported Kyllönen asking for patience in discussion about the Arctic railway projects. (41, 42)

Prime Minister Katainen referred to the Arctic railway as ”a great possibility” to Finland. Nevertheless, Finland has to discuss thoroughly with the other Nordic countries which

---

<sup>49</sup> The Finns Party (Finnish: Perussuomalaiset) a leading EU-skeptic party in Finland, and currently the largest party in the opposition (Perussuomalaiset 2014).

Arctic harbour they are all supporting, and carefully estimate if a new railway connection is a profitable transportation solution to the region. Katainen was interviewed by YLE Lappi after an Arctic conference, which was held in Rovaniemi in December 3th, 2013. (43)

Katainen gave an opening remark in the conference, where he elaborates Finland's objectives for new Arctic strategy by highlighting the core vision of the strategy. Katainen affirms Finland's plans "to promote growth and enhance competitiveness in the region, while paying due regard to the environment." Also, Katainen addressed the importance of international cooperation in the region, and economic partnerships through which to expand Finnish export markets. Katainen mentions Norway and Russia, as vibrant Arctic markets, where there could be demand also for Finnish Arctic businesses. (43)

#### **6.4.6. Finnish Icebreakers: Doom of the Arctic Environment, Or the Savior of the Finnish Economy?**

Finnish ice management know-how was praised in the new Arctic strategy; Finland produces world leading off-shore ice breakers, as well as it masters highly skilled knowledge for oil spill prevention operations in Arctic conditions (Arktinen neuvottelukunta 2013, 6). Finnish ice-breaker industry, especially state-owned Arctia Shipping, broke their way to the Finnish mainstream media in October 2013, when Minister for State Ownership Steering was accused of double standards in a dispute case between Arctia Shipping and Greenpeace activists. As mentioned earlier, Hautala had blocked filing of complaints from Arctia Shipping towards Greenpeace activists in two incidents in 2012, when Greenpeace protesters climbed onboard state-owned icebreakers in Helsinki. YLE news, together with several Finnish media outlets, reported proceedings of the Hautala vs. Arctia Shipping –case. Hautala's case caused lots of debate and controversy in Finnish media, over renting icebreakers for oil exploration projects such as the mission of Arctia Shipping and the Royal Shell at Beaufort Sea in Alaska in 2012. (44)

As a result of the accusations, Minister Hautala resigned from her ministerial position on the October 11<sup>th</sup> 2013, which accelerated debate over the justification of state-owned icebreakers' activities in the vulnerable Arctic region. Hautala commented at YLE that



environmental and economic interest clash in Finnish ice breaker business. Hautala reminds that Finland's Arctic strategy obliges state to consider carefully use of Arctic natural resources, which can be interpreted to include icebreaker activities as well. In addition, she emphasized the need to formulate a state monitored, specific strategy for Arctia Shipping actions in the Arctic. (45)

Helsingin Sanomat and YLE reported on the aftermaths in the Finnish Parliament after Hautala's resignation. According to the Prime Minister Katainen, the Government does not see a serious conflict between sustainable Arctic politics and icebreaker business in the Arctic maritime areas. However, Katainen states that "the issues has to be now discussed thoroughly inside the Government, and broader. It is important to contemplate, what is Finland's role in the Arctic". (46, 47)

YLE published that Minister of Transport, Merja Kyllönen, defended strongly the Government's decision to order the so called "traditional" icebreakers, that will be owned by Ministry for Transportation, yet Arctia Shipping prefers to produce multi-purpose vessels, of which services can be sold also for external customers. (47)

Despite the heated debate in the Finnish Parliament over the icebreaker business, and the use of emerging new commercial routes in the Arctic waters, *there are no guarantees Arctic shipping routes will be utilizable in the near future*. An Executive from Danish shipping giant Maersk Group, comments on Finnish Tekniikka&Talous-magazine, that global shipping business will benefit from Northern Sea Route at the earliest 15-20 years from now. Suez channel is still today the dominant transportation between Asia and Europe. (48)

Besides the political debate around Finnish icebreaker industry, YLE news reported in October of that year, that the risks and opportunities that the Arctic oil exploration business creates for icebreaker companies. Interestingly, Finland is the only state in world, which at the moment is renting its icebreakers out to be used in Arctic oil exploration purposes. Russia is another global ice management super power, but its

icebreakers cooperate only with Russian energy giants such as Rosneft and Gazprom. (49)

Icy Arctic conditions are still dangerous and unpredictable, and due to ice-covered sea areas, the season for oil exploration is short. Arctia Shipping's offshore vessels, Nordica and Fennica, were rented to Royal Shell's oil exploration in Alaska, but the operation was put on hold due to several problems during the mission. Greenpeace Finland's General Director, Tapio Laakso, believes that Shell cannot re-start the operation in the upcoming years either, because the US officials are re-examining Shell's permission to operate in the Arctic. (49)

Kaleva summarized the arguments from both sides of the vigorous public discussion on Finnish icebreakers, environment vs. economic benefits –paradigm, and hidden Arctic energy “treasures” in their article “Cold Arctic Arouses Hot Emotions” (Finnish: *Kylmä Arktis herättää kuumia tunteita*). The article argued that Finland lacks consensus on how to approach the Arctic issues, when emerging energy sources attract new business to the Northern Finland, and at the same time environmental organization anticipate catastrophic consequences of a possible oil spill in vulnerable Arctic environment. If Arctic business scenarios succeed, Finnish economy, and especially Lapland region, can benefit from the Arctic future a great deal in terms of new jobs and investments landing to the region. (50)

#### **6.4.7. Finland's Arctic Epiphany Badly Belated?**

The Arctic region was referred (in the media) as the northern “Eldorado”, whose potential Finland had not yet fully discovered.<sup>50</sup> On YLE's Morning Talkshow (Finnish Aamutv) in October 2013, Minister of Labour Lauri Ihanalainen described Finland's Arctic activities sluggish comparing to our neighbors Sweden, Norway and Russia. Ihanalainen emphasizes Finland's strong Arctic know-how, which it should capitalize now rapidly, although acting in respect of environmental values in the region. (51)

---

<sup>50</sup> For instance Mirja Niemitalo, Kaleva 27.12.2013: “Eldorado, next door”; Verna Leinonen, YLE 5.10.2013: “‘Eldorado of the oil world’ on the map: this is what Russia is going after in Arctic maritime region.”

Chairman of the Parliament, Eero Heinäluoma, suggested in Helsingin Sanomat in November 2013, that Finland should appoint a new minister to manage and monitor Arctic affairs in order to stay up-to-date with emerging, Northern employment opportunities. Heinäluoma pointed out that especially the employment potential in Northern-Norway's energy project. Norway's energy projects could be extremely beneficial for Finland's businesses and workers. (52)

Heinäluoma was not the only one encouraging Finland to explore arising employment and investment potential in Norway. In 2013, Norway came up several times in the Finnish media as "a perfect Arctic student", whose example Finland should follow more carefully. MTV 3 news interviewed Terje Mayer, Managing Director of Kirkenes Naringsshage (Business Garden 'hub'), who encourages Finns to start engaging rapidly in accelerating Arctic business life before they would be left out. Especially the Chinese and Koreans are eager to participate in investment project in the Barents region. MTV 3 news published a commentary article after Terje Mayer's interview, where journalist Keimo Lehtinen accused Finland of lacking political will to proceed with Arctic business and political prospects. Arctic affairs are still seen as "dabble of Laplanders", which hinders political decision makers to see the exceptional growth potential on the coast of Arctic Ocean. Lahtinen argues, that in the worse case scenario, decision-making, and potential investment projects, will land to the hands of the Chinese and the Koreans, who have shown great interest towards the Barents region. (53, 54)

After a visit to Hammerfest Norway, Minister Alexander Stubb wrote in this blog about *the huge trade and partnership potential* between Finland and Norway. Stubb argued that "there is lots of room for growth in economic relations between Norway and Finland". He highlighted the Finnish know-how potential especially in construction, mining, engineering and metal industries. At the moment Finland's export to Norway is only 3 % of its total foreign exports. Economic growth in the North is lead by the Norwegians still today, but it is high time for Finland to get involved in these emerging Arctic markets. (55)

#### **6.4.8. The Other Side of the Golden Coin: Environmentalists Get Activated**

As summarized above, Finland's economic initiatives in the Arctic were covered rather actively in Finnish media in the fall 2013, and consequently environmental endeavors remained in the background. Nevertheless, Finnish, as well as foreign, environmentalists praised Finland's significant initiative to create a global sanctuary around the North Pole, which was introduced in the new Arctic Strategy. Greenpeace International was pleased on Finland's initiative to support "one of the key demands of the growing Save the Arctic movement", which is Greenpeace's massive international, civil movement against Arctic energy exploitation. Greenpeace reminds in the same story on their website, that Finland's previous Arctic strategy did not consist "a single concrete proposal about Arctic protection" (Greenpeace International 2013).

Tapio Laakso from Greenpeace Finland expressed Greenpeace's appreciation on Finland's significant opening in the conservation of the Arctic nature. Laakso explained in YLE news' interview that Greenpeace is very pleased about the call for global sanctuary around the North Pole, as well as for minimum standards for oil drilling in the Arctic region. Greenpeace campaigns for a total ban for Arctic oil drilling but Finland's initiative is the first state level demand around the oil drilling issue in the Arctic. (56)

First and foremost, Arctic environmental questions appeared in Finnish mainstream media thanks to Greenpeace's boarding of Gazprom's oil exploration vessel in the Pechora Sea in October 2013. Finnish media was mostly interested in Finnish activist Sini Saarela's participation in the mission, but in this study I have left out the media material around Saarela's prison-time in Russia of the primary research data, because direct coverage of Saarela's trial focused mainly on contradictions between international human rights and Russian juridical system. Through Saarela's case, international Arctic politics gained great interests in media and public discussion. In that perspective

Greenpeace's mission to raise awareness on the Arctic oil exploration issues in Russia was successful<sup>51</sup>.

As reported above, the economic aspects, and Finland's involvement to the Arctic business opportunities, did raise an intense debate in Finnish media; however environmental questions were not left out media's limelight either. In October 2013, YLE interviewed Magnus Nyström, specialist to environmental safety and damages at the Ministry of the Environment, who argued that the Arctic stands a great symbolic value for environmental organizations. Arctic ecosystem is very different from the regions where oil exploration and drilling has been done before. Nyström argued that risks for environmental hazard rise essentially when commercial activities will be started at the Arctic region. (57)

Again in YLE, Finnish MEP, Sirpa Pietikäinen, called for a robust *ethical thinking* over the questions on Arctic oil drilling, or Finland's role in external partners' Arctic resource explorations. Pietikäinen argued that Finland has to make a decision whether to be part of the Arctic resource exploitation or not, and consider what kind of message it will send from Finnish climate change policies. She also calls after proper evaluation on environmental risk analysis in EU's Arctic strategy. Pietikäinen compares environmental risk potential of an oil spill accident at the Arctic as ten times bigger than environmental hazards of the infamous Finnish Talvivaara mine disaster.<sup>52</sup> (58)

In September YLE summarized new results from IPCC's fifth report on proceedings of climate change. The report described how global climate could warm up to 5 degrees over next decade. IPCC's new report affirms that for 95 % guaranteed human activities are the main contributors for accelerating climate warming. The panel addressed the importance of cutting growing number of greenhouse gas emissions in order to slow

---

<sup>51</sup> In YLE radio's magazine programme "World Politics Daily" (Finnish "Maailmanpolitiikan arkipäivää" ) Professor Lassi Heininen and Senior Research Fellow Harri Mikkola stated that the Arctic would not be in the public interest without Greenpeace's "publicity" stunt in the Russian Arctic, that involved personal stories of the activist.

<sup>52</sup> Talvivaara <http://londonminingnetwork.org/2012/11/finland-talvivaara-environmental-disaster-goes-on-an-on/>

climate warming to proceed. (59) The melting of the polar areas is believed to affect world's climate globally. Finnish professor Timo Koivurova from University of Lapland commented IPCC's report at YLE's interview by stating that its results might be even too *optimistic*. He argued that living standards keep rising, especially in the Asian countries, which questions if there even is a global willingness to curb CO<sub>2</sub>-emission (60).

YLE news reported about unpredictable weather conditions becoming a norm in the Arctic regions. Biodiversity of the polar areas alters due to changes in the areas usual weather conditions. International studies affirm climate change to be factual, which means melting of polar glacier as well as Arctic permafrost. Rising temperatures heat Arctic waters, air and land, which consequently has effects on for example Arctic fish stock. Drastic changes in the Arctic biodiversity jeopardize indigenous lifestyles that are still in deep interdependency with the Arctic nature. (61)

Aggressive fall storms raged in Finland in October and November 2013, which raised questions about origins of these exceptionally strong storms. Director of Finnish Meteorological Institute, Mikko Alestalo, discussed his concerns for the reasons behind the unusually strong storms in YLE news' interview in December 2013. Alestalo posed a possible link between melting Arctic Ocean and exceptional weather conditions in Northern-Europe. (62)

Arctic environmental cooperation suffered a political setback from a Finnish perspective in December 2013, when international Arctic ministerial meeting in Inari, Finland faced dramatically low attendance by its neighbors. The Minister of Environment Niinistö was *the only* ministerial representative in the meeting of Ministers of Environment of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in December 2013. Among others, Kaleva and Lapin Kansa newspapers noted Finland's neighbors' unfortunately low interest towards the Arctic environmental meeting. Kaleva quoted editor-in-chief from Barents Observer who interpreted lack of interest towards the meeting to reflect that "the states are interested in the Arctic region, mainly because of the economy, and the environmental issues are considered to be secondary" (63)

The only completely positive news piece on the Arctic environment registered on Arcticfinland-forum during the year 2013, was an article from MTV3 news station in December 2013. MTV3 reported on results of European Space Agency report on a bounce back in the extent of sea ice in the Arctic in the summer 2013. Also, the volume of the sea ice increased. However, scientists warn to not get too consoled from the “recovery” news. Professor Andy Shepherd of University College London concluded: "Although the recovery of Arctic sea ice is certainly welcome news, it has to be considered against the backdrop of changes that have occurred over the last few decades". (64)

## 7. Analysis

By investigating the process constructed by the data presented in the previous chapter I have aimed to locate causal mechanisms behind the change in Arctic discourse in Finland, which I argue to reflect the current understanding of the Arctic in Finland.

I acknowledge the researcher’s role in process tracing always to be active due to his/hers role as an interpreter of causal connections. Bennett (2002) describes researchers observations on causal mechanisms same as “(...) a detective looks for suspects and for clues linking them to a crime.” In process tracing dependent variables (*the suspect*) will be reflected through the eyes of a researcher (*detective*) and with the tools of independent variables, (*the clues*) in order to “solve” the selected research question (*the crime*) (Bennett 2002, 31).

As the previous data review (the process) illustrates, the Arctic was widely covered topic in the Finnish media, as well as in the speeches and opinion pieces of the Finnish policymakers. All the arguments, the framings and the emphasis presented in various platforms (in media outlets, in conferences or in debates), as well as all the things, *that were not said*, have shaped the Arctic discourse as it appears in Finland today. In this master thesis project I presented only a limited selection of comments and arguments,

that were said about/or related to the Arctic affairs from 2011 to 2013, but already in an early stage of the research process I realize how vibrant the Arctic discussion in Finland and carefully limitations had to be made to the data. I focus on the arguments on the environmental issues and economic prospects in the Arctic, which both proved to have vital part in the last years' Arctic discussion.

That being said, I had to restrict the data selection to December 2013, in order to have control over this process, and actually have time to locate the causal mechanism behind the Arctic discourse in Finland. Though this thesis provides an analysis of the change that happened in the Arctic discourse during 2011-2013 in Finland, is there definitely demand on further studies and new hypotheses, when Arctic politics go forward. I would suggest a new study on the impacts that the change in the discourse have on the actual policymaking in Finland, e.g. how the new emphasis in the Arctic discourse will reflect in implementation of the Arctic strategy (2013)? Arctic discourse will and should be under constant revaluation, because the actual changes in the Arctic region, and its politics happen rather rapidly. New actors, such as the Asian countries, will create new dynamics in the Arctic international relations, which can also effect to the Arctic discourse in Finland, as well as globally.

Unexpected events in the Arctic, political or environmental, such as Greenpeace vs. Russia –dispute can have unforeseeable impacts on the current understanding of the Arctic, which is exactly what makes analysis of *the change in the discourse* meaningful. As I have showed in the data selection, the 'Arctic media storm' in the fall of 2013 had a significant impact on the Arctic discussion in Finland, and consequential shaped the current Arctic discourse; After the events around Sini Saarela's case in Russia and Heidi Hautala's resignation due to lack of confidence in Arctic Shipping vs. Greenpeace –case raised completely unforeseen attention in Arctic environment vs. economic prospects –debate in Finland. ArcticFinland-portal collected only between October and February 2013 over 80 articles, speeches etc. to its media monitoring web archives whereas in 2011 and 2012, the total and combined number of same Arctic materials could not even together reach to numbers of the Arctic media boom in Finland fall of 2013 (Arctic



Finland 2014). I argue this activated Arctic discussion will have long-reaching impacts on Finnish understanding of the Arctic, and consequential can affect the path chosen by the policy makers.

In the next few pages I will analyze how the selected variables reflect the change in the discourse. I present the themes and framings used in the argumentations pro/con Arctic environment and economics (independent variables). I approach Finland's international partners', especially Norway's, impacts to the change in the discourse as an intervening variable. Finally I will summarize, how causal connection between the variables envision the change that happened in the Arctic discourse in Finland from 2011 to 2013.

As mentioned earlier all conclusions and connections presented in this analysis are drawn from this selection research data, and will not aim to present only possible interpretation of the current Arctic discourse. This study, as majority case studies in social sciences, aim to differentiate empirical generalizations from analytical replications; drawing generalizations from a highly selected and defined case study research should not be the goal of a single or comparative case study. I have focused on presenting the analytically replicable conclusions that can be tested in another context (Vaus 2001, 243) (Laine, Bamberg and Jokinen 2007, 25), and further, an analysis that encourage scholars to create new hypotheses in order to capture future changing in Arctic discourse in Finland (or elsewhere).

## **7.1. Year 2011**

Despite the newly published, Finland's first Arctic strategy, Arctic issues were not as actively discussed in Finland in 2011 as they were in 2012 and 2013. Two thematic frames overarched discussion documented in my selected research data during the 2011: Objectives of Finnish first Arctic strategy and EU's importance in Finnish Arctic politics, as well as Finland's support to the EU in its Arctic affairs.

As in Pertti Torstila's speech (1) from the January, 2011, Finland was described several times during 2011 as an economic-driven, environmentally conscious and cooperation-favoring Arctic player, whose objectives for the Arctic politics were defined in its first Arctic strategy. In addition, international Arctic cooperation was mentioned as the cornerstone of Finland's Arctic politics. Finland economic approach was described to respect the fragile Arctic nature, which was pointed as the basis of all the Arctic activities Finland supports or carries out.

During the year 2011, government officials and civil servants repeated mainly that same arguments about Finland as a responsible, economic and environmental Arctic actor, and as a strong supporter of the EU's bid for the permanent observer status in the Arctic Council. However, coherent actions, or initiatives to materialize the defined objective on the Arctic issues lacked from the speeches and commenters given by the Finnish governments representatives. I argue that media's low interest, and consequential non-existing public discussion, about the first Arctic strategy was a result of the vagueness in terms of concrete actions in the strategy. On the basis of the data, I could see that as critical geopolitics suggest, the practical dimension of geopolitical discourses (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4-6), such as official speeches about the Arctic strategy, construct discourses. Finnish government official did not comment easily anything besides the points presented in the official documents, which shows their ways of framing the Arctic was defined by the Arctic strategy.

In terms of following the intervening variable, international Arctic, Finland's support EU's bid to become observer in the Arctic Council was the most actively used argument in comments related to Arctic international affairs in 2011. I interpret Finland's support to EU to reflect its attempt to strengthen its own role as an international Arctic actor (5), as well as to facilitate Finland's own objective to get EU's Arctic Information center to be placed in Rovaniemi (4). University of Lapland was also mentioned several times in documents from 2011 and 2012 as international, highly respected Arctic research institution (5, 23, 14), which, I argue, to reflect Finland's role as neutral research partner in Arctic affairs.

In addition, references to EU as Finland's important international Arctic partner, cooperation at the Barents Region was mentioned more than once as an important forum for international Arctic cooperation. Ministry of Employment and Economy emphasized Finland's reluctance to materialize its geographical benefits in terms of business cooperation with Russia, which Norway is already doing successfully (2). Minister Erkki Tuomioja (8) highlighted the crucial role the Barents region has in infrastructural projects taking place in the Arctic, which obviously referred also to investment potential that the region has. The Barents link railway was discussed as a great opportunity for Finland to enhance its economic cooperation in the Arctic with Russia and Norway, and consequential the cooperation in the framework of the BEAC (and the Barents region in general) as Finland's gateway to the Arctic. However, comments related to the Barents region were strongly economic focused already during the year 2011, Tuomioja (8) and Niinistö (9) did mention the BEAC's objective to support sustainable socio-economic growth in the region, and to act against climate change in terms of developing e.g. efficient use of renewable energy sources, in which the region states have remarkable knowledge and expertise. Niinistö encouraged BEAC to communicate importance of the environmental issues louder with and between the stakeholders at the region, especially when global interest toward the region is increasing.

The Arctic Council did not come up in the documents from the 2011 at all, except in the note on US Secretary of State's participation in the Nuuk Ministerial meeting, which was interpreted to envision growing importance of the Council. Also Asian countries' bids for the observer status in the Council were noted as sign of the Arctic affairs becoming more and more globalized. (6)

Changes in domestic politics also effected the Arctic discourse in Finland in 2011. In the spring of 2011, Finland's domestic politics underwent turbulent national elections, which resulted in a delay in the formulation of the new Government. The 2011 Elections were argued to have a hindering impact on the Arctic policymaking, because the new Government had new ministers with new political priorities (10). However, I argue that

change of the Government in the summer 2011, gave ‘a fresh start’ for Finland’s Arctic policy-lines and perceptions. As the data in this thesis show, Finland’s first Arctic strategy did not trigger any special interest towards the Arctic issues in Finland. In June 2011 the new Government of Katainen’s announced their intent to increase focus on the Arctic issues (7) ‘kicked’ the Arctic affairs higher on the national policymaking agenda.

## **7.2. Year 2012**

On the basis of my data I refer to year 2012 as Finland’s ‘real Arctic awakening’. The biggest single event, that had influence to the Arctic discussion in Finland in 2012, was the business partnership agreement between Shell and the Finnish company Arctia Shipping icebreakers, which was received as welcomed stimulation to Arctic business in Finland (14, 17). Although, some counterarguments against the Arctic resource exploration were presented (Tapio Laakso in 15, Niinistö in 16), the Arctic economic prospects mainly framed as underused economic potential, in where Finland should turn their gaze rapidly (e.g 14).

Northern Finland was seen as a key region in the Arctic business partnerships. Northern Finland as a region has great potential to attract investments and increase regional cooperation with Russia and Norway in the Arctic businesses. Barents region and BEAC was only one forum for cooperation but also bilateral relationship between the local partners in Norway and Russia was encouraged (12, 13). Kaleva newspaper was a strong ‘voice’ to support regional business partnerships between the Northern regions of Finland, Norway and Russia (e.g.13). Finnish mining industry, among the others, was encouraged to learn about the efficient business models in the Arctic from the Norwegians. Shtokman’s energy projects were mentioned as an example of the efficient Norwegians-Russian cooperation in the Arctic (13). Although Arctic partnership with Russia can be greatly beneficial to Finland (21), has it also its price. I found it very interesting to realize that the controversy, a sort of Arctic paradox (Palosaari 2011), with Russia as Arctic business partner did not arise to the headlines: Russia as a dirty Arctic

oil exploration, vs. important investment partner in the Barents Region did not come up in any documents in my data selection from the year 2012.

President Niinistö's state visit to Norway produced positive publicity about Finland and Norway's good diplomatic relations, which mainly focused on their mutual interest towards the Arctic, and the political and economic cooperation in the region (26). Niinistö encouraged both countries to 'open their eyes' for their closeness and reinforce their cooperation in the Arctic. President Niinistö also admitted Finland to be behind Norway in terms of materializing the economic potential of the Arctic (27). In the arguments presented during the state visit in Norway, variable international Arctic, envisioned Finland's dependency on its Arctic partners, such as Norway. Samio Moisio argued that Finland's position in the Arctic geopolitics will be defined in future developments of the Arctic international relations, which are strongly influenced by the global energy and raw mineral prices (18). Through partner such as Norway, Finland can expand its Arctic leverage outside of its place as a non-littoral Arctic state.

Economic potential in the Arctic was not seen to benefit only the Northern Finland. Among the others Prime Minister Katainen argued that business opportunities in the Arctic Finland would not only to benefit the regions in the northern Finland, but also the whole country; Arctic has shifted from far-away to center of the opportunities (19). Finnish expertise in ice management technology was embraced by various Finnish Arctic actors (19, 15), which I argue, reflects a common 'need' to create positive discussion about the economy in Finland. Europe's economic stand-still has created a need for Finland to create national trust to the economy with new business opportunities such as the Arctic.

However, focus on the business opportunities in the Arctic increased remarkably compared to previous years' data. Prime Minister Katainen and Minister Tuomioja reminded Finland to coordinate its Arctic activities in environmental constraints of the fragile Arctic nature (19, 20). In addition, conflicting interests of the local indigenous people and the potential investors' was seen as a challenge for materializing Arctic

business potential (13). Concerns over the fragile Arctic nature appeared the strongest in the arguments of Minister Niinistö, who was very vocal in his demands for more sustainable Arctic environmental politics. Niinistö was the only Finnish politician, who (based on my data) suggested a the Arctic moratorium, which would ban all oil and gas extraction in the Arctic region.

Not surprisingly Greenpeace's Tapio Laako also reminded weakening environmental agenda in Finnish Arctic politics: He accused Finland to "talk the talk" of environmental conservation in the Arctic, but not "walking the walk" to it (15).

Also in 2012, EU was framed as one of Finland's main Arctic partners, and EU's High Representative, Catherine Ashton's visit was clearly received in Finland as a sign of respect for Finland being 'a real Arctic country'. The main, common theme in the media coverage from the visit was the Arctic research cooperation between Finland and the EU, in which the EU's support to Finland's bid to get the Arctic Information Center to Finland was frequently emphasized (e.g. 14, 20, 21, 22). I argue that the EU's Arctic Information center represents an easy, low-tension area of cooperation in the times of conflicting environmental and economic interests in the Arctic.

### **7.3. Year 2013**

The Arctic discussion in Finland unfolded to an entirely new level in 2013 due to a combination of developments in the national Arctic policymaking, and unexpected international and national events in the Arctic politics. The Finnish Government released its new Arctic strategy in October 2013 and in September 30 international, Greenpeace activists attempted to board a Russian oil drilling platform in the Pechora Sea in order to protest against oil drilling activities in the Arctic. This caused a media tornado, which invigorated Arctic interest also in the Finnish media. During the 2013, Arctic question were covered by wider range of Finnish media outlets than during any previous years since the turn of the millennium, but due to limits of a master thesis project I still focus only to the same selection of media outlets than in years 2011 and 2012 (Helsingin Sanomat, YLE and Kaleva).

Through Sini Saarela's time in custody, Arctic questions, especially the debate between environment and economic activities, got a new, personal, Finnish angle that the entire Finland was following during the fall of 2013.

All the 30 Greenpeace activists participating the operation, including s Finnish activist Sini Saarela, were detained by Russian Coast Guard and kept in prison for more than two months. Finnish as well as global media followed closely the events surrounding the imprisoned Greenpeace activist in Murmansk. Sini Saarela was one of two activists who were able to board the Russian vessel before they got detained. Saarinen was held in custody for over two months while Russian authorities pursued investigation around piracy charges for the activist. However, charges changed from piracy to hooliganism during November 2013 (Greenpeace International). Through Sini Saarela's time in custody, Arctic questions, especially the debate between environment and economic activities, got a new, personal, Finnish angle that the entire Finland was following during the fall of 2013.

In addition to the incidents mentioned above, environment vs. economic benefits in the Arctic rose to the media headlines, when the Finnish Minister for State Ownership Steering Heidi Hautala resigned after a dispute between Arctia Shipping and Greenpeace in 2013. Hautala had blocked filing of complaints following two incidents in 2012, when Greenpeace protesters climbed aboard state-owned icebreakers in Helsinki. Hautala is a former chair of the Green League, Finnish environmental party, and media accused her supporting her own "green agenda" (i.e. Greenpeace) over economic benefits of the state of Finland (Arctia Shipping). YLE news, together with several Finnish media outlets, reported widely on the proceedings of the Hautala vs. Arctia Shipping-case. As a result of accusations, Minister Hautala resigned from her ministerial position on October 11<sup>th</sup> 2013, which accelerated debate over the moral behind state-owned ice breakers' activities in the vulnerable Arctic region.

Whether Greenpeace's project was successful, or even legal, or whether Hautala's reassignment was necessary, is not discussed in this paper. However both of these incidents' influence to Finnish Arctic discussion is undisputable; in the fall of the 2013 Arctic questions were discussed in Finnish media more frequently than any other year during the 2000s. Also, the release of Finland's new Arctic strategy accelerated media to address Arctic question more often than usually (Arctic Finland 2014)<sup>53</sup>.

Arctic discussion in Finland unfolded to an entirely new level in 2013 due to a combination of developments in national Arctic policymaking and unexpected international and national events in the Arctic politics. The Finnish Government released its new Arctic strategy in October 2013 and in September Greenpeace attempted to board a Russian oil drilling platform in the Pechora Sea in order to protest against oil drilling activities in the Arctic. This caused a media storm, which invigorated Arctic interest in the media.

All 30 Greenpeace activists participating the operation, including the Finnish activist, Sini Saarela, were detained by Russian Coast Guard and kept in prison for more than two months. Finnish as well as global media followed closely the events surrounding the imprisoned Greenpeace activist in Murmansk. Sini Saarela was one of two activists who were able to board the Russian vessel before they got detained. Saarinen was held in custody for over two months while Russian authorities pursued investigation around piracy charges for the activist. However, charges changed from piracy to hooliganism during November 2013 (Greenpeace International). Through Sini Saarela's time in custody, Arctic questions, especially the debate between environment and economic activities, got a new, personal, Finnish angle that the entire Finland was following during the fall of 2013.

In addition to the incidents mentioned above, the discussion on environment vs. economic benefits in the Arctic rose to the media headlines, when the Finnish Minister

---

<sup>53</sup> Arctic Finland-forum gathered 85 articles, news etc. press releases on the Arctic topics only during the fall months of 2013, from August to December.



for State Ownership Steering Heidi Hautala resigned after a dispute between Arctia Shipping and Greenpeace in 2013. Hautala had blocked filing of complaints following two incidents in 2012, when Greenpeace protesters climbed aboard state-owned icebreakers in Helsinki. Hautala is a former chair of the Green League, Finnish environmental party, and media accused her supporting her own “green agenda” (i.e. Greenpeace’s agenda) over economic benefits of the state of Finland (Arctia Shipping) (44). YLE news, together with several Finnish media outlets, reported widely on the proceedings of the Hautala vs. Arctia Shipping–case. As a result of accusations, Minister Hautala resigned from her ministerial position on October 11<sup>th</sup> 2013, which accelerated debate over the moral behind state-owned ice breakers’ activities in the vulnerable Arctic region (49, 50, 58). Finnish MEP Sirpa Pietikäinen made an important comment on *now* being crucial point in Finland’s Arctic policy making in order to decide whether it wants to support the Arctic resource exploration or not (58).

During the 2013 arguments on the both sides of the debate over economic benefits vs. environmental conservation got stronger than any other year in the 2000 before, and I argue that publicity that Greenpeace got with their Arctic Sunrise-attack made ‘the business-side of the Arctic’ fight even harder to get their arguments out to the conversations as well. Norway’s example was used to back up different argumentations on execution of Arctic business potential, which reflects Norway’s increased influence as role model to Finland’s Arctic politics(52, 53, 54, 55).

I argue that events of 2013 triggered significant Arctic conversations in Finland, which created new geopolitical imagination in of the Arctic in the understanding of the Finnish public. Critical understanding of geopolitical produced definitions of power, in this case who has the power to define the Arctic, can be studied exactly in geopolitical structures between actors such as nations states and NGO’s (Harle 2003, 38-39). Obviously environmental organization Greenpeace and Russian energy company define the Arctic very differently, but what was even more interesting finding from my data was that even different ministers of the same (Finnish) Government defined the Arctic very differently. Reviews and comments about Finland’s new Arctic strategy envisioned variety of the

perspectives Finnish ministers represent about the Arctic. Minister Niinistö emphasized the boundaries of the Arctic nature as a starting point for all activities in the Arctic (37), whereas minister Stubb commented the Arctic to be “first and foremost a huge business opportunity for Finland”(40). In terms of the content of the strategy Niinistö’s highlighted the initiative, supported by Greenpeace (56) to create protected maritime zone around the North Pole as one of the most important action points of the strategy (37). Stubb instead praised the concrete business initiatives the strategy suggests (40). Business and political Arctic partnerships were high on Stubb’s agenda in his visit to Hammerfest, Norway (55). I argue that these divergent perspectives to the future of the Arctic diluted the boost that the new Arctic strategy could have had for Finland’s Arctic actions. Prime Minister Katainen’s comments in media also reflected his concerns about Finland’s Arctic role (46, 47)

Arctic business opportunities indeed penetrated into Finnish discussions in 2013 after the release of the new Arctic strategy, which introduced more detailed visions for execution of Finland’s economic actions at the Arctic region, as well as after media storm around Arcticia Shipping ice breakers and minister Hautala. Most significant change in the discussion of the Arctic business opportunities in Finland was the wider range of actors who participated the conversation, as well as increased number of arguments for the Arctic railway connection. Better connections e.g to the Arctic Norway were used to argument for the benefits of the project (41).

I argue that the AC’s Kiruna meeting was the most influential event to the dimension of international Arctic in Finnish Arctic discourse in 2013. I argue that in Kiruna the global governance in the Arctic took a huge leap forward, and lifted the Arctic affairs higher on the global political agenda (29,30). For Finland the delay in the schedule to reaffirm the Arctic Information Center’s location (28), as well the AC’s decision to postpone the acceptance of the EU’s bid for the observation status in the Council, were both geopolitical setbacks.

Science of the climate change and changing weather conditions got bit more voice in the data in 2013 compared to previous years, but it was overshadowed by the ice breakers' and Arctic railway news. However IPCC's report results that the climate change is, with 95 % guarantee, caused by human activities, was a strong scientific to support the environmental conversation agenda in the Arctic. I argue that sort of an 'Arctic media hype' made room also for more scientific debates to rise on the headlines, because in 2013 people in general had rising interest towards the Arctic (62). Biggest (environmental) political set back in the Arctic front for Finland was its neighbors low interest towards the BEAC's ministerial meeting in Inari. From geopolitical perspective the low attendance in international Arctic meeting hosted by Finland reflected Finland's place in the lonely periphery of Finland (again).

From the basis of the selected data and analysis above I conclude that three (four) strong factors, which created the change in the Arctic discourse from 2011 to 2013. In 2012 and 2013 Norway was mentioned frequently as 'a good role model' in the Arctic business functions, and Finnish political decision makers were eager to find Arctic partners for Finland from Norway. In addition in international Arctic, Finland identified itself as a strong supporter of the EU in the Arctic matters throughout the 2011-2013, but active discussions about the EU's Arctic endeavors faded in 2013, after the EU was left without the final confirmation to join the AC as a permanent observer.

From the basis of my data I name the polarization between the environmental and economic arguments as the most significant change in the Arctic discourse during the years from 2011 to 2013, and it got stronger towards 2013. The polarization was clearly shown in the media aftermath of minister Hautala's resignation and Sini Saarela's imprisonment. The supporter of the Arctic business framed e.g. utilization of the Finnish ice breaker in the Arctic as *an economic necessity* in order to strengthen Finland's economic competitiveness in the global, and domestic markets. In the contrary, the environmentalist demanded a total ban on the Arctic resource exploitation and called for Finland's moral responsibility on the fragile Arctic nature. As a third significant finding I conclude the Finnish Government representatives' fragmented positions in the Arctic

policymaking in terms of supporting or objecting commercial activities in the Arctic. Fragmentation of the arguments was cleared to observe in the comments given after new Finnish Arctic strategy was published in the fall 2013. Though the new Arctic strategy assured Finland to be aiming for environmental sustainability in its future Arctic actions, the economic initiatives, e.g. the plans of the Arctic railway, were more frequently highlighted in the public discussion and in the media during the fall 2013.

## **8. Conclusions**

Naturally, for every aspect of Arctic discourse analyzed in this thesis I have left a dozen out. It can rightfully be argued that I have neglected e.g. the importance of the aboriginal population, latent domestic and global economic issues or the security consequences of climate change. I have however allowed my analysis to be guided by the chosen methodology, which focus on first and foremost collecting a wide selection of data on the selected case, and to locate causal mechanisms (connections) between the selected variables, which I choose due their 'current nature'. Based on the findings presented in the analysis I conclude that chosen independent variables (environmental changes and economic prospects) had an impact on the dependent variable (the change in the Arctic discourse in Finland), and the intervening variable (international Arctic) brought some unexpected results out of the process.

Process tracing analysis requires a huge collection of data, which in this thesis was collected only from the Finnish media outlets and other sources representing public and official 'voice' in Finland, the same method can create interesting new understanding of the Arctic discourse, when applied to a different case, e.g. the Arctic discourse, which European Union is representing could be another interesting research topic to scrutinize. Though process tracing provided this thesis with a fresh methodological approach, it was also a challenge to find any drastic changes in the discourse, when the timeframe of this study covered only the past three years of the Arctic discussion in Finland. However, the timeframe of years 2011-2013 was chosen due to significant events in the Arctic politics, that happened during those years, and which paradoxically enough, were triggered by the

accelerated environmental changes in the Arctic, but appeared to strengthen the arguments supporting the business plans for the future of the Arctic.

The change reflected in the Finnish Arctic discourse can be also seen in the change of the Arctic academic paradigm. As the chapter three in this thesis indicated conflict vs. cooperation -paradigm have has been the dominant thematic umbrella in the Arctic IR until the recent years. However, scientific data on accelerating global warming on the polar areas combined with the diplomatic resolutions to territorial disputes, such as the Barents Sea Treaty, have pushed academic Arctic discussions further from the deterministic preconceptions of only two possible outcomes of the Arctic relations, *conflict or cooperation*, and towards a more complex analysis of unknown implications triggered by the environmental changes in the region (Sørensen 2013, 5-6). On the basis of my data analysis, I conclude that the developments in the Finnish Arctic discourse reflect similar changes that the international Arctic affairs is undergoing, as well as a shift in the paradigm of the Arctic IR from conflict vs. cooperation to environment vs. economy –debate.

In this thesis I have presented that complex, political ‘ping pong-battle’ between the conflicting arguments of the Arctic Paradox define contemporary Arctic discourse in Finland, and even further, the economic arguments in the debate are becoming more frequent and stronger. Theoretical reason behind this thesis backs up the question *why* this change in the discourse actually matters, and it is based on the critical understanding of geopolitics. Critical understanding of geopolitics suggest that acts of politics, e.g. foreign policy strategies such as the Arctic strategy and discussion around it, produce geopolitical spaces, which are always produced, and reproduced by someone in discourses. Discourses create geopolitical imagination of e.g. the Arctic as a geopolitical region, and change in the discourse envision change in imagination, and consequential it reflects a change in the politics (Ó Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 194-195).

On the basis of the events influenced the Arctic discourse in Finland in 2011-2013, is still too early to make far-reaching conclusions of *the change in the actual Finnish Arctic*

*politics*, but this thesis concludes that change have already happened *at the discursive level*. At the time of writing this, in the spring 2014, writing of John Vidal, the Guardian's environmental editor, already support my conclusion, that frequency of the economic-driven arguments to back up actions in the Arctic will increase. He argued "*confidence that the Arctic will become economically important is seen in the rush of countries and companies to claim a stake*" (Vidal 2014). As an example he mentions Russia's urge to cash in the thawing temperatures in its Siberian cities. Remote cities in the Russian Arctic locate in a halfway point on the sea route between Europe and China – if the polar shipping route opens up because of climate change. In the same article Finnish Hannu Hallinen defined Finland's current vision on the Arctic economic prospects: "*Finland needs a new Nokia. The Arctic could be it*" (Vidal 2014).

I argue that the change in the Arctic discourse in Finland envisioned in this thesis is just the beginning, and the discourse requires academic up-to-date analysis again when the politics and the Arctic international relations proceed. Investigation of causal mechanism, between different variables, behind the Arctic discourse in Finland after e.g. 10 years from now will reveal new, most likely, unexpected connections. Nevertheless I hope this thesis can still that time contribute a snap shot of analysis of the discourse of its own time, from 2011 to 2013, which can serve as a relevant academic comparison and evaluation, how the discourse have change in 10 years from now.

In terms of creating new, geopolitical understanding of the Arctic, I found it interesting to evaluate how much influence the official briefing paper and strategies, such as the first and the second Finnish Arctic strategies, compared to the events such as 'Sini Saarela – case', which received vast publicity in media, have on the Arctic discourse formulation. In the data selection of this thesis I aimed to include as thoroughly as possible sources from formal and practical 'producers' of geopolitical knowledge in order to create a comprehensive picture of the Arctic discourse in Finland. In terms of the 'media buzz', which represents the public 'voice' about the Arctic in this thesis, unexpected events initiated by e.g. environmental NGOs, can have a huge effect on the Arctic debates in

Finland, which also the official representative of the Finnish government have to participate and take a stand on those issues.

Although process tracing analysis is time-consuming and ‘heavy’ method to be used in master thesis research , it enabled me to create academically reasoned, up-to-date analysis on how the economic argument in the Arctic discourse in Finland have actually increased, which leaves the window open for the further research to be conducted, and new hypotheses to be created on what does this change actual implicate for the future years of the Finnish Arctic. The heating up of rhetoric (environment vs. economy) makes me argue that such an analysis as you have in your hands serves to strengthen the argument found in my hypotheses, and inspire to further studies on Arctic discourse in Finland. As I see it today, discussions around environmental and economic perspectives of the Arctic will accelerate in Finland, and globally, in the upcoming years, and well-founded research needs to be conducted in questions arising.

## 9. Research data, in order of appearance

1. Statement by Secretary of State Pertti Torstila at the Arctic Frontiers 2011 Conference, Tromsø, Norway. January 24, 2011.  
<<http://www.formin.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=211419>> (accessed January 15, 2014).
2. The Ministry of Employment and Economy, press release. *Selvitysmies: Yrityksillä etsikko aika osallistua Barentsin hankkeisiin*. January 19, 2014.  
<[http://www.tem.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedotearkisto/vuosi\\_2011?105033\\_m=101749](http://www.tem.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedotearkisto/vuosi_2011?105033_m=101749)> (accessed February 4, 2013).
3. Helsingin Sanomat. *Pohjoismaat ovat suosikkeja kumppaneiksi arktisilla alueilla*. January 1, 2011.  
<<http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/artikkeli/Pohjoismaat+ovat+suosikkeja+kumppaneiksi+arktisilla+alueilla/1135263278772>> (accessed January 15, 2014).
4. Yle Lappi. *Arktinen informaatiokeskus: EU-parlamentti tukee Rovaniemeä*. January 20, 2011. <[http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktinen\\_informaatiokeskus\\_eu-parlamentti\\_tukee\\_rovaniemea/2302800](http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktinen_informaatiokeskus_eu-parlamentti_tukee_rovaniemea/2302800)> (accessed January 17, 2014).
5. European Parliament, debate A7-0377/2010. *A sustainable EU policy for the High North*. January 2, 2011. <<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20110120+ITEM-004+DOC+XML+V0//EN>> (accessed January 15, 2014).
6. Speech by Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava at Arctic Council Ministerial meeting, Nuuk, Greenland. May 12, 2011.  
<<http://www.formin.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=220507>> (accessed January 20, 2014).



7. Arctic Finland, press release. *Arktiset alueet huomioidaan hyvin uudessa hallitusohjelmassa*. June 21, 2011.  
<<http://www.arcticfinland.fi/news/Arktiset-alueet-huomioidaan-hyvin-uudessa-hallitusohjelmassa/-n2enu2ns/340a27b3-7b8d-47e1-b26f-dbb26eaa8a2c>> (accessed January 19, 2013).
8. Speech by Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja at The Barents Euro-Arctic Council meeting, Kiiruna, Sweden. October 12, 2011.  
<<http://www.formin.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=231439>> (accessed February 23, 2013).
9. Speech by Minister of the Environment Ville Niinistö at Barents Euro-Arctic Council meeting of the Ministers of the Environment, Umeå, Sweden. November 9, 2011.  
<[http://www.ym.fi/fi-FI/Ajankohtaista/Puheet/Minister\\_of\\_the\\_Environment\\_of\\_Finland\\_V\(1522\)](http://www.ym.fi/fi-FI/Ajankohtaista/Puheet/Minister_of_the_Environment_of_Finland_V(1522))> (accessed March 3, 2014).
10. Heikkilä, Markku (2011), ”Arktisuus juuttui vaaleihin, kuten kaikki muukin”, *Analys Norden*. June 9, 2011.  
<<http://www.norden.org/fi/analys-norden/teemat/taistelu-arktuksesta/arktisuus-juuttui-vaaleihin-kuten-kaikki-muukin>> (accessed February 12, 2014).
11. Niemitalo, Mirka (2012), ”Rikas, rakas Norja”, *Kaleva*, columns. February 1, 2012.  
<<http://www.kaleva.fi/mielipide/kolumnit/rikas-rakas-norja/566277/>> (accessed January 20, 2014).
12. Heikkilä, Markku (2012), ”Pohjoisen presidentit”, *Kaleva*, columns. February 8, 2012. <<http://www.kaleva.fi/mielipide/kolumnit/pohjoisen-presidentit/566610/#comments>> (January 29, 2014).

13. Heikkilä, Markku (2012), ”Katse pohjoiseen”, *Kaleva*, columns. March 14, 2012.  
<<http://www.kaleva.fi/mielipide/kolumnit/katse-pohjoiseen/570952/>> (accessed February 16, 2014).
14. Prima – Elinkeinoelämän keskusliiton lehti (Journal of The Confederation of Finnish Industries). *Arktinen business*. 1/2012.  
<<http://content.yudu.com/A1vjfg/Prima-012012/resources/index.htm?referrerUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ek.fi%2Fek%2Ffi%2Fprima%2Findex.php>> (accessed March 14, 2014).
15. Helsingin Sanomat. *Kilpailu arktisten alueiden hyödyntämisestä kiihtyy*. April 10, 2012.  
<<http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/Kilpailu+arktisten+alueiden+hy%C3%B6dynt%C3%A4misest%C3%A4+kiihtyy+/a1305559625066>> (accessed March 24, 2014)
16. Niinistö, Ville (2012), ”Herkät arktiset alueet pitää suojella”, *Villeniinisto.fi* (blog). May 16, 2012. <<http://www.villeniinisto.fi/ajankohtaista/17-blogit/434-herkaet-arktiset-alueet-pitaa-suojella>> (accessed March 24, 2014).
17. Huvudstadsbladet. *Arktis hann ikapp Finland*. March 9, 2012.  
<<http://hbl.fi/opinion/ledare/2012-03-09/arktis-hann-ikapp-finland>> (accessed February 15, 2014).
18. Moisio, Sami (2012), ” Pohjoisen uusi maantiede”, *Kaleva*, columns. August 30, 2012. <<http://www.arcticfinland.fi/loader.aspx?id=c817a2c7-5f54-4a3f-b63c-61f8ae5c3ed6>> (accessed March 24, 2014).
19. Lecture by Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen, Jyväskylä, Finland. November 27, 2012.  
<<http://vnk.fi/ajankohtaista/puheet/puhe/fi.jsp?oid=370579>> (accessed February 19, 2014).

20. Speech by Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja at Arctic seminar, Helsinki, Finland. September 18, 2012.  
<<http://www.formin.fi/public/Print.aspx?contentid=257778&nodeid=15145&culture=fi-FI&contentlan=1>> (accessed February 19, 2014).
21. Speech by Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja at Seminar of the Finnish-Russian Arctic Partnership, Oulu, Finland. June 5, 2012.  
<<http://www.arcticfinland.fi/loader.aspx?id=3966a15b-8d71-4d60-9db5-22993d3d742b>> (accessed March 24, 2014).
22. Visit of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, Rovaniemi, Finland. Media coverage. March 6, 2012.  
<<http://www.arcticfinland.fi/news/EUn-korkea-edustaja-Catherine-Ashton-ja-ulkoministeri-Erkki-Tuomioja-Rovaniemella,632012/n2enu2ns/9221f3fb-c887-40b7-ae64-c73f072861c8>> (accessed February 16, 2014).
23. Ylä-Kotola, Mauri (2012), ”Rovaniemi arktisen yhteistyön keskuksiksi”, *Kaleva*, column. June 6, 2012.  
<<http://www.kaleva.fi/mielipide/vieras/rovaniemi-arktisen-yhteistyon-keskukseksi/596670/>> (accessed March 24, 2014).
24. Yle Lappi. *Tuomioja: Rovaniemi saa EU:n arktisen keskuksen*. June 4, 2012.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/tuomioja\\_rovaniemi\\_saa\\_eun\\_arktisen\\_keskuksen/3310789](http://yle.fi/uutiset/tuomioja_rovaniemi_saa_eun_arktisen_keskuksen/3310789)> (accessed February 20, 2014).
25. Yle Lappi. *Suomi havittelee arktista lottovoittoa*. March 6, 2012.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/suomi\\_havittelee\\_arktista\\_lottovoittoa/3310462](http://yle.fi/uutiset/suomi_havittelee_arktista_lottovoittoa/3310462)> (accessed February 20, 2014).

26. Office of the President of the Republic of Finland, press release. *State visit to Norway to bolster Arctic cooperation*. September 10, 2012.  
<<http://www.tpk.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=259601&nodeid=44807&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>> (accessed March 17, 2014).
27. Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. October 11, 2012.  
<<http://www.tpk.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=259704&nodeid=44807&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>> (accessed March 24, 2014).
28. Yleisradio. *EU:n katse kääntyy pohjoiseen*. January 31, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/eun\\_katse\\_kaantyy\\_pohjoiseen/6474718](http://yle.fi/uutiset/eun_katse_kaantyy_pohjoiseen/6474718)> (accessed February 5, 2014).
29. Yleisradio. *Tutkija: Arktinen neuvosto luonut vakauden*. May 14, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/tutkija\\_arktinen\\_neuvosto\\_luonut\\_vakauden/6641493](http://yle.fi/uutiset/tutkija_arktinen_neuvosto_luonut_vakauden/6641493)> (accessed February 16, 2014).
30. Yleisradio. *Tutkija: Arktinen neuvosto vahvistui*. May 15, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/tutkija\\_arktinen\\_neuvosto\\_vahvistui/6643516](http://yle.fi/uutiset/tutkija_arktinen_neuvosto_vahvistui/6643516)> (accessed February 16, 2014).
31. Helsingin Sanomat. *Hylkeennahkakielto oli estää EU:n pääsyn Arktisen neuvoston tarkkailijaksi*. May 15, 2013.  
<<http://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/a1368618277260>> (accessed February 16, 2014).
32. Yleisradio. *Barentsin alueen pääministerien kokous Norjassa alkaa*. June 3, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/barentsin\\_alueen\\_paaministerien\\_kokous\\_norjassa\\_alkaa/6670544](http://yle.fi/uutiset/barentsin_alueen_paaministerien_kokous_norjassa_alkaa/6670544)> (accessed March 17, 2014).

33. Yleisradio. *Medvedev: Barentsin alue viisumivapaaksi*. June 4, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/medvedev\\_barentsin\\_alue\\_viisumivapaaksi/6672304](http://yle.fi/uutiset/medvedev_barentsin_alue_viisumivapaaksi/6672304)> (accessed March 17, 2014).
34. Yle Lappi. *Suomi ei innostu viisumivapaasta Barentsista*. June 5, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/suomi\\_ei\\_innostu\\_viisumivapaasta\\_barentsista/6673466?ref=leiki-uu](http://yle.fi/uutiset/suomi_ei_innostu_viisumivapaasta_barentsista/6673466?ref=leiki-uu)> (accessed March 18, 2014).
35. Kaleva. *Harvat päät yhteen pohjoisilla alueilla*. May 26, 2013.  
<<http://www.kaleva.fi/mielipide/paakirjoitukset/harvat-paat-yhteen-pohjoisilla-alueilla/631259/>> (accessed March 16, 2014).
36. Vihreät, press release. *Niinistö ja Hassi: Arktisen alueen käyttö tarvitsee pelisäännöt*. June 14, 2013.  
<<http://www.vihreat.fi/tiedotteet/niinisto-ja-hassi-arktisen-alueen-kaytto-tarvitsee-pelisaannot>> (accessed March 17, 2014).
37. Niinistö, Ville (2013), ”Suomi sitoutuu vaalimaan herkkää Arktista aluetta”, *Villeniinisto.fi* (blog). August 23, 2013.  
<<http://www.vihreat.fi/blogit/ville-niinisto/suomi-sitoutuu-vaalimaan-herkkaa-arktista-alueetta>> (accessed March 30, 2014).
38. Pokka, Hannele (2013), ”Arktisesta strategiasta”, *Pokan mietteet* (blog), August 26, 2013. <<http://pokanmietteet.blogspot.dk/2013/08/arktisesta-strategiasta.html>> (accessed March 30, 2014).
39. Tuomioja, Erkki (2013), ”Arktisen kutsu”, *Tuomioja.org* (blog). August 26, 2013.  
<<http://www.tuomioja.org/index.php?mainAction=showPage&id=1919>> (accessed March 21, 2014).

40. Stubb, Alexander (2013), “Arktinen strategia”, *Alex Stubb* (blog). August 27, 2013.  
<<http://www.alexstubb.com/fi/blog/2023/#.Uw3Vy0JdUaN>> (accessed March 30, 2014).
41. Yleisradio. *Eduskunta rynnimässä innolla Jäämerelle*. October 2, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/eduskunta\\_rynnimassa\\_innolla\\_jaamerelle/6862125](http://yle.fi/uutiset/eduskunta_rynnimassa_innolla_jaamerelle/6862125)> (accessed December 17, 2013).
42. Yleisradio. ”*Jäitä hattuun Jäämeren radan rakentamisessa*”. October 7, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/jaita\\_hattuun\\_jaameren\\_radan\\_rakentamisessa/6868767](http://yle.fi/uutiset/jaita_hattuun_jaameren_radan_rakentamisessa/6868767)>  
(accessed December 10, 2013).
43. Yleisradio. *Katainen: Jäämeren rata suuri mahdollisuus*. December 3, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/katainen\\_jaameren\\_rata\\_suuri\\_mahdollisuus/6967154](http://yle.fi/uutiset/katainen_jaameren_rata_suuri_mahdollisuus/6967154)> (accessed December 9, 2013).
44. Media coverage over Hautala vs. Arctia Shipping:
- a. Yleisradio. *Ministeri Heidi Hautala eroaa tehtävästään*. October 12, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/ministeri\\_heidi\\_hautala\\_eroaa\\_tehtavastaan/6877239?ref=leiki-uu](http://yle.fi/uutiset/ministeri_heidi_hautala_eroaa_tehtavastaan/6877239?ref=leiki-uu)> (accessed November 18, 2013).
- b. Yleisradio. *MPs accuse Hautala of double standards*. October 9, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/mps\\_accuse\\_hautala\\_of\\_double\\_standards/6873177](http://yle.fi/uutiset/mps_accuse_hautala_of_double_standards/6873177)> (accessed November 11, 2013).
- c. Yle News. *Minister suspected of behind-the-scenes intervention for Greenpeace*. October 9, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/minister\\_suspected\\_of\\_behind-the-scenes\\_intervention\\_for\\_greenpeace/687238](http://yle.fi/uutiset/minister_suspected_of_behind-the-scenes_intervention_for_greenpeace/687238)> (accessed November 11, 2013).
45. Yleisradio. *Hautala: Ympäristö ja talous vastakkain jäänmurtajabisneksessä*. October 12, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/hautala\\_ymparisto\\_ja\\_talous\\_vastakkain\\_jaanmurtajabisneksessa/6878797](http://yle.fi/uutiset/hautala_ymparisto_ja_talous_vastakkain_jaanmurtajabisneksessa/6878797)> (accessed November 18, 2013).

46. Helsingin Sanomat. *Hautalan ero synnytti kädenväännön arktisesta jäänmurrosta*. October 12, 2013.  
<<http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/Hautalan+ero+synnytti+k%C3%A4denv%C3%A4%C3%A4nn%C3%B6n+arktisesta+j%C3%A4%C3%A4nmurrosta/a1381544211233>>  
(accessed November 18, 2013).
47. Yleisradio. *Katainen: Hallituksessa ei vakavaa ristiriitaa jäänmurrosta*. October 12, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/katainen\\_hallituksessa\\_ei\\_vakavaa\\_ristiriitaa\\_jaanmurrosta/6878848](http://yle.fi/uutiset/katainen_hallituksessa_ei_vakavaa_ristiriitaa_jaanmurrosta/6878848)> (accessed November 18, 2013).
48. Laitala, Markku (2013), ”Maersk-pomo: Koillisväylä hyödynnettävissä laivarahtiliikenteessä vasta 15-20 vuoden kuluttua”, *Tekniikka & Talous*. October 7, 2013.  
<<http://www.tekniikkatalous.fi/talous/maerskpomo+koillisvayla+hyodynnettavissa+lai+varahtiliikenteessa+vasta+1520+vuoden+kuluttua/a936222>> (accessed November 11, 2013).
49. Yleisradio. *Näillä alueilla öljy-yhtiöt tarvitsevat jäänmurtajia etsinnöissään*. October 18, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/nailla\\_alueilla\\_oljy-yhtiöt\\_tarvitsevat\\_jaanmurtajia\\_etsinnoissaan/6885793](http://yle.fi/uutiset/nailla_alueilla_oljy-yhtiöt_tarvitsevat_jaanmurtajia_etsinnoissaan/6885793)> (accessed November 23, 2013).
50. Kaleva. *Kylmä Arktis herättää kuumia tunteita*. October 21, 2013.  
<<http://www.kaleva.fi/uutiset/ulkomaat/kylma-arktis-herattaa-kuumia-tunteita/645526/#comments>> (accessed November 23, 2013).

51. Yleisradio. *Ihalainen: Suomi jäljessä arktisella alueella*. October 19, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/ihalainen\\_suomi\\_jaljessa\\_arktisella\\_alueella/6890657?ref=leikki-uu](http://yle.fi/uutiset/ihalainen_suomi_jaljessa_arktisella_alueella/6890657?ref=leikki-uu)> (accessed November 23, 2013).
52. Helsingin Sanomat. *Heinäluoma: Suomi tarvitsee arktisen yhteistyön ministerin*. November 9, 2013.  
<<http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/a1383963444288>> (accessed November 14, 2013).
53. Mtv. *Norjalaiset: Suomalaiset pian myöhässä Barentsin alueelta*. September 15, 2013.  
<<http://www.mtv.fi/uutiset/ulkomaat/artikkeli/norjalaiset--suomalaiset-pian-myohassa-barentsin-alueelta-/2339166>> (accessed November 23, 2013).
54. Mtv. *Kommentti: Poliittinen voima puuttuu*. September 15, 2013.  
<<http://www.mtv.fi/uutiset/ulkomaat/artikkeli/kommentti--poliittinen-voima-puuttuu/2340360>> (accessed November 14, 2013).
55. Stubb, Alexander (2013), “Huikea Hammerfest”, *Alex Stubb* (blog). September 19, 2013.  
<[http://www.alexstubb.com/?page\\_id=59](http://www.alexstubb.com/?page_id=59)> (accessed January 23, 2014).
56. Yleisradio. *Greenpeace: Onko ministeri Vapaavuori lukenut koko arktista strategiaa?* October 12, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/greenpeace\\_onko\\_ministeri\\_vapaavuori\\_lukenuk\\_koko\\_arktista\\_strategiaa/6878985](http://yle.fi/uutiset/greenpeace_onko_ministeri_vapaavuori_lukenuk_koko_arktista_strategiaa/6878985)> (accessed November 2, 2013).
57. Yleisradio. *Arktisella alueella symbolinen arvo ympäristöjärjestöille*. October 1, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktisella\\_alueella\\_symbolinen\\_arvo\\_ymparistojarjestoille/6857972](http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktisella_alueella_symbolinen_arvo_ymparistojarjestoille/6857972)> (accessed November 21, 2013).



58. Yleisradio. *Arktinen öljynetsintä valtava riski - "Talvivaara potenssiin kymmenen, jos jokin menee pieleen"*. October 22, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktinen\\_oljynetsinta\\_valtava\\_riski\\_-\\_talvivaara\\_potenssiin\\_kymmenen\\_jos\\_jokin\\_menee\\_pieleen/6893988](http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktinen_oljynetsinta_valtava_riski_-_talvivaara_potenssiin_kymmenen_jos_jokin_menee_pieleen/6893988)> (accessed November 3, 2013).
59. Yleisradio. *YK-paneeli: Ilmasto voi lämmetä lähes 5 astetta vuosisadassa*. September 27, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/yk-paneeli\\_ilmasto\\_voi\\_lammeta\\_lahes\\_5\\_astetta\\_vuosisadassa/6853090](http://yle.fi/uutiset/yk-paneeli_ilmasto_voi_lammeta_lahes_5_astetta_vuosisadassa/6853090)> (accessed November 11, 2013).
60. Yleisradio. *Tutkimusprofessori: Ilmasto voi lämmetä jopa yli 5 astetta*. September 18, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/tutkimusprofessori\\_ilmasto\\_voi\\_lammeta\\_jopa\\_yli\\_5\\_astetta/6854756](http://yle.fi/uutiset/tutkimusprofessori_ilmasto_voi_lammeta_jopa_yli_5_astetta/6854756)> (accessed November 20, 2013).
61. Yleisradio. *Arktinen luonnonkalenteri on pois raiteiltaan*. November 15, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktinen\\_luonnonkalenteri\\_on\\_pois\\_raiteiltaan/6933927](http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktinen_luonnonkalenteri_on_pois_raiteiltaan/6933927)> (accessed January 20, 2014).
62. Yleisradio. *Sään muutokset askarruttavat Ilmatieteen laitoksen johtajaa*. December 13, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/saan\\_muutokset\\_askarruttavat\\_ilmatieteen\\_laitoksen\\_johtajaa/6984921](http://yle.fi/uutiset/saan_muutokset_askarruttavat_ilmatieteen_laitoksen_johtajaa/6984921)> (accessed December 15, 2013).
63. Kaleva. *Naapureiden ympäristöministerit eivät tulleet Inariin – Niinistö ainoana paikalla*. March 4, 2013.  
<<http://www.kaleva.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/naapureiden-ymparistoministerit-eivat-tulleet-inariin-niinisto-ainoana-paikalla/650004/>> (accessed March 20, 2014).

64. MTV. *Vaihteeksi hyvä uutinen ilmastosta - arktinen jäämassa kasvanut*. December 16, 2013.  
<<http://www.mtv.fi/uutiset/ulkomaat/artikkeli/vaihteeksi-hyva-uutinen-ilmastosta---arktinen-jaamassa-kasvanut/2448614>> (accessed December 17, 2013).
65. Yleisradio. *Arktisen jään sulaminen muuttaa meriluontoa rajusti*. February 15, 2013.  
<[http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktisen\\_jaan\\_sulaminen\\_muuttaa\\_meriluontoa\\_rajusti/6498138](http://yle.fi/uutiset/arktisen_jaan_sulaminen_muuttaa_meriluontoa_rajusti/6498138)> (accessed March 12, 2014).

## 10. Bibliography

- Ó Tuathail, Gearóid Ó, and John Agnew . "Geopolitics and discourse Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy." *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (1992): 190-204.
- Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. "(Dis)placing geopolitics: writing on the maps of global politics." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 1994: 525-546.
- . *Critical Geopolitics*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. "Critical Reading/Writing of Geopolitics: Re-Reading/Writing Wittfogel, Bowman and Lacoste." *Progress in Human Geography* 18, no. 3 (1994): 313-332.
- Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. "Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22, no. 2-3 (1999): 107-125.
- Ó Tuathail, Gearóid, and John Agnew . "Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy." *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (1992): 190-204.
- Ó Tuathail, Gearóid, and Simon Dalby. *Rethinking geopolitics*. Routledge, 1998.
- Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. "Postmodern Geopolitics? The modern geopolitical imagination and beyond." In *Rethinking geopolitics*, by Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby. 1998.
- Aalto, Pami. "Europe's North: Historical Geopolitics and International Institutional Dynamics." *European Politics and European-Russian Relations, University of Tampere* . Tampere, Autumn 2011.

- Aaltonen, Mika, and Michael Loescher . *ARKTINEN MYRSKY. Globaalin Logistiikan Muutokset ja Suomen Nousu Maailmannäyttämölle*. Research report, Helsinki: Cataloging-in-Publication, 2013.
- Arctia Shipping. *Uusi luku suomalaisten jäänmurtajien tarinaan Monitoimimurtajat Fennica ja Nordica kesäkausiksi Alaskan öljykentille*. Helsinki, February 11, 2011.
- Arctic Finland. *Arktinen keskustelu Suomessa*. March 1, 2014.  
<http://www.arcticfinland.fi/FI/keskustelu> (accessed March 1, 2014).
- Arctic Strategy. 2010.
- Arctic Strategy. 2013.
- Arctic Studies Center. *Frequently Asked Questions*. Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History. 2004. [http://www.mnh.si.edu/arctic/html/resources\\_faq.html](http://www.mnh.si.edu/arctic/html/resources_faq.html) (accessed September 28, 2011).
- Arktinen neuvottelukunta. *Suomen arktinen strategia 2013*. Arctic Strategy, Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2013.
- Bennett, Andrew, and Alexander George. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, 2005.
- Bennett, Andrew. "Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages," In *Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods* , by Detlef F Sprintz and Yael Wolinsky, 27-65. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan University Press, 2002.
- Bennett, Andrew, and Alexander George. "Process Tracing in Case Study Research." *MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods* .  
<http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teaching/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm>, 1997. 10.
- Borgerson, Scott G. "Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming." *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 2 (March/April 2008): 63-77.
- . "The Great Game Moves North - As the Arctic Melts, Countries Vie for Control ." *Foreign Affairs*. March 29, 2009. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64905/scott-g-borgerson/the-great-game-moves-north?page=2> (accessed March 28, 2012).
- Brosnan, IG, TM Leschine, and EL Miles. "Cooperation or Conflict in a Changing Arctic?" *Ocean Development & International Law*, no. 42 (2011): 173-210.

- Burns, Thomas J. "Review: Environment, Scarcity, and Violence." *Human Ecology Review* 7, no. 1 (2000): 76-77.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. "It's the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics." *Working Paper No. 26*,. University of Oslo. ARENA Center for European Studies, 2005.
- Claes, Dag Harald, Øyvind Østerud, and Øistein Harsem. "The New Geopolitics of the High North." *International Studies Association's annual conference*. 2010.
- Collier. 2011.
- Dalby, Simon. *Creating Second World War. Discourse of Politics*. London: Pinter, 1990.
- Devine, Fiona. "Qualitative Methods." In *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, by David Marsh and Garry Stoker, 197-216. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002.
- Devine, Fiona. "Qualitative Methods." In *Theory and Method in Political Science*, by David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 197-215. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- Ebinger, Charles K., and Evie Zambetakis. "The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt." *International Affairs* 85, no. 6 (2009): 1215-1232.
- European Commission. *Press release: Catherine Ashton to visit northern Finland, Sweden and Norway to highlight importance of an enhanced EU policy towards the Arctic*. March 5, 2012. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-12-212\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-212_en.htm) (accessed January 15, 2014).
- Fairclough, Norman. *Miten media puhuu*. Tampere : Vastapaino, 1997.
- Finnish Government, Valtioneuvosto. "Arctic policies discussed at government evening session/Press release." <http://valtioneuvosto.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedote/fi.jsp?oid=367006>. October 10, 2012. (accessed March 2013).
- G. Falletti, Tulia, and Julia F. Lynch. "Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* (2009 Sage Publications), 2009.
- Geopolitics in the High North. *Arctic strategy documents*. January 15, 2014. [http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=84](http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84) (accessed March 5, 2014).

- Government of Finland. *Programme of Prime Minister Katainen's Government*.  
 Programme of the Government, Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2011, 28-29.
- Graff, James. "Fight for the Top of the World." *Time Magazine* 170, no. 13 (October 2007).
- Grant, Shelagh D. *Polar Imperative - A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America*. Vancouver, BC: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010.
- Greenpeace International. 2013.  
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/go-finland-first-arctic-nation-to-call-for-a-/blog/46483/>.
- . *LIVE - Latest Updates from the Arctic Sunrise activists*. December 29, 2013.  
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/From-peaceful-action-to-dramatic-seizure-a-timeline-of-events-since-the-Arctic-Sunrise-took-action-September-18-CET/> (accessed January 5, 2014).
- Häkli, J. "Discourse in the production of political space: decolonizing the symbolism of provinces in Finland." *International Sociology* 14 (1998): 321–336.
- Hajer, Maarten. *Authoritative Governance: Policy Making in the Age on Mediatization*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Hall, Ian. "What Causes What: The Ontologies of Critical Realism." *International Studies Review* 11, no. 3 (2009): 629-630.
- Halliday. 1994, 38.
- Harle, Vilho. "Onko kriittinen geopolitiikka kriitiistä tiedettä?" In *Muuttuva geopolitiikka*, by Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2003.
- Harle, Vilho, and Sami Moisio. *Muuttuva geopolitiikka*. Helsinki: Gaudemus, 2003.
- Heikkilä, Markku. "Arktisuus juuttui vaaleihin, kuten kaikki muukin." *Analys Norden*. 2011. <http://www.norden.org/fi/analys-norden/teemat/taistelu-arktuksesta/arktisuus-juuttui-vaaleihin-kuten-kaikki-muukin> (accessed November 10, 2013).
- Heininen, Lassi, and Lotta Numminen. SUOMI ARKTISENA MAANA JA EUROOPAN UNIONIN JÄSENVALTIONA: MITEN ARKTISTA NEUVOSTOA VAHVISTETAAN." In *Jäitä Poltellessa*. 2011.

- Heininen, Lassi. *Arctic Strategies and Policies: Inventory and Comparative Study*. Research paper, Rovaniemi: The Northern Research Forum & The University of Lapland, 2012, 97.
- Heininen, Lassi. "Arktisen alueen muuttuva geopolitiikka ja valtioiden arktiset/pohjoiset strategiat ja politiikat." In *Jäitä Poltellessa*. 2011.
- Hong, Nong. "Journal of Energy Security." *Arctic Energy: Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High North*. May 11, 2011.  
[http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-to-conflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375](http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-to-conflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375). (accessed March 2013).
- Huebert, Rob. *Canada & the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security & Stewardship*. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,, 2011.
- . "Welcome to a new era of Arctic Security." *Globe and Mail*, August 24, 2010.
- Ilullisat . 2008.
- Ilulissat Declaration. 2008.
- Ingimundarson, Valur. *The Geopolitics of Arctic Natural Resources*. Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament, Belgium: European Parliament, 2010.
- Jacobsen, Marc. *The Development of the Arctic Security Discourse*. MA dissertation, London: University of Westminster, 2013.
- Jukarainen, Pirjo. "Feministinen geopolitiikan tutkimus." In *Muuttuva geopolitiikka*, by Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2003.
- Katainen, Jyrki. *Pääministerin ilmoitus 92/2013*. June 11, 2013.  
<http://puheenvuorot.kansanmuisti.fi/istunnot/92-2013/17694-paaministerin-ilmoitus-arktisesta-strategiasta> (accessed March 3, 2014).
- Keskitalo, Carina. "International Region-Building: Development of the Arctic as an International Region." *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 2 (2007): 187-205.
- Kiruna Declaration . Kiruna: Arctic Council, 2013.
- Koivumaa, Jari. "Pohjois-Suomen raja-alueet kylmän sodan jälkeen-Kuinka tarttua rajojen luonteen muutoksen avaamiin mahdollisuuksiin?" In *Jäitä Poltellessa. Suomi ja arktisen alueen tulevaisuus*, by Lassi Heininen and Teemu Palosaari, 107-116. Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2011.

- Koivurova, Timo. "Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty – Evaluation and a New Proposal." *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law* (Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,) 17, no. 1 (2008): 14-26.
- Kurki, Milja. "Causes of a divided discipline: rethinking the concept of cause in International Relations theory." *Review of International Studies* 32 (2006): 189–216.
- Kuus, Merje. "Isacompss.com." University of British Columbia. 2009.  
[http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/criticalgeopolitics\\_sample.pdf](http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/criticalgeopolitics_sample.pdf).
- . *The International Studies Encyclopedia 2 "Critical geopolitics"*. 2010.
- Kuusisto, Riikka. *Western Definitions of War in the Gulf and in Bosnia The Rhetorical Frameworks of the United States, British and French Leaders in Action*. Saarijärvi: Suomen Tiedeseura, Gummerus Oy, 1999.
- Laine, Markus, Jarkko Bamberg, and Pekka Jokinen. "Tapaustutkimuksen käytäntö ja teoria." In *Tapaustutkimuksen taito*, by Markus Laine, Jarkko Bamberg and Pekka Jokinen. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2007.
- Leino, Helena. "Yleinen ongelma, yksi tapaus." In *Tapaustutkimuksen taito*, by Markus Laine, Jarkko Bamberg and Pekka Jokinen, 214-227. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2007.
- Mikkola, Harri. *Politiikan paluu Arktikselle*. October 24, 2014.  
[http://www.fiia.fi/fi/blog/434/politiikan\\_paluu\\_arktikselle/](http://www.fiia.fi/fi/blog/434/politiikan_paluu_arktikselle/) (accessed May 5, 2014).
- Mikkola, Harri. *The Return of Realpolitik? The deepening crisis in Ukraine may spill over to the Arctic*. FIIA Comment 6/2014, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2014.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. "Töissä UM:ssä: Hannu, arktinen suurlähettiläs." <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=220224&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI>. May 11, 2011. (accessed March 2013).
- . *The Northern Dimension*. 3 20, 2014.  
<http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=15579&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> (accessed 3 23, 2014).
- Moisio, Sami , Jason Dittmer, and Klaus Dodds. "Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics." *Political Geography* 30, no. 4 (2011): 202-214.

- Moisio, Sami. "Geopolitiikan viisi olemusta." In *Muuttuva geopolitiikka*, by Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio, 28. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2003.
- Moisio, Sami. "Geopolitiikka kamppailuna." In *Muuttuva geopolitiikka*, by Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2003.
- National Snow and Ice Data Center. *Climate Change in the Arctic*. September 15, 2012. [http://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/climate\\_change.html](http://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/climate_change.html) (accessed November 2, 2014).
- Nilsson, Annika E, Gunhild Hoogensen, and Heather Nicol. "Transforming theoretical tensions into new analytical tools: Lessons from the Arctic." *SGIR 7<sup>th</sup> Pan-European International Relations Conference*. Stockholm, 2010.
- Nuuk Declaration. "Arctic Council." *Nuuk Declaration*. May 12, 2011. <http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/5-declarations> (accessed March 26, 2012).
- Oye, Kenneth A. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics* (Cambridge University Press) 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 1-24.
- Palosaari, Teemu. "The Amazing Race. On resources, conflict and cooperation in the Arctic." *ECPR General Conference*. Reykjavik, 2011.
- Pelaudeix, Cécile. *Arctic Council Kiruna Ministerial Meeting: Strengthened role of the Arctic Council in a globalized Arctic – China in, the EU on hold*. May xx, 2013. <http://eu-arctic-forum.org/publications/arctic-council-kiruna-ministerial-meeting-strengthened-role-of-the-arctic-council-in-a-globalized-arctic-china-in-the-eu-on-hold/> (accessed February 5, 2014).
- . *Arctic Council Kiruna Ministerial Meeting: Strengthened role of the Arctic Council in a globalized Arctic – China in, the EU on hold*. May 20, 2013. <http://eu-arctic-forum.org/publications/arctic-council-kiruna-ministerial-meeting-strengthened-role-of-the-arctic-council-in-a-globalized-arctic-china-in-the-eu-on-hold/> (accessed February 3, 2014).
- Popke. 1994.
- Prime Minister's Office. *Finland to lead the way in sustainable development in the Arctic region*. August 23, 2013. <http://vnk.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/tiedote/fi.jsp?oid=392379> (accessed April 5, 2014).



- Rosamond, Annika Bergman. "Perspectives on Security in the Arctic Area." DIIS Report 2011:09, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2009.
- Sørensen, Anne Toft. "From International Governance to Region Building in the Arctic?" *New Global Studies* 7, no. 2 (2013): 1-27.
- Sale, R, and E Potapov. *The Scramble for the Arctic: Ownership, Exploration and Conflict in the Far North*. London: Frances Lincoln, 2010.
- Suter, Keith. "Arctic Politics are Getting Warmer: A New Scramble for Territory?" *Contemporary Review*, 2010: 187-195.
- The Arctic Strategy of Finland. *Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 23.8.2013: Suomen arktinen strategia 2013*. Arctic Strategy, Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office/Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2013.
- The Finnish Institute of International Affairs . *Latest Publications*. April 11, 2014. <http://www.fia.fi/fi/publications/> (accessed April 11, 2014).
- Tienhaara, K. "A Tale of Two Crises: What the Global Financial Crisis Means for the Global Environmental Crisis." *Environmental Policy and Governance* 20 (2010): 197-208.
- U.S. Geological Survey. "Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle." U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, DC, 2008.
- United Nations Environmental Programme. *UNEP Year Book 2013: Emerging issues in our global environment*. Annual report, Nairobi: UNEP, 2013.
- Valtioneuvosta, Government of Finland. "Arktinen strategia 2013." 2013.
- Vaus, David de. *Research Design in Social Research*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2001.
- Yleisradio Oy. *This is Yle*. April 5, 2014. <http://yle.fi/yleisradio/about-yle/this-is-yle> (accessed April 5, 2014).
- Young, Oran. "Institutional dynamics: Emergent patterns in international environmental governance." *The Review of International Organizations*, 2010: 339-341

